TGr Authentication Framework

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Doc.: IEEE /1867r1 Submission November r Security TeamSlide 1 TGr Security Requirements Notice: This document has been prepared to.
Advertisements

Use of KCK for TGr Management Frame Protection
Secure 3-Party Protocol
LB84 General AdHoc Group Sept. Closing TGn Motions
[ Interim Meetings 2006] Date: Authors: July 2005
Resource Request/Response Discussion
TGn Sync Atlanta Presentation on Confirmation
Motions Date: Authors: January 2006
London TGu Motions Authors: January 2007 Date: Month Year
LB73 Noise and Location Categories
LB73 Noise and Location Categories
Waveform Generator Source Code
March 2014 Election Results
TGp Closing Report Date: Authors: July 2005 Month Year
TGp Closing Report Date: Authors: July 2007 Month Year
Attendance and Documentation for the March 2007 Plenary
TGr Architectural Entities
3GPP Extended Date: Authors: July 2005 July 2005
[ Policies and Procedure Summary]
[ Policies and Procedure Summary]
Secure Key Distribution and Authorization
Motion to accept Draft p 2.0
Protected SSIDs Date: Authors: March 2005 March 2005
3GPP liaison report July 2006
R0KH-R1KH protocol requirements
[place presentation subject title text here]
Motions Date: Authors: January 2006
Fast Transition Mobility (FTM) Domain
TGp Motions Date: Authors: November 2005 Month Year
TGp Closing Report Date: Authors: March 2006 Month Year
TGu-changes-from-d0-02-to-d0-03
TGp Closing Report Date: Authors: May 2007 Month Year
TGp Closing Report Date: Authors: March 2006 Month Year
Reflector Tutorial Date: Authors: July 2006 Month Year
TGv Redline D0.07 Insert and Deletion
TGu Timeline Date: Authors: January 2005 January 2005
TGv Redline D0.06 Insert and Deletion
Solution for comment 32 Date: Authors: July, 2008
Selection Procedure Recommendation
TGu-changes-from-d0-01-to-d0-02
LB73 Noise and Location Categories
Proposal for QAP Available Admission capacity
TGy draft 2.0 with changebars from draft 1.0
TGv Redline D0.10 Insert and Deletion
WAPI Position Paper Sept 2005 Sept 2005 IEEE WG
Redline of draft P802.11w D2.2 Date: Authors:
TGr Proposed Draft Revision Notice
TGu-changes-from-d0-02-to-d0-03
[ Policies and Procedure Summary]
May 2005 CAPWAP AHC Closing Report
TGu Motions Date: Authors: May 2006 May 2006
Beamforming and Link Adaptation Motions
[ Policies and Procedure Summary]
Draft P802.11s D1.03 WordConversion
Questions to the Contention-based Protocol (CBP) Study Group
TGr Authentication Framework
Motion to go to Letter Ballot
EC Motions – July 2005 Plenary
TGu-changes-from-d0-04-to-d0-05
2-Level Key Hierarchy Date: 19 July 2005 Authors: July 2005 Month Year
Transition Nowhere Date: Authors: Sept 2005 Sept 2005
TGu-changes-from-d0-03-to-d0-04
TGu Timeline Date: Authors: January 2005 January 2005
TGu Motions Date: Authors: May 2006 May 2006
WAPI Position Paper Sept 2005 Sept 2005 IEEE WG
Use of KCK for TGr Management Frame Protection
Use of KCK for TGr Management Frame Protection
TGu Timeline Date: Authors: July 2005 July 2005
TGr Proposed Draft Revision Notice
TGp Motions Date: Authors: January 2006 Month Year
Presentation transcript:

TGr Authentication Framework doc: IEEE 802.11-05/724r0 July 2005 July 2005 TGr Authentication Framework Date: 2005-07-07 Author(s): Name Company Address Phone Email Dan Harkins Trapeze Networks 5753 W. Las Positas blvd Pleasanton, CA 94588 +1 925 474 2212 dharkins@trpz.com Notice: This document has been prepared to assist IEEE 802.11. It is offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein. Release: The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE 802.11. Patent Policy and Procedures: The contributor is familiar with the IEEE 802 Patent Policy and Procedures <http:// ieee802.org/guides/bylaws/sb-bylaws.pdf>, including the statement "IEEE standards may include the known use of patent(s), including patent applications, provided the IEEE receives assurance from the patent holder or applicant with respect to patents essential for compliance with both mandatory and optional portions of the standard." Early disclosure to the Working Group of patent information that might be relevant to the standard is essential to reduce the possibility for delays in the development process and increase the likelihood that the draft publication will be approved for publication. Please notify the Chair <stuart.kerry@philips.com> as early as possible, in written or electronic form, if patented technology (or technology under patent application) might be incorporated into a draft standard being developed within the IEEE 802.11 Working Group. If you have questions, contact the IEEE Patent Committee Administrator at <patcom@ieee.org>. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

doc: IEEE 802.11-05/724r0 July 2005 July 2005 Abstract The 802.11r draft currently specifies 5 distinct entities with no defined role. This brings up problems with how 802.1X, EAP, and RADIUS are used. This presentation describes the problem and recommends a solution to adhere 802.11r to a more orthodox view of these protocols. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

802.11r Entities AAA Client PMK-R0 holder PMK-R1 holder PMK-R2 holder doc: IEEE 802.11-05/724r0 July 2005 July 2005 802.11r Entities AAA Client PMK-R0 holder PMK-R1 holder PMK-R2 holder PTK holder There are 11 different ways to combine them. And many of those combinations are problematic and unorthodox. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

802.11r Entities AAA client PMK-R0 holder PMK-R1 holder PTK holder July 2005 802.11r Entities AAA client PMK-R0 holder PMK-R1 holder PTK holder Even without the lower layer of the key hierarchy there are still 8 different ways to combine them many with the same problematic and unorthodox issues. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

Problems with 5 distinct entities July 2005 Problems with 5 distinct entities “first contact” is with a PMK-Rx holder but the AAA client forwards the EAP traffic on to a AAA server. Prevents EAP channel binding from being used Should be reason enough for the STA to disassociate! How are EAP packets transported between these PMK-Rx holders and the AAA client? EAP places specific requirements on its transport “the AAA Client…may be co-located with the PMK-R0 key holder or may be a separate device” NO! Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

Problems with 5 distinct entities July 2005 Problems with 5 distinct entities How can authorization of PMK key holders be sanely performed when PMKs are being so widely distributed? Need to distribute more than just a PMK-Rx To properly use EAP we must define what we distribute, where and how. With 5 distinct entities the job is difficult, more difficult than it needs to be. Even with 4 distinct entities it is much harder than necessary. We cannot just say it’s “out of scope”. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

July 2005 Proposal Restrict the number different combinations of 802.11r entities to 2 The AAA client and PMK-Rx holders are co-incident, and the PTK holder is separate All five entities are co-incident Satisfy all architectures described in CAPWAP taxonomy memo Enforce a traditional and orthodox use of 802.1x and EAP on 802.11r Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

What is an authenticator? July 2005 What is an authenticator? A PMK holder A NAS, identified by a NAS-Id A AAA client An EAP authentication occurs at an authenticator, not at an access point. The 4-way handshake is between a STA and an authenticator, not a STA and an access point. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

Requirements on an authenticator July 2005 Requirements on an authenticator Upon successful “first contact” authentication of a STA it must derive all PMKs as well as appropriate PMKSAs for itself. Authorization attributes returned by AAA must be part of all PMKSAs and they must be distributed to other NASes along with the PMK derivative. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

How does it work? AAA server AAA client AAA client PMK-R0 NAS a PMK-R0 July 2005 AAA server AAA client AAA client PMK-R0 NAS a PMK-R0 NAS b PMK-R1-a PMK-R1-b PTK holder PTK holder PTK holder Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

Benefits Allows for proper analysis of 802.11r July 2005 Benefits Allows for proper analysis of 802.11r Conforms 802.11r to approved use of EAP Enables EAP Key scoping EAP channel binding Authorization and correctness Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks

doc: IEEE 802.11-05/724r0 July 2005 July 2005 Motion Instruct editor to incorporate changes from 11-05-0724-00-000r into draft. Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks Dan Harkins, Trapeze Networks