AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING AN OPTIMAL GUARANTEED BASIC INCOME

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Federal Planning Bureau Economic analyses and forecasts Federal Planning Bureau Economic analyses and forecasts The gross-net trajectory in MIDAS_BE Some.
Advertisements

WORK AND PENSIONS SELECT COMMITTEE: Labour market seminar: 26 TH February: ‘Trends in part-time working and short-term employment contracts and the impacts.
Fairness and Social Welfare Functions. Deriving the Utility Possibility Frontier (UPF) We begin with the Edgeworth Box that starts with individual 1,and.
RRSP TFSA LIRARRIF LIF Locked-in RRSP Spousal RRSP Non- registered.
Castellanza, 20 th October and 3 rd November, 2010 FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION. Corporate Finance.
BR I T I S HC O L U MBI A. This year’s BC Child Poverty Report Card is dedicated with love and gratitude to the memory of Steve Kerstetter (1943–2013).
Copyright © 2006 Pearson Education Canada Fiscal Policy 24 CHAPTER.
CHAPTER 12 VALUING IMPACTS FROM OBSERVED BEHAVIOR: DIRECT ESTIMATION OF DEMAND CURVES.
Labor Market Trends in North America – Has Economic Well-being improved ? Lars Osberg Department of Economics, Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia.
1 Distributional Impact of VAT Reform in the Dominican Republic By Anna Fruttero and Omar Arias LCSPP Frontiers in Practice Reducing Poverty Through Better.
Policy Issues of EDRC Models Ex-ante Poverty Impact Assessment of Macroeconomic Policies International Workshop Washington, D.C. October 14-15, 2003 Aghasi.
Poverty measures: Properties and Robustness
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities cbpp.org EITC was the single biggest factor in boosting employment among single mothers 1.
LEARNING OUTCOME 5 NATIONAL INCOME National Income is a measure of the value of economic activity in an economy. The basis of National Income is Aggregate.
Centre for Tax Policy and Administration Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Tax Burden Indicators for Labour (Taxing Wages model) and.
Geographic Inequality in Social Provision and Redistribution Sarah K. Bruch - University of Iowa INEQUALITY ACROSS THE US STATES Inequality Workshop The.
Legislative Analyst’s Office Presented to: Ryan Woolsey, Fiscal and Policy Analyst CSDA/CWDA Policy Symposium March 4, 2015.
Adjustment of benefit Size and composition of transfer in Kenya’s CT-OVC program Carlo Azzarri & Ana Paula de la O Food and Agriculture Organization.
Chapter 5 Consumer Welfare and Policy Analysis
Cumulative impacts of austerity measures and the distribution of economic outcomes John Hills Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, London School of.
Additional analysis of poverty in Scotland 2013/14 Communities Analytical Services July 2015.
Social Security Spouse and Survivor Benefits for the Modern American Family Melissa M. Favreault and C. Eugene Steuerle The Urban Institute August 10,
Household Economic Resources Discussant Comments UN EXPERT GROUP MEETING 9 September 2008 Garth Bode, Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Multinational Cost of Capital & Capital Structure.
Designing Optimal Taxes with a Microeconometric Model of Labour Supply Evidence from Norway Rolf Aaberge, Statistics Norway and CHILD Ugo Colombino, Univ.
14 | Poverty and Economic Inequality Drawing the Poverty Line The Poverty Trap The Safety Net Income Inequality: Measurement and Causes Government Policies.
Chapter 8 The Cost of Capital © 2005 Thomson/South-Western.
1 Measuring Poverty: Inequality Measures Charting Inequality Share of Expenditure of Poor Dispersion Ratios Lorenz Curve Gini Coefficient Theil Index Comparisons.
Ratio Analysis…. Types of ratios…  Performance Ratios: Return on capital employed. (Income Statement and Balance Sheet) Gross profit margin (Income Statement)
Towards a National Universal Guaranteed Basic Income Harvey Stevens Wayne Simpson University of Manitoba 1.
Chapter 14 Poverty and Economic Inequality
Poverty measures: Properties and Robustness Michael Lokshin DECRG-PO The World Bank.
Poverty in Scotland Poverty is measured by household income.
Prepared by Apostolos Serletis
Taxable Income and Tax Payable For Individuals
Taxes: Equity vs. Efficiency
GOVT Module 16 Taxes.
February 2016 Dr. Gordon Cleveland, University of Toronto Scarborough
Chapter 20 Monetary and fiscal policy
Using life insurance for charitable donation
Tax Preparation Financial Literacy.
Harvard Summer Institute on College Admissions
Congress Considers Major Medicaid Changes
Financial Aid 101.
Poverty and Inequality
Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty
Overview of Income Redistribution Programs
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
Assessment-Based National Dialogue Step 2:
Multinational Cost of Capital & Capital Structure
International Labour Office
Wenliang Hou and Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher
Families, Time and Well-Being in Canada
Theoretical Tools of Public Finance
Missouri Tax Policy Options
Are tobacco taxes regressive?
Technical Briefing April 17, 2018
The causes of the declining realized rate of provincial income taxation experienced in sk Jeff Bowman April 10, 2018 This template can be used as a starter.
Introduction to the UK Economy
Introduction to Taxation
Preferential VAT rates, cash transfers and redistribution
Poverty Targeting with Heterogeneous Endowments
November 30, 2017 Taxes.
MISSOC NETWORK MEETING,NICOSIA
Basic Income Some Options for Canada
NABIG, Hamilton Mai 26, 2018 Introduce Trevor, Duncan, Erin and Jason
Introduction to Taxation
Premium tax credits have made the cost of marketplace plans similar to employer plans for low-income adults, but adults with higher incomes pay more Percent.
Economic life cycle in Sweden: 1980s, 1990s, & 2000s Daniel Hallberg Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm 1 Demographic background 2 Institutional.
Changes in Income Inequality in Lithuania: The Role of Policy, Labour Market Structure, Returns and Demographics Comments by Anna Lukyanova IARIW-HSE.
Presentation transcript:

AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING AN OPTIMAL GUARANTEED BASIC INCOME by Harvey Stevens for the 2018 NABIG Congress

THE CHALLENGE: WHICH OPTION IS THE BEST? These options have the same common features: They are financed by the removal of the following non-refundable tax credits: Basic, Age, Pension Income, Education, Tuition and Interest on student loans, the transfer of unused education tax credits and the elimination of the GST credit. The nuclear family is the administrative unit for calculating the net benefit. Total family income less allowable CRA deductions is used as the basis for clawing back the value of the Guarantee. As such the value of all federal transfers are included. The Guarantee for a single adult is increased by the square root of family size for larger size units. A top-up to the value of the Guarantee is provided for those in receipt of a tax credit for a disability and for caring for an infirm dependent.

The Potential for an Optimum Design The design of a GAI involves trade-offs due to the formula that determines the net benefit and cost: Net Benefit/Cost = Guarantee – (Other Income x Benefit Reduction Rate) Given this formula, to remain within the same budget constraint, raising the value of the Guarantee (G) requires raising the Benefit Reduction Rate (BRR). In turn, a higher G and a higher BRR generates the following trade-offs: A reduction in the rate and depth of poverty; A reduction in income inequality; A reduction in labour supply and earnings; Reduction in the number of winners. To see the nature of these trade-offs, we can look at the previous chart of the four equal-cost options. These trade-offs suggest that there may be an optimum combination of a G and BRR that maximizes poverty reduction while minimizing the loss of earnings and the number of winners.

The Methodology for Determining an Optimal Design Identify the criteria for assessing each G/BRR combination. With the SPSDM package, it is possible to measure the following: rate and depth of poverty/total poverty gap, degree of income inequality and the percent winners. By applying consensus estimates of substitution and income elasticities to the changes in marginal tax rates induced by the financing of the GAI and the G and BRR parameters, it is possible to estimate the change in earnings due to the GAI. Measure each of the criteria under the current tax and transfer system. Generate a range of equal cost G and BRR combinations and measure the criteria for each combination. For each criteria and for each G and BRR combination, calculate the per cent change from the current system. The ‘per cent change’ calculation provides a common metric across the criteria. Aggregate the per cent changes to create a total or average score for each combination. Compare the aggregate score across the range of combinations to see if it reaches a maximum value. If there is a maximum value , then that indicates the optimal design.

An Example – Canada 2015 BRR & G Combination % change in Poverty Rate % change in Poverty Depth % change in GINI Index % change in Earnings % change in Winners Average % Change – Equal Weights (1) 0%/G=$2083 -8.7% -4.3% -1.4% -0.8% +13.8% +5.46% 7%/G=$5,061 -32.7% -7.5% -5.3% -3.3% +6.4% +9.71% 10%/G=$5,978 -36.5% -10.4% -5.6% -4.2% -1.3% +9.41% 20%/G=$8,420 -44.2% -21.9% -5.8% -7.6% -15.9% +9.68% 39%/G=$8,420/TP=$11,635 -55.8% -19.2% -11.6% -28.4% +8.11% 35%/G=$11,243 -50.0% -37.3% -5.7% -29.2% +10.46% 50%/G=$13,606 -51.2% -5.5% -14.7% -37.6% +10.89% 58%/G=$14,749 -49.0% -57.9% -5.4% -15.7% -41.2% +11.09% 60%/G=$15,024 -48.1% -59.2% -15.6% -42.2% +10.97% 70%/G=$16,344 -47.1% -64.0% -5.2% -46.0% +10.92% Note: (1) The changes in the rate and depth of poverty and the GINI index have been scored as positive, in calculating the average change. These results are particular to the population covered by the GAI, the method of financing it and the indicators used. Preliminary work on an Alberta and Manitoba GAI indicates that the optimum is a 7 per cent BRR. A different method of financing the GAI also would lead to different results as it would affect the METRs and the per cent winners. Other indicators also could affect the results. For example, instead of two measures of poverty, one could use a composite measure – the total poverty gap measured in dollars. As for the results for Canada, the following should be noted: - There is a local maximum at a 7% BRR and a global maximum at 58%, likely reflecting the shape of the income distribution. The big trade-offs are between poverty reduction and the per cent winners. The impact on income inequality is minimal and it peaks at a 20% BRR. A comparison of the two options with a G=$8,420 show that the option featuring no turning point results in a higher average change score than the one with a turning point. Very high BRRs reduce the impact on the rate of poverty but continue to improve the depth of poverty impact. Reductions in earnings increase as the BRR and G increase but seem to plateau at the 58%/$14,749 combination.

A Second Example – Canada 2017 BRR & G Combination % change in Total Poverty Gap % change in GINI Index % change in Earnings % change in Winners Average % Change – Equal Weights (1) Average % Change – Unequal Weights (2) 0%/G=$2083 -14.2% -1.4% -0.8% +13.8% 7.15 7.17 7%/G=$5,061 -40.8% -5.3% -3.3% +6.4% 12.30 14.02 10%/G=$5,978 -46.6% -5.6% -4.2% -1.3% 11.67 14.06 20%/G=$8,420 -59.4% -5.8% -7.6% -15.9% 10.43 14.19 35%/G=$11,243 -70.5% -5.7% -11.6% -29.2% 8.84 13.83 50%/G=$13,606 -77.2% -5.5% -14.7% -37.6% 7.59 13.33 60%/G=$15,024 -80.0% -5.4% -15.6% -42.2% 6.90 13.02 70%/G=$16,344 -82.0% -5.2% -15.7% -46.0% 6.37 12.77 Note: (1) The changes in the rate and depth of poverty and the GINI index have been scored as positive, in calculating the average change. Each criteria has a weight of 0.25, such that they add to 1.00 Note: (2) Weights are: 0.30 for Total Poverty Gap; 0.25 for GINI index and % change in earnings; and, 0.20 for % change in winners. Replacing the two poverty measures with the aggregate total poverty gap measure results in the optimum BRR/G combination dropping from 58% & $14,479 to 7% & $5,601 when equal weights are applied to each criterion. This is because the % change in the total gap is less than the combined per cent change in the rate and depth of poverty. However, if poverty reduction is weighted more heavily and the % winners weighted less heavily, the optimum BRR/G combination increases to 20% & $8,420. Thus, the results are sensitive to both the outcome measures used to rate the combinations and the weights assigned to each criteria. Conclusions: It is possible to compare equal cost combinations of BRR & G on several outcome criteria and, calculating the % change score for each combination across the several criteria, then rank the combinations according to their total or average score. For Canada, this comparison suggests that a high BRR and G combination is the optimum if both the rate and depth of poverty measure is used. However, if just the total poverty gap measure is used, then the optimum BRR & G combination is a low BRR and G. Shifting more policy weight to poverty reduction and less to maximizing the number of winners results in a more generous G and higher BRR. While such shifts indicate that the choice of an optimum is dependent upon the criteria used and the weights applied, the application of the method permits a more disciplined approach to selecting a GAI design, based on policy makers objectives and policy preferences.