Ethical and religious language Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Aquinas on analogy We must extend our terms before applying them to God. Talk of God is by analogy.

Univocal language Talk of God is univocal. A word is univocal if it yields a contradiction when affirmed and denied of the same thing Objection: this doesn’t do justice to the transcendence of God. Duns Scotus

Aquinas on analogy We must extend our terms before applying them to God. Talk of God is by analogy.

Analogy of attribution Organisms are literally healthy (or not); food is healthy (or not) by analogy. Food that is healthy causes organisms to be healthy. To say ‘God is love’ is to say God is the cause or ground of all love. Two problems: Is God literally the cause of love? Does ‘love’ apply literally to us and analogically to us? Or does it apply literally and in the first instance to God?

Analogy of proportion A human father loves in the way and sense appropriate to human fathers and God loves in the way and sense appropriate to God. But if we don’t already know what God is, how do we know what it means to say that God loves in a way appropriate to God?

Tillich: Symbolic language Our understanding of God takes the form of symbols, e.g. ‘the Way, the Truth, the Life’, the Resurrection, the Cross. Religious language tries to express this symbolic meaning. Symbols ‘partake’ in what they express.

Three implications of symbolic language Understanding symbols and finding the words to express their meaning doesn’t follow any obvious rules. It is not possible to give a literal statement of the meaning of a symbol. We need to be sensitive to the fact that symbols ‘point beyond’ themselves.

Difference and overlap Many theories of religious language, e.g. symbolic, analogical, have not been applied to ethical language. But both religious and ethical language face the question of whether, and in what way, they are meaningful. A common debate began with the verification principle.

The Verification Principle Ayer: in order to be meaningful, a statement must either be analytic (true or false in virtue of the definition of the words); or empirically verifiable (shown be experience to be true). Because statements about God and statements about values are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, they are not meaningful. The big objection: by its own standard, VP is not meaningful.

The big question Does religious and ethical language state facts, describe the world? Do we experience morality or God? How can we refer to God or values?

Expressivism Both types of language express personal commitments – to a way of life and a system of values. They motivate us to act in certain ways. Language that motivates does not describe. Any fact, on its own, doesn’t motivate. I need to care about the fact. Is this true? What does it show?

Wittgenstein Language is always social, and expresses a shared form of life. ‘God’ and ‘moral values’ are not ‘things’ in the world; the language that uses these terms is not like empirical language. The nature of religious faith and moral views supports this. Yet many ‘users’ think that religious or ethical language does state facts… Can’t it be both an expression of attitude and a description?

Realism Virtues and the search for the good life Human situation and human nature Overlap Matters of life and death Psychic ‘wholeness’