Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” Philosophy 219 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”

Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) Berlin was born in Latvia, but he spent early, formative years in St. Petersburg, Russia. He had a front row seat for some of the more dramatic events of the Russian Revolution. In 1921, his family emigrated to the UK to avoid some of the less desirable developments in post-revolutionary Russia. He pursued the study of classics and philosophy in college and graduate school, eventually becoming one of the most prominent British intellectuals and academics of the 20th century.

“Two Concepts” Most of Berlin’s work philosophical work was in social and political philosophy and he approached these topics with the range and erudition characteristic of the best “history of ideas.” Two central ideas of his work were freedom and value-pluralism. He belongs to a tradition of political philosophy known as liberalism: the idea that the central problem of politics is the preservation and enhancement of human freedom. We’ve encountered a few other ‘liberals’ of this sort: John Locke and John Stuart Mill (Utilitarianism). For advocates of liberalism, the free individual is the atomic unit of the social, and only social principles that enable and protect liberty, equality, and our common human good should be implemented. The essay “Two Concepts of Liberty” is one of his most famous defenses of the idea of freedom that he thinks is consistent with liberalism.

Two Senses of Political Freedom Berlin begins his discussion modestly, acknowledging that the concept of freedom is a broad one, and that he’s interested in a particular range of this breadth: what he calls ‘political freedom.’ Presumably, this distinction is offered to cut off certain expectations. Berlin is not interested in freedom as a metaphysical concept, as part of a theory of human nature.  Rather, he focusses on freedom as it functions as an element in our conception of politics/the social. Within political freedom, Berlin identifies the key distinction as the one between negative and positive freedom. Negative political freedom answers the question, ‘To what extent should citizens be free from the interference of others?’. Positive political freedom answers the questions, ‘What are the forces/structures which shape people’s lives and what should be done to liberate people from them?’ Often the distinction is framed as the difference between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’

Negative Political Freedom Berlin’s discussion of negative freedom reveals how important the limitation of his discussion to political freedom is. He makes clear that from this perspective, the notion of freedom as ‘the absence of constraint or coercion’ is an illusion. We are all of us limited in many ways, physically, mentally, psychologically, but that sort of limitation shouldn’t be confused with the sort of ‘interference’ that is the opposite of negative political freedom. Negative political freedom (NPF) is only violated by, “…the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act” (875c2). With this characterization, Berlin is by no means ignoring the complicated ways in which we humans limit each other’s agency. Imprisoning someone is an obvious instance of a limitation of NPF, but economic systems which systematically deny equal access to people based on race, sex, class, sexual orientation, etc., are also attacks on NPF(875-877).

A Difficulty While acknowledging that such systematic forms of the freedom restriction of are repressive, Berlin reveals the polemical aim of the essay when he discusses the complications of responding to such restrictive forms. I can, in pursuit of equality (for example), agree that a certain range of action should be limited (like for example, laws governing how property is inherited). I may purchase greater equality in this way, but Berlin insists that we should not ignore the cost to the negative freedom of individuals. To the extent that we privilege liberty above other goods, this cost looms larger and larger.

3 Elements Concluding his discussion of NPF, Berlin uses Mill’s account of individual liberty to summarize the key features of this type of freedom. Limitations of NPF are bad; the absence of limitations are good. This badness and goodness are understood as relative, not absolute. NPF is a good, but not the only good; limitations of NPF are bad, but not the only bad. This is consistent with Berlin’s value pluralism. Political philosophy’s concern for NPF is relatively ‘modern.’ “There seems to be scarcely any discussion of individual liberty as a conscious political ideal…in the ancient world” (878c2). Maximization of NPF is not necessarily connected to any particular political system. Democracy doesn’t guarantee NPF, nor is tyranny inconsistent with it.

Positive Political Freedom It’s clear from the beginning of Berlin’s discussion of positive political freedom (PPF) that the Kantian notion of autonomy (self-rule) is a key element of the account, “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be h[er] own master” (879c2). This is reinforced by Berlin’s recognition that this ‘wish’ is a key feature of a claim to rationality (Ibid.). Though on the face of it, PPF doesn’t seem very different from NPF, the history of the employment of these concepts has created important areas of conflict between them. Berlin tries to establish this by pursuing a common way of exploring the limits of PPF, an exploration which historically has led to a kind of spiritual dualism. Even though I may be in fact constrained by all sort of natural and socio-cultural facts, the desire for self-mastery has encouraged many to distinguish a ‘true self’ from the self that is ‘naturally’ constrained. PPF is assigned to the 'spiritual' side of this distinction, which at least in the philosophical and religious versions of this dualism, is associated with reason or our 'higher nature.'

The Slippery Slope Here we begin to see Berlin's concerns about a politics governed by a theory of positive political freedom. The notion of a 'higher self' is, sometimes at least, at odds with the material/lower self. We make choices that are not in our 'best interest.'  In at least some instances, it may be to one's own good, or the good of others, to coerce your behavior. As we've seen, sometimes a good requires (or at least can only be purchased with) such coercion. But such coercion is clearly at odds with the good of NPF. And that is bad. And it quickly gets very bad: "Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their real selves..." (880c2).

Two Different Selves While it may not explain why things go bad so fast, Berlin spends some time considering two different forms of the PPF spiritual dualism. One of them is what could be called 'philosophical asceticism,' these days most commonly associated by ancient stoicism and Buddhism (control your desires, don't get caught up in the 'appearances'). He suggests that this sort of 'inwardness' has political manifestations like isolationism, central control of the economy. More importantly, "...it is difficult to see how it can be called an enlargement of liberty" (882c2). The other he describes as a kind of 'tellic optimism,' the idea that we are going 'somewhere' and with the right kind of push, we can get there. The 'somewhere' is a society of our 'higher nature, and the 'push' is the removal of the hindrances (ideological, psychological, economic, legal, etc.) that prevent us from getting there.

The Temple of What? It's at this point that we begin to appreciate how formative Berlin's experience of the Russian revolution was. The version of the optimistic form of the second self that he clearly has in view is the state 'communism' of the Soviet Union. However, Berlin tries to make clear that Soviet communism is just the most obvious form of a form of thought that assumes the triumph of reason over all forms of limitation, culminating in the optimistic exultation, "The truth shall set you free!" (cf. 886). The "Temple of Sarastro" is a reference to the Mozart opera, The Magic Flute.

Why Negative Political Freedom Wins As has become clear, Berlin believe that NPF is the best theory of freedom for a liberal political community (one which privileges individual freedom over other social goods). He's made it clear what he thinks are the dangers of theories of PPF, but that falls short of an argument for the superiority of NPF. The first step in such an argument is the recognition that NPF is as prerequisite for PPF. There must be some area of noninterference for any more substantive possibility of freedom to emerge. The second step is to articulate the conditions under which a theory of NPF can operate within a political society. With the help of Constant, Berlin identifies two conditions (889c1-2). The concept of rights, not the concept of authority, must be absolute. There must be a shared recognition of the absolute independence of human beings, an independence grounded in a fundamental moral dignity.

A Moderate Pluralism We should not confuse the vigor with which Berlin advocates for NPF as a radical rejection of any other social goods. Remember, Berlin is a pluralist, and acknowledges that there are many other competing goods which are legitimate social and political ends. The final stage of his argument for NPF is the claim that not only is it a good in itself, but it enables other goods. You couldn't achieve other legitimate social aims without a robust system of NPF. Indeed, the sort of value pluralism which he and other classical liberals are generally committed to seems to require a zone of non-interference. We need to be free to decide the general shape of our lives. This does not mean that concerns for PPF (like those that animate compulsory educational systems) are completely valueless. However, if there is any conflict between PPF and NPF that threatens to overwhelm NPF, then NPF must outweigh PPF.