Network Economics -- Lecture 4: Auctions and applications Patrick Loiseau EURECOM Fall 2012.

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Network Economics -- Lecture 4: Auctions and applications Patrick Loiseau EURECOM Fall 2012

References V. Krishna, Auction Theory, Elseiver AP 2009 (second edition) – Chapters 2, 3, 5 P. Milgrom, Putting auction theory to work, CUP 2004 – Chapter 1 D. Easley and J. Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds and Markets, CUP 2010 – Chapters 9 and 15 Ben Polaks online course – Lecture 24

Outline 1.Generalities on auctions 2.Private value auctions 3.Common value auctions: the winners curse 4.Mechanism design 5.Generalized second price auction

Outline 1.Generalities on auctions 2.Private value auctions 3.Common value auctions: the winners curse 4.Mechanism design 5.Generalized second price auction

Where are auctions? Everywhere! – Ebay – Google search auctions – Spectrum auctions – Art auctions – Etc.

What is an auction? Seller sells one item of good through bidding – Set of buyers Buyer buys one item of good – Set of sellers – Called procurement auction (governments) Auctions are useful when the valuation of bidders is unknown More complex auctions – Multi-items – Combinatorial

Standard auction Standard auction: the bidder with the highest bid wins Example of nonstandard auction: lottery

The two extreme settings Common values Private values

Main types of auctions 1.Ascending open auction (English) 2.Descending open auction (Dutch) 3.First-price sealed bid auction 4.Second price sealed bid auction (Vickrey)

Relationships between the different types of auctions

Outline 1.Generalities on auctions 2.Private value auctions 3.Common value auctions: the winners curse 4.Mechanism design 5.Generalized second price auction

Private value auctions: Model One object for sale N buyers Valuation X i X i s i.i.d. distributed on [0, w], cdf F(.) Bidder i knows – Realization x i of his value – That other bidders have values distributed according to F Def: symmetric: all bidders have the same distribution of value

Game The game is determine by the auction rules – Game between the bidders Bidders strategy: β i : [0, w] [0, ) Look for symmetric equilibria – 1 st price auction – 2 nd price auction – Compare sellers revenue

Second-price sealed-bid auction Proposition: In a second-price sealed-bid auction, bidding its true value is weakly dominant

First-price sealed-bid auction Bidding truthfully is weakly dominated

First-price sealed-bid auction (2) What is the equilibrium strategy?

First-price sealed-bid auction (3) Proposition: Symmetric equilibrium strategies in a first-price sealed-bid auction are given by where Y 1 is the maximum of N-1 independent copies of X i

Example Values uniformly distributed on [0, 1]

Revenue comparison With independently and identically distributed private values, the expected revenue in a first- price and in a second-price auction are the same

Proof

Warning This is not true for each realization Example: 2 bidders, uniform values in [0, 1]

Revenue equivalence theorem Generalization of the previous result Theorem: Suppose that values are independently and identically distributed and all bidders are risk neutral. Then any symmetric and increasing equilibrium of any standard auction such that the expected payment of a bidder with value zero is zero yields the same expected revenue to the seller. See an even more general result in the (beautiful) paper R. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, Mathematics of Operation Research 1981 – 2007 Nobel Prize

Proof

Reserve price r>0, such that the seller does not sell at a lower price

Reserve price in second-price auction No bidder with value x<r can make a positive profit Bidding truthfully is still weakly dominant Winner pays r if the determined price is lower Expected payment

Reserve price in first-price auction No bidder with value x<r can make a positive profit Symmetric equilibrium: Expected payment:

Effect of reserve price on revenue Seller has valuation x 0 of the good Sets r>x 0 ! Optimal reserve price: Increases the sellers revenue – Sometimes called exclusion principle

Remark Efficiency: maximize social welfare – Good ends up in the end of the highest value among bidders and seller Efficient is NOT the same as revenue optimality Example – Seller with valuation zero

Outline 1.Generalities on auctions 2.Private value auctions 3.Common value auctions: the winners curse 4.Mechanism design 5.Generalized second price auction

The winners curse Good has value V, same for all bidders – Example: oil field Each bidder has an i.i.d. estimate x i =V+e i of the value (E(e i )=0) They all bid (e.g., first-price auction)

The winners curse (2) Suppose bidder 1 wins Upon winning, he finds out his estimate was too large! bad news: winners curse Bid as if you know you win! Remark: the winners curse does not arise at equilibrium, if your bid takes it into account.

Outline 1.Generalities on auctions 2.Private value auctions 3.Common value auctions: the winners curse 4.Mechanism design 5.Generalized second price auction

Mechanism design An auction is only one of many ways to sell a good Mechanism design studies the design of rules such that the resulting game yields a desired outcome The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences was awarded to Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, and Roger Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory"

Setting Buyers Values Set of values Distributions Product set Joint density

Mechanisms Set of messages (bids) Allocation rule Payment rule Example: 1 st or 2 nd price auction

Direct mechanism Definition Characterization: Pair (Q, M) Truthful equilibrium

Revelation principle Given a mechanism and an equilibrium for that mechanism, there exists a direct mechanism such that 1.It is an equilibrium for each buyer to report his value truthfully 2.The outcomes (probabilities Q and expected payment M) are the same as in the equilibrium of the original mechanism

Proof

Incentive compatibility (IC) A direct revelation mechanism is IC if it is optimal for a buyer to report his value truthfully when all other buyers report their value truthfully

Revenue equivalence If the direct mechanism (Q, M) is incentive compatible, then the expected payment is Thus, the expected payment in any two incentive compatible mechanisms with the same allocation rule are equivalent up to a constant Generalizes the previous version

Two questions How to design a revenue optimal mechanism? How to design an efficient mechanism? Restricting to – IC mechanisms – Individually rational mechanisms (i.e., such that the expected payoff of every buyer is nonnegative)

Optimal mechanism Define the virtual valuation Define Under some regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism is: allocate to the buyer with highest virtual valuation (if it is nonnegative), with expected payment y i (x -i )

Symmetric case We find the second price auction with reserve price

Efficient mechanism Social welfare maximized by Q * If there is no tie: allocation to the buyer with highest value Notation:

VCG mechanism: definition The VCG mechanism is (Q *, M V ), where Note: the Ws are computed with the efficient allocation rule

VCG mechanism: properties The VCG mechanism is – Incentive compatible – truthful reporting is weakly dominant – Individually rational – Efficient is equilibrium payoff is the different in social welfare induced by his truthful reporting instead of 0 Proposition: Among all mechanisms for allocating a single good that are efficient, IC and IR, the VCG mechanism maximizes the expected payment of each agent

Example In the context of auctions: VCG = 2 nd price auction!

Outline 1.Generalities on auctions 2.Private value auctions 3.Common value auctions: the winners curse 4.Mechanism design 5.Generalized second price auction

Sponsored search Ads in sponsored box Several spots: multiple items auction Pay per click for the advertiser

Generalized second price auction (GSP) How Google determines which ad is shown for a given keyword? Advertisers submit bids Google ranks ads by bid x expected nb of clicks – Ad quality factor Advertisers pay the price determined by the bid below (GSP)

GSP properties GSP is not truthful GSP is not VCG GSP may have several equilibria GSPs revenue may be higher or lower than VCGs revenue B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz, Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords, American Economic Review 2007 H. Varian, Position auctions, International Journal of Industrial Organization 2007