April 5, 2012

(A) On Right Action: Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. -Kant, Groundwork, Ch. 1 (B) On the Status of Desire: It is just here that the worth of character is brought out, which is morally the incomparably highest of all: [when a person] is benecent not from preference but from duty. -Kant, Groundwork, Ch. 1

(A)[I]t is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits…. -Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 3 (B) [T]he man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. -Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 8

But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely…matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health….[T]he agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation. -Aristotle, NE, Bk. II, Ch. 2

But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely…matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health….[T]he agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation. -Aristotle, NE, Bk. II, Ch. 2

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. -Aristotle, NE, Bk. II, Ch. 6

[B]oth fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate.

Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. -Aristotle, NE, Bk. II, Ch. 6

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Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. -Aristotle, NE, Bk. II, Ch. 6

Sphere of Action or Feeling ExcessMeanDeficiency Fear & Confidence RashnessCourageCowardice Pleasure & PainSelf-indulgenceTemperanceInsensibility SpendingProdigalityLiberalityIlliberality Honor & Dishonor VanityProper ambitionUnambitiousness AngerIrascibilityPatienceLack of spirit Social conductObsequiousnessFriendlinessCantakerousness