SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 1 SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 Thomas Wolfgang Pieber 1

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 2 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 2

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 3 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 3

Introduction New System Designs need to be tested thoroughly SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 4 Introduction New System Designs need to be tested thoroughly Currently done by manually specifying I/O combinations and random testing Designing tests based on use cases and boundary conditions Oportunity that the designer misses special cases Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 4

24.11.15 24.11.15 Introduction 5 Improvement Use cases can be used to directly generate valid test scenarios Boundary conditions are simulated through changing initial and final conditions Simulated hardware can affect the surrounding test system  Feedback Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 5

24.11.15 24.11.15 Introduction 6 Example Scenario A sensor (DUT) is read out and charged via NFC by a robot The robot approaches with activated NFC field and tries to read data Data transmission fails due to long communication range The robot gets closer Data transmission suceeds The robot leaves the sensor Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 6

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 7 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 7

Design Gazebo plugin to communicate with SystemC SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 8 Design Gazebo plugin to communicate with SystemC SystemC process is started by this plugin Communication between the processes via standard I/O Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 8

Requirements The simulation settings in SystemC must be configurable 24.11.15 24.11.15 Design 9 Requirements The simulation settings in SystemC must be configurable Commands and responses must be readable and generic SystemC testbed must be activated continuously Communication to affected parts must be possible Incoming commands must be executed in correct order Time between the simulations must be synchronized Simulation time and memory must be reduced as much as possible Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 9

24.11.15 24.11.15 Design 10 Communication The Gazebo plugin restructures the internal communication and adds additional information The SystemC testbed parses the information and passes it to the correct components and adjusts simulation parameters The simulation sends infor- mation directly to the Gazebo simulation The Gazebo plugin needs to restructure the information to send it to the rest simulation Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 10

24.11.15 24.11.15 Design 11 Communication Gazebo starts the SystemC simulation and sends commands and a start signal SystemC sends status information during the simulation When the SystemC simulation is finished a signal to proceed is sent If the simulation should run longer, the Gazebo simulation again sends a start signal; otherwise an empty SystemC run is performed and both simulations are terminated Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 11

24.11.15 24.11.15 Design 12 Communication cont‘d To be as generic as possible the communication between the simulations is performed with XML Specific tags are necessary for configuring the SystemC environment, the communication between the simulations, and the triggering of new time steps Possible commands can look like this: Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 12

Simulation Time Reduction 24.11.15 24.11.15 Design 13 Simulation Time Reduction Normal SystemC operations are performed If all relevant components are in an Idle-state the changing parameters are estimated and changed The simulation is stopped and a signal that indicates that a discontinuity occurs is generated Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 13

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 14 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 14

SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 15 Evaluation A robot, equipped with NFC capabilities approaches the sensor This influences the channel and allows communication and energy transfer The sensor gets charged and transmits the sensor values to the robot Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 15

Parameters Can the robot communicate with the sensor at all? 24.11.15 24.11.15 Evaluation 16 Parameters Can the robot communicate with the sensor at all? How fast can this simulation approach be? What are bottlenecks of this simulation approach? Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 16

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 17 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 17

Results The robot is able to communicate with the sensor SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 18 Results The robot is able to communicate with the sensor The simulation gets much slower if the sensor needs to work  Time reduction works as expected Realtime factor: Gazebo alone: 0.8 Gazebo + SystemC idle: 0.5 Gazebo + SystemC running: 0.0005 Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 18

Identified Bottlenecks 24.11.15 24.11.15 Results 19 Identified Bottlenecks Multiple SystemC simulations are execured sequentially Parsing XML messages is slow SystemC generates huge maounts of data that need to be stored and processed Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 19

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 20 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 20

Conclusion Valid inputs for the sensor are generated SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 21 Conclusion Valid inputs for the sensor are generated Errors in the communication / execution are translated to errors appearing on the robot Erroneous states in the hardware can be found by matching the timestamp of the error message with the generated data Simultaneous simulation of many SystemC instances is very slow Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 21

Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 22 Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 22

SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 23 Future Work Update plugin structure to communicate to a server and receive results in next time step Implement a server that searches for valid SystemC simulations to connect to Implement a structure to parallelize SystemC simulations Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 23

Acknowledgement SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24.11.15 24.11.15 24 Acknowledgement This project has received funding from the Electronic Component Systems for European Leadership Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No 692480. This Joint Undertaking receives support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Slovakia. IoSense is funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT) under the program "ICT of the Future" between May 2016 and May 2019. More information https://iktderzukunft.at/en/ Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99): [. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure. Institute of Technical Informatics 26.07.17 24

Thank you for your attention! 24.11.15 24.11.15 25 Thank you for your attention! 25