George Mason School of Law

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George Mason School of Law Contracts I L. Post-contractual Opportunism © F.H. Buckley fbuckley@gmu.edu

Relational contracts: Reliance and opportunism

The Reliance Problem You and I contemplate a joint venture which, if successful, promises $10M in profits for each of us. To see if the deal is worthwhile you must build a prototype for $50,000. If I decide not to do the deal, the prototype is worthless.

The Reliance Problem You and I contemplate a joint venture which, if successful, promises $10M in profits for each of us. To see if the deal is worthwhile you must build a prototype for $50,000. If I decide not to do the deal, the prototype is worthless. Assume I can’t specify ex ante what counts as a permissible rejection.

The Reliance Problem You and I contemplate a joint venture which, if successful, promises $10M in profits for each of us. To see if the deal is worthwhile you must build a prototype for $50,000. If I decide not to do the deal, the prototype is worthless. Are you at risk of a shakedown here?

The Reliance Problem Some jargon Asset specificity Bilateral (Situational) Monopolies Post-contractual Opportunism

The Reliance Problem Asset specificity: The bargaining surplus can be exploited only by the two parties It is an asset specific to the contract

Children as asset specific to their parents Raphael, The Judgment of Solomon

Asset specificity and Monopoly Bilateral (Situational) Monopolies A monopoly is owned by one party only A bilateral monopoly is an asset jointly shared

Asset specificity and Monopoly Bilateral (Situational) Monopolies A monopoly is owned by one party only A bilateral monopoly is an asset jointly shared E.g., An asset specific contractual surplus

Bilateral Monopolies and Opportunism Post-contractual Opportunism

Post-contractual opportunism Armen Alchian et al. 21 J.L.E. 297(1978) 12

Post-contractual opportunism 13

Post-contractual opportunism Distinguish three cases: Zero reliance and no costs to a break-up

Zero reliance and no costs to a break-up In some relationships, no one invests anything Jean-Paul Belmondo, Jean Seberg, Breathless (1960) Jean-Luc Godard

Post-contractual opportunism No possibility of opportunism where no relation-specific assets

Post-contractual opportunism Distinguish three cases: Zero reliance and no costs to a break-up Equal reliance on both side

No opportunism if equal break-up costs Mutually Assured Destruction Dr Strangelove

Mutually assured destruction Player 2 Cooperate Defect 0,0 -∞, -∞

Post-contractual opportunism Distinguish three cases: Zero reliance and no costs to a break-up Equal reliance on both side Asymmetric break-up costs

Asymmetric break-up costs and Opportunism Where only one person invests, the other has a threat advantage Ford Maddox Brown, Stages of Cruelty

Why is Opportunism a problem? Ex post a fairness issue when the opportunistic person uses his position to gain an unbargained-for advantage: 22

Why is Opportunism a problem? Ex ante an efficiency problem of under-investment If a bargainer expects to be treated opportunistically after entering into a contract, he won’t enter into a contract 23

Is that the story of Red Owl at 289

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts Why was Red Owl adamant about a personal investment by Hoffman?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts The Free-riding problem

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts Was Red Owl in bad faith? Did Red Owl up the ante from the $18,000 investment? And if it did?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts Is this how the financials looked? Assets Liabilities 70,500 52,500 Equity 18,000

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts Was there a contract?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts Estoppel: What kind of damages?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts What’s the argument for a presumption of no liability?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts How would you expect franchisors to react to Red Owl?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts How would you expect franchisors to react to Red Owl? Non-liability agreements? Or assume liability for reliance damages?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts How would you expect franchisors to react to Red Owl? Non-liability agreements? If statutory, exit from state? Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991)

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts How would you expect franchisors to react to Red Owl? Non-liability agreements? Exit from state? Only deal with sure things?

Opportunism in Franchise Contracts How would you expect franchisors to react to Red Owl? Non-liability agreements? Exit from state? Only deal with sure things? Equal investments?

What if both parties invest equally? Hamburger U. as a risk-sharing strategy

Mooney v. Craddock p. 299

Mooney v. Craddock Who was in the best position to judge the health club’s chances of success?