复杂网络可控性 研究进展 汪秉宏 2014 北京 网络科学论坛.

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复杂网络可控性 研究进展 汪秉宏 2014 北京 网络科学论坛

We need a few inputs to control a system Controllability We need a few inputs to control a system

Controllability We need a few inputs to control a system

Outline We analyze the evolution of controllability for networks in the process of cascading failures with the specific edge attacks, we find that the cascading failures are more likely to happen in the strongly connected components(SCC).   Then we study the evolution of the controllability of networks with the increasing of removal fraction under two different edge attacks, random and intentional, respectively. The results show that the robustness of controllability behave differently with the increasing of removal fraction.

The dynamical system is controllable if it can be driven from any initial state to any desired final state with external inputs in finite time。   Liu,Barabasi et al. studied the controllability of various real systems and proposed a method to find the minimal driver nodes which could control the whole network, the main conclusion is that the controllability of networks is determined by the degree distributions of networks. To further study this problem, Wang WX et al. give a solution of exact controllability to find the minimum set of driver nodes required to fully control the networks with arbitrary structures and link weights.

Generally, the systems are always confronting with the random or intentional edges attacks, for example, in power grids networks , the edges attacks can be interpreted as that the connections of substations are cut off so the power cannot be transmitted from one substation to others.   For Internet networks, the attack on edges can be interpreted as the two Gnutella hosts cannot share Gnutella peer-to-peer file. These damages usually depend on the importance of attacked edges.

Controllability system: its state can be driven to different predefined states by a given set of input control signals

linear system: system matrix input matrix M: system dimension Controllability linear system: system matrix input matrix M: system dimension

Kalman’s rank condition Controllability Kalman’s rank condition Gramian condition nonsingular

Structurally controllability example: system (A,B) (random non-zero weight) uncontrollable

系统可控

Maximum matching:边的最大集合,其中的边无公共起止点 Driver nodes( ND ): 若maximum matching中的边指向某节点,则该节点为matched, 否则为unmatched,其中unmatched的节点即为驱动节点drive nodes Liu et al. Nature 473, 167 (2011)

边的分类: Critical: its removal needs to increase the number of driver nodes to maintain fully control; Redundant: its removal cannot affect the current set of driver nodes; Ordinary: if it is neither critical nor redundant.

The cascading dynamics

SCC: Strongly connected component Results , ER networks: The highest-load edge attack SCC: Strongly connected component

SF networks

ER networks: A fraction of edges attack RA: random attack IA: intentional attack

1. 与highest-load edge attack类似 2. IA删边抑制了级联失效的传播 3. IA 删边更容易删除网络中的critical边

SF networks

1. In the region of moderate The intentional attack causes the network need more driver nodes than random attack 2. In the region of large The networks with small power exponent needs more driver nodes to maintain fully control under random attack than intentional attack. 3. For larger The difference of amount of driver nodes under two attacking strategies is not significant as larger

Conclusion We study the controllability of networks in cascading failure under two different attacking strategies, random and intentional, respectively. As we remove the highest load edge in network, the number of driver nodes in cascading failure mainly depends on the edges amount in strongly connected component (SCC), the reason is that the cascading failure is more likely to spread in SCC.

Conclusion For ER networks, with small or large enough average degrees, the highest-load attack cannot trigger the cascades and it impacts the controllability of networks slightly.   The existence of hub nodes makes the SF networks are vulnerable to the highest-load attack, and the larger damage can be triggered in the network with small power-law exponent than with the large one when the average degree is small, however, the increments of the driver nodes for both of them are nearly the same.

Conclusion For multiple edges attacks represented by removing a fraction f of edges.   The moderate f can efficiently suppresses the cascade under intentional attack, which causes the number of driver nodes under intentional attack is smaller than the case under random attack for ER networks and SF networks with moderate.

Conclusion This result indicates that the random attack impacts the controllability of less heterogenic networks more greatly than intentional attack for moderate removal fraction f .   For larger f , the attacks of both two strategies cannot trigger the cascades, and the number of driver nodes is determined by the robustness of control.

Thanks for your listenning!