A Novel Electricity Transaction Mode of Microgrids based on Blockchain and Continuous Double Auction Source: Energies, vol. 10, no. 12, pp. 1-22, November 2017 Authors: Jian Wang, Qiang-Gang Wang, Nian-Cheng Zhou, and Yuan Chi Speaker: Chit-Jie Chew Date: 11/22/2018

Outline Introduction Related works Proposed scheme Performance analysis Conclusions

Introduction Consumer Power grid Distributed generation(DG) Consumer Markets Distributed generation(DG) Consumer

Related work(1/2)-Continuous double auction Opaque data Risk of tampering Untraceable Low-to-high High-to-low Market Price: 10200/unit Unit: 3 Price: 10500/unit Unit: 5 Tom Bob 14000/unit Price: 10500/unit Unit: 1 Price: 10000/unit Unit: 3 Alice Mike 14000/unit Price: 10800/unit Unit: 4 Price: 9900/unit Unit: 4 Jay Jarry

Related work(2/2)-Blockchain Miners Transparent Non-tampering Traceable Miner Transaction Bob Tom

Proposed scheme(1/9)-Architecture Markets 𝑀𝐼𝑁: 4500/unit 𝑣: 16000/unit Quotes Quotes DGs Information Information 𝑐: 5000/unit 𝑀𝐴𝑋: 16000/unit Consumers Digital certificate Digital certificate Transaction costs Blockchain Transaction costs Grid Power energy Buy price: 6000/unit Sell price: 18000/unit

Proposed scheme(2/9)-AA strategy Update Transaction price Market information 𝑝 𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑑 , 𝑝 𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑘 Markets Competitive equilibrium price estimation 𝜏 𝑝 𝑝 ′ Aggressiveness model Pricing strategy 𝑣,𝑐 𝑀𝑖𝑛,𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣,𝑐 𝑀𝑖𝑛,𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑟,𝜃 Price constraints 𝑝 ′ Adaptive learning

Proposed scheme(3/9)-AA strategy Aggressiveness model Intra-marginal 𝜏 𝑖𝑛,𝑏 = 𝑝 ′ −𝑀𝐼𝑁 1− 𝑒 −𝑟𝜃 −1 𝑒 𝜃 −1 +𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑟∈(−1,0) 𝑝 ′ + 𝑣− 𝑝 ′ 𝑒 𝑟𝜃 −1 𝑒 𝜃 −1 𝑟∈ 0,1 𝜏 𝑖𝑛,𝑠 = 𝑝 ′ + 𝑀𝐴𝑋− 𝑝 ′ 𝑒 −𝑟𝜃 −1 𝑒 𝜃 −1 𝑟∈ −1,0 𝑐+ 𝑝 ′ −𝑐 1− 𝑒 𝑟𝜃 −1 𝑒 𝜃 −1 𝑟∈ 0,1 Extra-marginal 𝜏 𝑒𝑥,𝑏 = 𝑣−𝑀𝐼𝑁 1− 𝑒 −𝑟𝜃 −1 𝑒 𝜃 −1 +𝑀𝐼𝑁 𝑟∈(−1,0) 𝑣 𝑟∈ 0,1 𝜏 𝑖𝑛,𝑠 = 𝑐+ 𝑀𝐴𝑋−𝑐 𝑒 −𝑟𝜃 −1 𝑒 𝜃 −1 𝑟∈ −1,0 𝑐 𝑟∈ 0,1

Proposed scheme(4/9)-AA strategy 𝑝 ′ = 𝑖=𝑚−𝑛 𝑛 𝑤 𝑖 𝑝 𝑖 𝑤 𝑖−1 =𝜌 𝑤 𝑖 𝑖=𝑚−𝑛 𝑛 𝑤 𝑖 =1 Competitive equilibrium price estimation 𝑝 ′ Aggressiveness model 𝑟 𝑡+1 =𝑟 𝑡 + 𝛽 1 𝛿 𝑡 −𝑟 𝑡 𝛿 𝑡 = 1+𝜆 𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑡 ,𝜆= −0.05, 0, 0.05 𝑟,𝜃 𝜃 𝑡+1 =𝜃 𝑡 + 𝛽 2 𝜃 ′ 𝛼 +𝜃 𝑡 𝛼= 1 𝑛 𝑖=𝑚−𝑛 𝑛 𝑝 𝑖 − 𝑝 ′ 2 𝑝 ′ 𝜃 ′ 𝛼 = 𝜃 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝜃 𝑚𝑖𝑛 1− 𝛼− 𝛼 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝛼 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝛼 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑒 2 𝛼− 𝛼 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝛼 𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝛼 𝑚𝑖𝑛 −1 + 𝜃 𝑚𝑖𝑛 Adaptive learning

Proposed scheme(5/9)-AA strategy 𝜏 Aggressiveness model Pricing strategy 𝑝 𝑏 𝑡 = 𝑝 𝑂𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 +𝜂 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑣, 𝑝 𝑂𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 − 𝑝 𝑂𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 , 𝑡=1 𝑝 𝑂𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 +𝜂 𝜏 𝑏 𝑡 − 𝑝 𝑂𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 , 𝑡≥2 𝑝 𝑠 𝑡 = 𝑝 𝑂𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 −𝜂 𝑝 𝑂𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 −𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑐, 𝑝 𝑂𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 , 𝑡=1 𝑝 𝑂𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 −𝜂 𝑝 𝑂𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 −𝜏 𝑠 𝑡 , 𝑡≥2 𝑐: 5000/unit 𝑀𝐴𝑋: 16000/unit 𝑝 𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 : 5000/unit 𝑐: 5000/unit 𝑀𝐴𝑋: 15000/unit 𝑝 𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑑 𝑡 : 9500/unit Tom Alice 𝑝 𝑏 𝑡 =9500+0.4 10500−9500 =9900 𝑝 𝑏 𝑡 =5000+0.5 16000−5000 =10500 𝑀𝐼𝑁: 4500/unit 𝑣: 16000/unit 𝑝 𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 : 16000/unit 𝑐: 5000/unit 𝑀𝐴𝑋: 15000/unit 𝑝 𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑡 : 11000/unit Bob Jarry 𝑝 𝑠 𝑡 =16000−0.5 16000−5000 =10500 𝑝 𝑠 𝑡 =11000−1 11000−9900 =9900

Economic loss/Satoshi Economic loss/Satoshi Proposed scheme(6/9)-AA strategy Markets Buy price: 6000/unit Sell price: 18000/unit 𝑝 Pricing strategy 𝐹 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑝 𝑏 ·𝑊,∆𝑊<0 𝑝 𝑏 ·𝑊+ 𝑝 𝑏_𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 ·∆𝑊,∆𝑊>0 𝐹 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑝 𝑏 · 𝑊+∆𝑊 Tom Price: 10,200/unit Unit: 4 Type ∆𝑾/Unit 𝒑 𝒃 /Satoshi unit-1 𝒇 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 /Satoshi 𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 /Satoshi Economic loss/Satoshi Consumer -1 10200 30,600 40,800 10,200 1 51,000 58,800 7800 𝐺 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑝 𝑠 ·𝑄+ 𝑝 𝑏_𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 ·∆𝑄,∆𝑄<0 𝑝 𝑠 ·𝑄+ 𝑝 𝑠_𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑑 ·∆𝑄,∆𝑄>0 𝐺 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝑝 𝑠 · 𝑄+∆𝑄 Price: 10,055/unit Unit: 5 Type ∆𝑾/Unit 𝒑 𝒃 /Satoshi unit-1 𝒇 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒆𝒅 /Satoshi 𝒇 𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍 /Satoshi Economic loss/Satoshi DG -1 10,055 40,220 32,275 7945 1 60,330 56,275 4055 Bod

Proposed scheme(7/9)-Settlement Blockchain Issuing energy money Multi-signature Arbitration refund Third party Bod Energy money Transferring bitcoins Tom

Proposed scheme(8/9)-Settlement Blockchain Energy money Request energy Bod Energy Third party Tom

Proposed scheme(9/9)-Settlement Blockchain Pay 30% of transaction money Create transaction Processing fee Refund transaction money Third party Bod Energy Tom Request energy

Performance analysis(1/4)

Performance analysis(2/4)

Performance analysis(3/4)

Performance analysis(4/4)

Conclusions Decentralized transactions Market equilibrium Multi-signature