6.853: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Fall 2011 Constantinos Daskalakis Lecture 16.

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6.853: Topics in Algorithmic Game Theory Fall 2011 Constantinos Daskalakis Lecture 16

Recap

Exchange Market Model traders divisible goods trader i has: - endowment of goods non-negative reals amount of goods trader comes to the marketplace with consumption set for trader i specifies trader is utility for bundles of goods - utility function

Competitive (or Walrasian) Market Equilibrium total demand total supply Def: A price vector is called a competitive market equilibrium iff there exists a collection of optimal bundles of goods, for all traders i = 1,…, n, such that the total supply meets the total demand, i.e. [ For Fisher Markets: ]

Arrow-Debreu Theorem 1954 Theorem [Arrow-Debreu 1954]: Suppose Then a competitive market equilibrium exists. (i) is closed and convex (iii a) (iii b) (iii c) (ii) (all coordinates positive)

Gross-Substitutability Condition

Excess Demand at prices p We already argued that under the Arrow-Debreu Thm conditions: (H) f is homogeneous, i.e. (WL) f satisfies Walrass Law, i.e. (we argued that the last property is true using nonsatiation + quasi- concavity, see next slie) suppose there is a unique demand at a given price vector p and its is continuous (see last lecture)

Excess Demand at prices p We already argued that under the Arrow-Debreu Thm conditions: (H) f is homogeneous, i.e. (WL) f satisfies Walrass Law, i.e. suppose there is a unique demand at a given price vector p and its is continuous (see last lecture)

Gross-Substitutability (GS) Def: The excess demand function satisfies Gross Substitutability iff for all pairs of price vectors p and p: In other words, if the prices of some goods are increased while the prices of some other goods are held fixed, this can only cause an increase in the demand of the goods whose price stayed fixed.

Differential Form of Gross-Substitutability (GS D ) Def: The excess demand function satisfies the Differential Form of Gross Substitutability iff for all r, s the partial derivatives exist and are continuous, and for all p : Clearly: (GS D ) (GS)

Not all goods are free (Pos) Def: The excess demand function satisfies (Pos) if not all goods are free at equilibrium. I.e. there exists at least one good in which at least one trader is interested.

Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP) Theorem [Arrow-Block-Hurwicz 1959]: Proof on the board Suppose that the excess demand function of an exchange economy satisfies (H), (WL), and (GS). If >0 is any equilibrium price vector and >0 is any non-equilibrium vector we have

Computation of Equilibria Corollary 1 (of WARP): If the excess demand function satisfies (H), (WL), and (GS), it can be computed efficiently and is Lipschitz, then a positive equilibrium price vector (if it exists) can be computed efficiently. proof sketch: W. l. o. g. we can restrict our search space to price vectors in [0,1] k, since any equilibrium can be rescaled to lie in this set (by homogeneity of the excess demand function). We can then run ellipsoid, using the separation oracle provided by the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In particular, for any non-equilibrium price vector p, we know that the price equilibrium lies in the half-space

Tatonnement Corollary 2: If the excess demand function satisfies continuity, (H), (WL), (GS D ), and (Pos), then the tatonnement process (price-adjustment mechanism) described by the following differential equation converges to a market equilibrium To show convergence to a price equilibrium, let us pick an arbitrary price equilibrium vector on the equilibrium ray (Lemma 2) and consider the following potential function proof sketch: Because of continuity, the above system has a solution. Moreover, because of the initial condition, it can be shown (…) that the solution stays positive, for all t, and remains within the box B=[min p(0), max p(0)] k.

[Properties of Equilibrium Lemma 1 [Arrow-Block-Hurwicz 1959]: Suppose that the excess demand function of an exchange economy satisfies (H), (GS D ) and (Pos). Then if is an equilibrium price vector Call this property (E + ) Lemma 2 [Arrow-Block-Hurwicz 1959]: Suppose that the excess demand function of an exchange economy satisfies (H), (GS) and (E + ). Then if and are equilibrium price vectors, there exists such that i.e. we have uniqueness of the equilibrium ray]

Corollaries proof sketch (cont): We have Observe that if, for some t 0, p(t 0 ) is a price equilibrium vector, then (by lemma 1) On the other hand, as long as p(t) is not an equilibrium, WARP implies that implying that the L2 distance from is monotonically decreasing for all t.

Corollaries proof sketch (cont): On the other hand, as long as p(t) is not an equilibrium, WARP implies that implying that the L2 distance from is monotonically decreasing for all t. To show convergence to a price equilibrium vector, assume for a contradiction that the p(t) stays at distance from the equilibrium ray for all t. The continuity of and compactness of B can be used to show that in this case the absolute value of remains bounded away from 0. This leads to a contradiction since V(t) 0.