Operations Section Leader

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Radiation at accelerator laboratories Prompt radiation from the particle beam Beam induced radiation –Neutrons –Gammas –Synchrotron radiation Radiation.
Advertisements

Temporary shielding for the 20" vertical penetration Igor Rakhno November 17, 2008.
PROBLEM: Radiation Dose Rate in IR2 When IR1 is Operating (and Vice Versa) Muon Dose Rate > 1 mRem/hr for 0.1% Collimated Halo.
UCN Phase 2 Design Status September 10, Design Components Bulk Shielding Target Crypt Cryogenic Insert Target Insert UCN Port Beam Window Cooling.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Review of May 29 Excursion Bob Casey.
Lali Tchelidze Safety work package leader
ESS DTL beam commissioning
1 Radiation Safety Aspects of the Linear Collider B. Racky, A. Leuschner, N. Tesch Radiation Protection Group TeV Superconducting Linear Accelerator.
Shielding calculation for ESS accelerator Lali Tchelidze TAC meeting April 2, 2014.
J. G. Weisend II Deputy Head of Accelerator Projects April 2, 2014 Actions at ACCSYS Resulting from the Recommendations of the Annual Review.
The Status of ESS Accelerator Shielding and Accident Scenarios Lali Tchelidze May 26, 2014.
1 1. Some recent views ( ) 2 Linac tunnel
D. Beavis (RSC) May 4, 2010 EBIS ARR Radiation Safety.
Integrated Radiation Measurement and Radiation Protection of BES Ⅲ Zhang Qingjiang, Wu protection group, accelerator center, IHEP,
Managed by UT-Battelle for the Department of Energy Residual Does Rate Analyses for the SNS Accelerator Facility I. Popova, J. Galambos HB2008 August 25-29,
HWDB: Operations at the Spallation Neutron Source Workshop on Accelerator Operations August 6-10, 2012 Glen D. Johns Accelerator Operations Manager.
Status of Radiation Protection Studies for the Linac4 beam dumps Joachim Vollaire DGS/RP.
PIP Status Report Linac Startup plans 12/05/2012.
Considerations for an SPL-Beamdump Thomas Otto CERN in collaboration with Elias Lebbos, Vasilis Vlachoudis (CERN) and Ekaterina Kozlova (GSI) Partly supported.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Summary of Shielding Calculations for NSLS2 Accelerators P.K. Job Radiation Physicist Peer Review 2007 March
New SPS scraping system: preliminary RP remarks Helmut Vincke DGS-RP.
Radiation Protection studies for the Linac4 / Linac2 interface Joachim Vollaire, DGS-RP 28/09/2015 Linac4 Coordination Meeting.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES NSLS-II Shielding Workshop R. Casey Activation Issues for NSLS-II March 28, 2007.
Details on the Accelerator Installation Plan E. Sargsyan & L. Lari 20 April 2016.
ESS wire scanner Benjamin Cheymol
Ma zhongjian Ding yadong Wang qingbin Wu qingbiao Radiation Protection Group/IHEP.
Personnel Safety Systems Stuart Birch Senior Engineer, Personnel Safety Systems November 6 th, 2014.
Accelerator Tunnel Layout (G01) Nick Gazis Senior Mechanical Engineer Review of ESS Accelerator Conventional Facility Design.
Safety - Lessons learnt from the design, commissioning and operation of the HIE-ISOLDE cryomodules Safety overview ESS 8 June 2016 AP.Bernardes/EN on behalf.
M. Munoz April 2, 2014 Beam Commissioning at ESS.
Accelerator Installation Plan: Graphical representation E. Sargsyan & L. Lari DRAFT - March March 2016.
Prompt dose upstream the 12-ft concrete shielding blocks Igor Rakhno May 4, 2007.
EURISOL, TASK#5, Bucuresti, November 1 Preliminary shielding assessment of EURISOL Post Accelerator D. Ene, D. Ridikas. B. Rapp.
Introduction to the Accelerator layout February 2016 Nick Gazis Mechanical Integration Lead Engineer.
ESS Front End diagnostic
3 MeV Measurements at Lianc4 1 Veliko Dimov (for the source and linac team) (J-B Lallement, J. Lettry, A. Lombardi, D. Fink)
Radiation protection studies for the ESS Activation issues AD seminar Michał Jarosz , Lund.
Dark Current and Radiation Shielding Studies for the ILC Main Linac
NICA injection complex status
MARS15 Simulation of Radiation Environment at the ESS Linac
Shielding Design for LCLS Injector Operation – Phase one
Radiation protection of Linac4 M. Silari Radiation Protection Group
Emanuele (ESS), Alessandro (CERN), Mikel (Tekniker), Hayley (ISIS)
Andreas Jansson, Lali Tchelidze
ESHAC meeting October 1-2, 2018
Beam Commissioning at ESS
PSS1 overview Stuart Birch
Operations, Risks & Hazards
RF systems introduction
Operations/Control room organization during commissioning
ISRC and LEBT Vacuum System Design
Testing Coordination at ESS
Ion Source and LEBT Beam Diagnostics
(Beam) Commissioning Plan
RSFs & categorisation 20 May, 2019.
Radiation Protection Handbook
T-489: Induced Activity and Residual Dose Rates
Beam Commissioning Planning
Operation of Target Safety System (TSS)
Lessons from the 1st Safety Readiness Review
ESHAC Meeting # Peter Jacobsson Head of ESH
RF introduction Anders Sunesson RF group leader
Charge and Agenda of the 18th TAC meeting
ESHAC #8 Safety Readiness Review Thomas Hansson, ESH
UITF Conduct of Operations Review
Radiation fields During 1st stage beam commissioning
The Management System at Work (Ion Source and LEBT commissioning)
Vashek Vylet, RadCon UITF Conduct of Operations Review April 24, 2019
Overview of the TARGET Monolith Rough Vacuum
IS&LEBT Commissioning Review Safety and Radiation Protection
Presentation transcript:

Operations Section Leader Radiological Hazard Analysis for Normal Conducting Linac Beam commissioning Lali Tchelidze Operations Section Leader Accelerator Division ESHAC meeting April 11, 2018

Outline Introduction Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation Radiological hazard analysis – activated air Radiological hazard analysis – earthquake Radiological hazard analysis – fire in the tunnel Radiological hazard analysis – lightning List of required RSF (radiation safety functions) for NC linac beam commissioning Defense in Depth analysis (ESS operational limits and conditions)

Before I start By the ESS management decision, the AD safety group is now gone All work/support coming from this group is now supposed to come from ESH No resources are foreseen in AD to provide support in conventional safety matters, nor for licensing application (currently I remain as AD representative in licensing team)

Introduction This presentation covers radiological hazard analysis for the normal conducting linac beam commissioning only. Beam commissioning is planned simultaneously with the installation activities in the downstream part of the linac tunnel. Beam commissioning is planned in the following steps: Ion source and LEBT beam commissioning (75 KeV, not covered in this presentation) RFQ and MEBT beam commissioning (3.6 MeV) DTL1 beam commissioning (22 MeV) DTL2 to DTL4 beam commissioning (up to 75 MeV)

Introduction

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – list of events List of analysed events: EA-13 Planned beam commissioning EA-14 Off-normal beam loss EA-15 Maintenance work in accelerator tunnel EA-16 FC shielding missing

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – dose rate plots EA-13 Planned beam commissioning Maximal dose rates for 1 W/m beam loss ESS-0136227 K. Batkov

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – dose rate plots

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – beam limitations Energy FC Location Average current Average power (W) Beam modes (to be discussed further) 22 DTL4 ws 8.8 µA 194 Probe, Fast, Slow, Fat probe 40 3.0 µA 132 Probe, Slow, Fat probe, Fast(10Hz) 57 1.4 µA 80 Probe, Fat probe, Slow(0.3Hz), Fast (3Hz) 74 1.2 µA 89 DTL2 w/o s 8.8 nA 0.19 Probe(0.2Hz) 3.0 nA 0.13 Probe(0.1Hz)

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – list of RSF Safety function SSCI2S Event class Functional Group RSF-3 attenuate radiation emitted from proton beam line Structural part of the tunnel and earth berm; all other permanent and movable shielding H1 Operational RSF-138 Ensure to stop the proton beam on FC at predefined destinations Faraday cup (in MEBT, end of DTL2 and end of DTL4) BPCS & MPS-ID RSF-139 attenuate radiation from beam on FC interaction FC shielding and TSW RSF-140 monitor and limit average beam current to values in “Table 3” BPCS RSF-32 Detect elevated prompt dose rates outside accelerator (normal conducting linac) shielding and alert/shut the beam off Dose rate shall be averaged over any one-hour period outside of TSW REMS & PSS1

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – shielding Permanent shielding structure: Concrete structure (with penetrations) “Movable” shielding structure: FEB chicane wall (ESS-0060233) Shielding in FEB side wall penetrations – not modeled (ESS-0120796) Drop hatch shielding - not modeled (ESS-0120796) Stubs shielding – not modeled yet (ESS-0189229) Alignment penetration shielding – not modeled (ESS-0120796) Temporary shielding walls (ESS-0136227)

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation – shielding Opening for alignment penetration Concrete tunnel Drop hatch Stubs shielding Stubs FEB FEB side wall penetrations FEB chicane (wall) HVAC inlet ducts

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation EA-14 Off-normal beam loss Safety function SSCI2S Event class Functional Group RSF-32 Detect elevated prompt dose rates outside accelerator (normal conducting linac) shielding and alert/shut the beam off REMS & PSS1 H2 Operational

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation EA-15 Maintenance work in accelerator tunnel Residual Radiation (100 days irradiation, 4 hours cooling) Safety function SSCI2S Event class Functional Group AM-10 Limit exposure by applying ALARA approach NA H1 Operational

Radiological hazard analysis – prompt and residual radiation EA-16 FC shielding missing Safety function SSCI2S Event class Functional Group RSF-32 Detect elevated prompt dose rates outside accelerator (normal conducting linac) shielding and alert/shut the beam off REMS & PSS1 H2 Operational

Radiological hazard analysis – activated air Highest expected DAC (derived air concentration) value for planned beam commissioning beam losses is 3.45x10-4 DAC, or 6.9 µSv in 2000 hours. Highest expected DAC values for the 74 MeV beam on Faraday cup is approximately 1.86x10-3 DAC, or 37.2 µSv in 2000 hours. No radiation safety functions are required. ESS-0239196, A. Polato

Earthquake On-going discussions. No agreement, yet, about the worst case scenario.

Fire in the tunnel On-going. Open issues: Worst case scenario Whether or not to credit fire dumpers in safety analysis.

Lightning Planned, but not started.

List of RSF for NC linac beam commissioning Safety function SSCI2S Event class Functional Group RSF-3 Attenuate radiation emitted from proton beam line Structural part of the tunnel and earth berm; All other permanent and movable shielding H1 Operational RSF-138 Ensure to stop the proton beam on FC at predefined destinations Faraday cup (in MEBT, end of DTL2 and end of DTL4) BPSC & MPS-ID RSF-139 attenuate radiation from beam on FC interaction FC shielding and TSW RSF-140 monitor and limit average beam current to values in Table 3 BPCS RSF-32 Detect elevated prompt dose rates outside accelerator (normal conducting linac) shielding and alert/shut the beam off (Dose rate shall be calculated over any one-hour period outside of TSW for H1) REMS & PSS1 H1, H2 AM-10 Limit exposure by applying ALARA approach NA

Thank you!