10.11.2004Yan Pu1 Theory of Price Regulation Agenda 1 Introduction –1.1 Objective of regulation –1.2 Rate balancing 2 Different approaches of pricing regulation.

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Presentation transcript:

Yan Pu1 Theory of Price Regulation Agenda 1 Introduction –1.1 Objective of regulation –1.2 Rate balancing 2 Different approaches of pricing regulation 3 Price-cap regulation –3.1 The formula and factors –3.2 Miscellaneous issues in price-cap regulation 4 Price regulation in interconnection 5 Price regulation in Hong Kong 6 Conclusion

Yan Pu2 Introduction 1/3 Price regulation objectives Financing objectives: to make operators get sufficient revenue to be viable Efficiency objectives: to reflect resource scarcity properly and to maximize the productivity Equity objectives: to distribute the welfare benefits between operators and consumers, and also among different consumer groups fairly. Other objectives can be to restrict the anti-competitive pricing

Yan Pu3 Introduction 2/3 Rate balancing Price should be closely aligned to its cost Unbalanced price structure is not sustainable in the competitive environment but occurs regularly in unregulated monopoly Ramsey pricing is widely used to recover the fixed and common costs Ramsey pricing: price is raised above marginal cost more for a lower demand elasticity (sensitivity) service and less for a higher demand elasticity service.

Yan Pu4 Introduction 3/3 Peak/off-peak pricing: Prices are set at a higher level in peak time to discourage use of facilities and transfer demand to off-peak periods. Advantages –Capacity utilization maximized –Traffic congestion reduced –Quality of service improved, –Purchase of additional equipment avoided.

Yan Pu5 Different approaches 1/3 Oligopoly era: a partly competitive and partly regulated market with a small number of operators Discretionary price –government operates the network to promote consumer-to-consumer equity objectives –Below-cost local connection price and over-cost long distance or international connection price. –Unbalanced and inefficient price structure –Because of some political reason, price is raised to meet the require revenue, part of the revenue deprived … all these threaten the viability of operators.

Yan Pu6 Different approaches 2/3 Rate-of-return regulation Aims to limit monopoly profit to a reasonable level Adjust the price to cover the calculated revenue requirement. This violates the efficiency objectives for there is no incentive for operators to reduce their costs. It will lead to over-investment, various "cost-padding" What a reasonable price is?

Yan Pu7 Different Approaches 3/3 Price-cap regulation Restrict the price rather than the profit. Encourages cost reduction and innovation. A price 'floor' is also important to prevent below cost pricing which is used to exclude lower-cost new entrants.

Yan Pu8 Price-cap regulation 1/5 Basic formula: Pt = P0 * (1 + I - X) ^t Pt = P0 * (1 + I - X) ^t P0 = baseline price-cap Pt = price-cap during year t after the institution of price-level regulation I = rate of inflation

Yan Pu9 Price-cap regulation 2/5 I factor Price can be indexed to the overall level of input costs. Regulators can focus on the whole industry instead of a specific operator in rate-of-return regulation. Thus encourage operator to achieve cost reduction and innovation. No industry-specific index, use broader reasonable inflation indices –CPI (Consumer Price Index): UK, Australia –PPI (Producer Price Index) with its sub indices. Any price index has limitations with time fluctuations so adjustment mechanism is needed

Yan Pu10 Price-cap regulation 3/5 X' factor X should pose a significant, but not insuperable challenge to the operator. Two main approaches to determine the X factor Historical productivity method: –carry out TFP (Total Factor Productivity) as basic offset. –X value should be equal to the difference between the productivity of the operator and the economy as a whole to make sure that every industry else being equal to avoid loss of investment in telecommunication. Regulatory benchmarking method: –In some emerging market or the regulation is changing from discretionary price –Adjustments are more important than basic offset

Yan Pu11 Price-cap regulation 4/5 Time period The productivity achieved should not be passed on to the consumer at once to cause possible dilution of incentives. A proper period should be between 3 to 5 years –FCC adopted a 4-year price-cap period with AT&T –Oftel with BT for 4 years also except the initial price-cap for 5 years.

Yan Pu12 Price-cap regulation 5/5 Miscellaneous issues in price-cap regulation Service Baskets –The API (Actual Price Index): price increase of individual services times their weight determined by their revenues. –API should be equal or less than PCI (Price-cap Index). –Sub-cap index for one specific service Profit Sharing (PS) Mechanism, a complementary choice –Regulator imposes a sharing rule if one operator is making excessively high profits. –If the operator does not agree to it, regulator revokes the contract. –To operators, the threat of revocation is very costly because of the capital intensive investment during contract period. The price-cap regulation should not be applied to the launch of innovative services –There is no fierce effective competition in market. –There is need for operators to exploit new markets and customers. –Profit can be seen as a reward for innovation and introduction of new services. –Profit can be seen a signal for new comer and trigger competition.

Yan Pu13 Price regulation in interconnection 1/ 3 LRIC (Long Run Incremental Cost): the most favored costing method Costing method: historical data or forward-looking approach –Historical data approach: price their service merely based on historical investment. –The forward-looking approach: operators are supposed to respond competition by price adjustment more actively –Forward-looking approach is preferred LRIC: the most widely accepted forward-looking costing approach –Used widely in retail and wholesale market –Estimated on the basis of current technology and best available performance standards. –The European Commission has adopted LRAIC (Long Run Average Incremental Cost) as its preferred costing methodology.

Yan Pu14 Price regulation in interconnection 2/3 The use of price-cap regulation in wholesale market The operator raises its interconnection charges and lowers the retail prices to squeeze the profit margin to exclude competitors or new comers. In CPP regime, the charge is relatively high when a fixed operator pays the corresponding mobile operator for a fixed-to-mobile call. –Oftel modified the mobile operators' licenses in April 2003 to require the first 15 per cent reduction by July –Further cuts of 15 per cent in each year for the next three years

Yan Pu15 Price regulation in interconnection 3/3 Other regulation principles Unbundled charges: no service provider shall be charged for any interconnection facility it does not seek or require Universal service and ADC (Access Deficit Contributions) charges: the interconnection charges should be separated where the cost of a particular component vary significant in different locations

Yan Pu16 Price regulation in Hong Kong In 1975, Scheme of Control (SoC) (Rate-of-return regulation) was established. After 1991, the government and HKTC mutually agreed to move to price-cap regulation In 1993, the Telephone Regulation set out the initial 3-year-long an overall price- cap and two sub-caps. Since 2003, all telecommunication sectors in Hong Kong fully liberalized. At present, almost all retail prices are without regulatory influence. Only PCCW HKT (former HKTC)'s price for local fixed network service are subject to regulation since it is designated a dominant operator. Even in a competitive market, the regulator must maintain vigilance –In early 2000, all mobile operators announced an increase in the monthly charge at almost the same time. –The price rise was withdrawn after OFTA declared that it would conduct an investigation to see whether any collusion was involved. IDD service was not under price control for free competition –Some services costs has fallen by more than 98%. –The incumbent is no longer dominating so pricing regulation for IDD service is no longer necessary now.

Yan Pu17 Conclusion Price regulation should be set to meet its objectives. In principle, price is supposed to be aligned with its cost; in practice, Ramsey pricing can be adopted to recover the costs. The most favored costing method is LRIC Price-cap regulation is widely adopted both in retail and wholesale market. Price-cap regulation restrict the price rather than the profit. Thus, it encourages the operator to reduce cost and to innovate. When applying price-cap regulation formula, the inflation, X factor, and time period should be picked up carefully. Price control should not be use in launch of innovative service. Profit sharing mechanism can be used as a complementary option to favor customers. In wholesale market, principles have already been set up to address some typical issues e.g. unbundled charges, universal and ADC charges. The Hong Kong price regulation evolution is a vivid case to illustrate above discussions.

Yan Pu18 Thanks ! Time for questions and comments.