CCMP MIC Processing Paul Lambert September 2002

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Presentation transcript:

CCMP MIC Processing Paul Lambert September 2002 Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.

September 2002 Overview CCM Algorithm is based on AES and provides integrity (CBC mode) and confidentiality (CTR mode encryption) CCMP is the IEEE 802.11 TGi format and processing that defines how .11 MPDU fields are processed in CCM Integrity processing is intended to be on all ‘invariant’ .11 fields Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.

Invariant Fields CCMP processing is once per MPDU September 2002 Invariant Fields CCMP processing is once per MPDU Retransmitted MPDUs should NOT repeat cryptographic processing Able to retransmit original MPDU Integrity processing can NOT include fields that change on retransmission Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.

September 2002 Current CCMP Muting CCMP ‘mutes’ fields so that hey are not part of the integrity processing. Current (draft 2.3) muted CCMP fields: Duration Retry Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.

September 2002 Complete Analysis of 802.11 fields for invariance of MIC calculation Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.

CCMP Muting Requirements September 2002 CCMP Muting Requirements The following CCMP fields must be muted: Duration Retry More Data Pwr Mgt QoS-TXOP/QueueLength, FEC, Ack Policy Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.

September 2002 Motion The CCMP integrity processing in the current Tgi draft shall be modified to mask to zero the ‘Pwr Mgt’, ‘More Data’ and ‘QC bits 4 to 15’ for purposes of the CBC integrity calculation. Paul Lambert, Airgo Networks, Inc.