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Presentation transcript:

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Review of Laboratory Systems

The Laboratory Response Network

Michigan Laboratory System

Regional Laboratories in MI

Regional laboratories Level B (confirmatory) lab for each region Each laboratory supports a specific city, county or group of counties Receive clinical specimens from Level A (sentinel) laboratories Rule In and Refer to MDCH Level B-C lab in Lansing

Biosafety Levels BSL-2, designed for working with agents of moderate risk Work may be done on benchtop Aerosol producing procedures done in a biosafety cabinet Personal protective equipment (PPE) Immunizations Training required Access restricted

Biosafety Levels- BSL-2

Biosafety Level 2 Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers) Class II Biosafety Cabinet 2.4

Biosafety Levels BSL-3, designed for working with infectious agents which may cause serious or lethal disease as a result of exposure via inhalation All BSL-2 requirements plus ~Secondary barrier ~Inward directional, one pass airflow ~Sealed walls, ceiling ~Extra PPE may be required

Biosafety Level 3 Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers) 2.5

Biosafety Levels BSL-4, for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose high-risk of inhalation transmitted laboratory acquired infections and life threatening disease Two types of BSL-4 Cabinet lab Suit lab

Biosafety Levels Cabinet lab All handling of agents is done in a class III biosafety cabinet Dedicated non-recirculating ventilation HEPA filtered supply and exhaust air Daily inspections of containment parameters Shower/changing anteroom

Biosafety Levels Suit lab Same requirements as cabinet lab Special designed suit offers same protection as a Class III biosafety cabinet

Biosafety Level 4 Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers) 2.6

Sentinel Laboratory BSL-2 for processing specimens BSL-3 when risk of aerosolization is present

Role of Sentinel Laboratories Key role Foundation of pyramid Prepared and trained to recognize agents Processing/plating of patient specimens

Role of Sentinel Laboratories Recovery and isolation of possible BT agents: Bacillus anthracis Brucella spp. Burkholderia spp. Francisella tularensis Yersinia pestis Emerging agents of public health concern Rule – out or refer agent

Role of Sentinel Laboratories Collection of referred specimens: Clostridium botulinum Suspect smallpox Potential chemical exposure Properly package and ship specimens/isolates Notify public health partners

Turnaround Time-Sentinel Labs Agent specific 1-5 days for initial isolation hours after isolation to rule-out. New FDA approved rapid test for anthrax – not endorsed by CDC

Role of Confirmatory Laboratories (Levels B-C) in a Bioterrorist Event Aid in rapid detection of cases Play a role in detection of covert attacks Identify and characterize isolates referred by the sentinel laboratories Collaborate with law enforcement Preserve original specimens and cultures pursuant to a criminal investigation Convey information appropriate law enforcement agency and FBI

Level B Confirmatory Laboratory BSL-3 or BSL-2 with BSL-3 practices Responsible for Rule In and Refer Identify isolates received Characterize isolates received Serotyping ~Susceptibility testing Refer to level C laboratory for further identification/characterization

Level C Confirmatory Laboratory BSL-3 facility and practices Responsible for Rule In and Refer Identify isolates received Further characterize isolate ~Toxin testing ~PFGE Refer to level D for further characterization and archiving

Level D National Laboratory BSL-4 facility and practices Responsible for Confirmation, Validation and Archiving of possible bioterrorism agents Two Level D laboratories

Turnaround Time Confirmatory Labs Agent specific 2-4 hours minimum for presumptive results 1-5 days for isolation and confirmation

Testing Done at MDCH MDCH laboratory will perform procedures for isolation and identification : Bacillus anthracis Yersinia pestis Francisella tularensis Brucella spp. (genus level) Burkholderia spp. (species level) Clostridium botulinum and toxin testing Rule out and/or confirm Variola virus Coxiella burnetii

Lab Results Reports on clinical specimens submitted to MDCH go to: Submitter Local Public Health Department* MDCH Bureau of Epidemiology* *if a reportable illness/disease

LRN Laboratory Levels Confirm, Validate and Archive. Perform high level characterization. Rule-in and Refer. Rapid identification. Rule-in and Refer Isolate. Identify Perform susceptibility testing. Rule-out or Refer. Detect early (presumptive cases). Level A Labs - Use BSL-2 Level B Labs - BSL-3 Recommended Level C Labs - Work at BSL-3 Level D Labs- Work at BSL-4

Public Health Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism Focus Area D: Chemical Agents

Introduction to the Chemical Terrorism Laboratory Network (CTLN) This program is not as mature as the BT program but this will be changing rapidly. Stay tuned.

Initially, the Chemical Terrorism Laboratory Network (CTLN) was Composed of: CDC – NCEH - DLS State of California State of Michigan State of New Mexico State of New York Commonwealth of Virginia

CTLN (2004) Consists of Three Laboratory Levels Level 1 Laboratories: Clinical Labs & other sentinel labs will be a referral center. Chemical Training to begin in Level 2 Laboratories: expansion to 40 states labs planned for 2004 in collaboration with CDC & CTLN for limited testing for chemical agents. Level 3 Laboratories: CDC & NY, VA, CA, NM & MI to provide backup capacity. Reference methods used. Funding supports testing of clinical specimens.

Level 1 CTLN Laboratories Level 1 laboratories do not perform laboratory testing for chemical agents. Chemical Terrorism Laboratory Coordinators (CTLC) will provide technical assistance and training in the collection, handling and shipment of human specimens in response to a chemical terrorism incident to the Level 1 labs. Samples from a CT event are evidence. Training for level 1 labs is top priority for MDCH.

Level 2 CTLN Laboratories Perform level 1 laboratory activities including education & training Perform limited laboratory testing for chemical terrorism agents. Laboratory testing is limited to methods performed on the GC-MSD and the ICP-MS platforms. Cyanide, toxic metals in the 1st phase. CDC training for OH, IN,IL, WI for 2004.

Level 3 CTLN Laboratories Perform level 1 and level 2 laboratory activities including education & training Perform additional laboratory testing for chemical terrorism agents (metabolite of parent agent). Laboratory testing at level 3 laboratories includes GC-MSD, ICP-MS, GC-MS/MS and LC-MS/MS platforms. Cyanide, toxic metals, nerve agents, sulfur mustard-2003; nitrogen mustard, Lewisite-04&05.

What role will CDC play in the CTLN?

CDC – NCEH – DLS will provide to the CTLN: Laboratory Response Team – Available 24/7 Establish Laboratory Instrumentation Develop Laboratory Procedures Train State Laboratories on Instrumentation and Laboratory Procedures

Laboratory Response Team Facilitate acquiring blood, serum and urine specimens as rapidly as possible Assist specimen shipment from emergency room, hospital or on-site facility The first 40 specimens will be sent to the CDC lab If help is needed, fly CDC staff to site of CT incident

Michigan Laboratory Response Network Approximately 180 Level 1 laboratories One level 3 laboratory (MDCH) Other resources include: MSP & FBI Regional Poison Centers Michigan Dept of Environ. Quality Michigan Dept of Agriculture Michigan Dept Labor & Economic Growth 51st WMD Civil Support Team (Natl Guard)

MDCH Laboratories Will Provide laboratory training & consultation for level 1 labs Provide laboratory surge capacity to the CDC laboratories in the event of a CT incident Assist in the analysis of human specimens from anywhere in the US Must be ready to perform specimen analysis within 3 hours of notification by the CDC

Impact of Specimen Type for Chemical Agents Clinical specimens Compounds of interest may be metabolized. Timing of specimen is important. Threat to Lab staff for chemical hazard reduced. Universal precautions adequate. Documents exposure. Unknown specimens CDC funding supports clinical specimens only Parent compound is of interest & threat to lab staff is significantly increased. Labs testing programs for unknown solids, liquids and gases is in development.

Federal Regulations & Laboratory Security

Federal Regulations The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 Result of inappropriate purchase of plague No prior mechanism to take legal action Regulated the transfer of selected agents Required HHS to issue rules to implement these regulations Proposed list of select agents

Select Agents Bacteria BT agents Viruses Ex: smallpox, Ebola Rickettsiae Coxiella sp Fungi Coccidioides immitis Toxins Botulinum toxin Ricin

Federal Regulations Select Agent Rule 42 CFR 72.6 Effective April 15, 1997 Designated the CDC as the enforcing agency Established requirements for all facilities transferring or receiving select agents. Required reporting of all transfers of the select agents Tracked the acquisition and transfer of agents Established an emergency notification process Included list of select agents.

Federal Guidelines Laboratory Security and Emergency Response for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories Appendix F Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 4th ed. 1999

Federal Regulations The USA PATRIOT Act Regulated appropriate use of select agents Restricted some personnel access to agents Imposed criminal and civil penalties for inappropriate use of select agents

Federal Guidelines MMWR December 6, 2002 Laboratory Security and Emergency Response Guidance for Laboratories Working with Select Agents

Federal Guidelines MMWR Guidelines Risk assessment Facility security plan Personnel security policies Restricted access to agents Select agent inventory and accountability Transfer/shipping procedures Emergency response plans Incident reporting

Federal Regulations Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of (42 CFR 73) Supercedes prior Select Agent Rule (42 CFR 72.6) Regulates transfer, possession and use of select agents. Requires security risk assessments Expands authority to the USDA to regulate activities to protect animal and plant health and products

Federal Regulations What do they really mean? PAPERWORK!!!!! Extensive laboratory registration process Listing of every agent, who has access, where, why Personnel review, screening, fingerprinting Security risk assessment– facility upgrades Additional safety plan Agent specific training Documentation, documentation, documentation On-site inspection......

Federal Regulations Packaging and shipping infectious substances: 49 CFR 171 Code of Federal Register DOT Department of Transportation DMM Domestic Mail Manual IATA International Airline Transport Association