METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL LAWS The Philosophy of Economics and Politics 8th November 2018 Lecturer: Dr. William Peden w.j.peden@durham.ac.uk

“… [the kind of economics he is criticising] invokes an agent from outside the economy… labelled ‘government’ … tasked with selflessly correcting market failures… the invocation of a disembodied benign agent violates the principle of methodological individualism.” - Meir Kohn (2004, p. 325-326)

Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism! Lars Udehn (2002)

Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism! Lars Udehn (2002)

Methodological Individualism Meir Kohn (2004): “… economic outcomes should be explained purely in terms of individual behavior.” (p. 308) Prediction and explanation in social science But what’s a good explanation? A (partial) theory of social scientific explanation - Specifying a necessary condition (a requirement) Still many versions – focus on most plausible

A theory T is a satisfactory explanation of a social phenomenon only if T is formulated using: (a) Terms describing individual beliefs, values, and actions (b) Terms reducible to (a) (c) Some mix of (a) and (b)

John Watkins 1924-1999 Half-way explanations Sufficient explanations MI explanations ≠ Rational choice explanations - Could explain a pattern of voting in terms of individuals’ irrational thinking John Watkins 1924-1999

NOT a metaphysical claim. NOT a claim about which theories are true NOT a metaphysical claim! NOT a claim about which theories are true! NOT a claim about meaningfulness! NOT a defence of individualist politics!

Friedrich Hayek (libertarian) 1899-1992 Max Weber (liberal) 1864-1920 Karl Popper (liberal/social democrat) 1902-1994 Jon Elster (Marxist communist) 1940-

Classes Hats A full understanding?

“Collective terms” in social science do denote individuals But they are not always definable using individual terms Defensive move: we can observe collective attitudes/behaviours e.g. “hostile crowd” Offensive move: there are some sufficient social explanations with irreducible collective terms Ernest Nagel 1901-1985

Nagel (1961): something like Keynesianism is needed for some explanations, but has non-reduced collective terms - “Sticky” wages/prices Reduction: inconsistent with microeconomics? BUT: the New Keynesians worked hard to develop “microfoundations” for Keynesianism (1970s/1980s/1990s) John Maynard Keynes 1883-1946

Compromises? Old theories of scientific explanation: focus mostly about the logical features of explanations Modern theories: more attention to aims of explanations - E.g. Bas Van Fraassen MI as a theory of social scientists’ aims?

Revised MI: Only explanations of social phenomena in individual terms can be fully satisfying explanations

Comparative MI: Ceteris paribus, T1 is preferable to T2 as an explanation of a social phenomenon P if T1 explains P in an MI way and T2 does not - The New Keynesians?

Social Laws Alternatives to MI explanations? - (Law-explanations CAN satisfy MI) Do social scientific laws actually explain anything? Interpretation of laws in social science?

One (of many) problems – where are these in social science? Social scientists: making deductions of phenomena using exceptionless laws or confirming them with probabilistic laws - DN/IS model One (of many) problems – where are these in social science? - Tautologies or have exceptions (?) Carl G. Hempel (1905-1997)

Mill: social laws as tendency laws TENDENCY: what happens ceteris paribus Tendency laws are generalisations that: (1) Can have exceptions (2) Express tendencies of a mechanism, including e.g. a social system John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) - A more modern philosopher of explanation!

Properties of a tendency: (1) A kind of causation (2) If there is a tendency in a mechanism then it produces an effect if there are no disturbing factors (3) Make a contribution even when there are Sébastien Chabal (1977-)

Causal tendency laws: make sense of social scientific explanations via laws? An increase in the level of currency increases the level of prices if there are no disturbing factors e.g. new regulations raising banks’ demand for currency reserves How can causal tendencies provide informative guidance for social policy? Nancy Cartwright (1944 -)

SUMMARY Methodological individualism: many meanings Stronger and weaker claims about our explanatory objectives in social science Tendency laws: a possible alternative to individualist explanations of social phenomena - Good news for Marx?

Bas Van Fraassen The Scientific Image (1980) Chapter 5 Carl G Bas Van Fraassen The Scientific Image (1980) Chapter 5 Carl G. Hempel: “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” (1948) (with Paul Oppenheim) Philosophy of Science Ernest Nagel: The Structure of Science (1961) Chapter 14 Section III Friedrich Hayek: The Counter-Revolution in Science (1964) Chapter 4 John Stuart Mill: A System of Logic (1882) Book VI Chapter VI (Other references in the module handbook) Jon Elster: “Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory” (1982) Theory and Society John Watkins: “Ideal Types and Historical Explanation” (1952) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science John Watkins: “Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences” (1957) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science Lars Udehn: “The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism” (2002) Annual Review of Sociology Meir Kohn: “Value and Exchange” (2004) Cato Journal