POL 315: Politics of War & Security Dr. Kevin Lasher

UN Peacekeeping Part Two

Peacekeeping Today (3rd Generation) Peace keeping operations since 1948: 71 Fatalities since 1948: 3828

Peacekeeping Today (3rd Generation) Current peace keeping operations: 14 (5 long-term) Uniformed personnel: 88,268 Troops: 74,740 Police: 10,283 Mil. Observers: 3245 Civilian personnel: 12,932

Peacekeeping Today (3rd Generation) Current budget: $6.7 billion Countries contributing personnel: 122

Top Ten UN Troop Contributors Ethiopia ………………………………………………... 8326 India …………………………………………………….. 7700 Pakistan ……………………………………………….. 7175 Bangladesh ……………………………………….….. 6864 Rwanda ………………………………………………… 6132 Nepal …………………………………………………… 5116 Senegal ……………………................................. 3715 Egypt ………………………………………………….... 3055 Burkino Faso ………………………………………….. 3032 Ghana …………………………..........................…. 2974

Developed Country Contributors Australia …………….…………………..…………... 40 Brazil ………………………………………………….. 1302 Canada ……………………………………………….. 106 France ..……….………………………………….….. 886 Germany ..…………………………………………… 429 Italy .…………………………………………………… 1137 Japan …..…………………................................. 272 Spain ………………………………………………….... 613 Sweden …….………………………………………….. 285 UK ……………………………………………………….. 299 USA …..…………………………............................ 73 China …………………………………………………….. 2645

Peace Operations in the 21st Century Preventive deployments Traditional peacekeeping Wider peacekeeping Peace enforcement

Peace Operations in the 21st Century Transitional Administrations Peace support operations

Preventive Deployments “It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy, and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico- military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out.” Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General, 1995

Preventive Deployments Utilization of UN troops to prevent armed conflict between hostile parties Before-the-fact deployments Extremely rare One example: UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia) From 1995-99, UN troops prevent Yugoslav civil war from spreading to newly independent Republic of Macedonia Successful in keeping Serbian troops from interfering in Macedonia UN mission replaced by European Union mission from 1999- 2005

Preventive Deployments Perhaps most useful in carrying out UN goal of reducing war, but almost never used Major difficulties: anticipating conflict, violation of sovereignty, time constraints, lack of institutional capability, lack of political will

Traditional Peacekeeping Application of traditional, limited peacekeeping functions to intrastate conflicts with some form of cease-fire agreement in place Few “pure” traditional peacekeeping missions because of the complexity of most modern intrastate conflicts Most 21st century missions are “multidimensional”

Wider Peacekeeping Maintains notion of some form of consent between belligerent parties in intrastate conflict May occur with “fragile” cease-fire which could break down Wide variety of tasks including separation of forces, disarming belligerents, monitoring cease-fires, organizing and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, protecting civilians and UN personnel, host-state capacity- building Likely to coordinate with many governmental and non- governmental humanitarian organizations Often include changing mandates as nature of task changes Often characterized by insufficient resources

Wider Peacekeeping Typical peacekeeping operation of 21st century Successes: Namibia (1989) El Salvador, (1991-94), Mozambique (1992-94), others Failures: Bosnia (1992-95), Rwanda (1994), others

Peace Enforcement Chapter VII of UN Charter grants authority to “determine when a threat to, or breach of, international peace and security has occurred” and subsequently “to order enforcement measures to be taken against a state or entities within a state.” May consist of sanctions or military action Waging war in order to create peace There is no permanent UN military force to utilize in such situations United States, NATO or other major powers take lead in creating a “temporary military force” High risk of casualties

Peace Enforcement Examples: Korean War (1950-53),Gulf War (1991), Somalia (1992-95), Afghanistan (2001-present ??) Major power (usually United States) utilizing UN status to legitimize military action and encourage other states to participate Few successful examples are interstate war not intrastate war

Transitional Administration Following cease-fire and political settlement, UN forces either assist or take charge of administrative duties such as policing, creating a temporary military force, judicial functions, creating new political institutions and bureaucratic structures, others Responsibilities include maintaining security and order, facilitating and coordinating relief assistance, facilitating emergency rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, administering and creating structures for sustainable governance and the rule of law, and assisting in the drafting of a new constitution and conducting elections Missions are based on traditional principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force

Transitional Administration Examples: Kosovo (1999-present), East Timor (1999-2002) Both involved provinces separating from larger states (Serbia and Indonesia) UN took over almost all administrative functions in both countries temporarily and assisted in training of indigenous personnel to take over these functions Both missions would be considered “modest successes” with a host of unresolved issues (East Timor probably more success)

Transitional Administration Difficulty of Kosovo and East Timor missions highlight the unlikelihood of such missions as a practical solution to the dilemma of fragile states Comes close to “shared sovereignty” or “trusteeships”

Peace Support Operations Peace support missions are designed to undertake a range of civilian and military tasks, including the maintenance of public order, policing, mentoring of security forces, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation The peace support model operates on the basis of flexibility, allowing the mission to adapt its posture between peacekeeping and peace enforcement depending on the compliance of the parties Wider peacekeeping plus peace enforcement where necessary

Peace Support Operations Robust military forces to protect peacekeepers, protect citizens, protect humanitarian activities Military forces can be used against “spoilers” -- one or more actors who are refusing to participate in or abide by a cease- fire/peace agreement Greater willingness to use military force – in order to promote the large goals of peace-making and societal reconstruction Stresses “impartiality” over neutrality – difficult to describe military force used against “spoilers” as neutral Temporarily using military force against “spoilers” in order to promote the larger goal of state unity

Peace Support Operations Incredibly difficult (impossible) missions because of the combination of wider peacekeeping with peace enforcement responsibilities Trying to “keep” peace and “make” peace at the same time

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Much research has examined individual peace operations and made judgements about success or failure Very difficult to draw comparative conclusions across peace operations Much scholarly disagreement Each mission is “unique” to a certain degree

Keys to Success in Peace Operations 2nd and 3rd Generation peace operations often occur in circumstances of maximum difficulty, no surprise that success rates are “mixed”

Keys to Success in Peace Operations What is the standard of success? Satisfaction of multiple parties? Length of time before renewed conflict? Reduction not elimination of civilian deaths? Keeping UN troop losses to a minimum? Making a horrible situation “less bad”?

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Operational matters (nature of mandate, resources, number of troops, command and control) not very important Of course, peace operations with clearly inadequate troops or funding have much lower chance of success “Bare minimum” in operational matters seems to be sufficient to enable success (considering many other factors)

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Contextual factors Less success in intrastate versus interstate conflict; serious problem since almost all recent peace operations involve intrastate conflict Intrastate conflict often involves multiple groups (more groups, more difficulty) Intrastate conflict poses greater threats to peace operation forces (more casualties)

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Contextual factors Intensity and length of hostility between opposition parties Most success following cease-fire plus peace agreement Smaller territory is more conducive to success than large territory

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Behavioral factors Degree of “acceptance” among main parties Presence of one or more “spoilers” Third party cooperation or failure to interfere in peace operations

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Political Scientist Susan Doyle stresses the “learning curve” among peace operations actors Examples of peace operations which started poorly but ended with some measure of success

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Peace keeping and peace operations do not possess a single “magic wand” to deal with their situations Increasingly peace operations are dealing with complex intrastate wars, often with multiple combattants Often involved in states with long history of conflict and possibly recurring civil conflict Peace operations in states where one or more actors are not committed to ending conflict are unlikely to succeed Peace operations in fragile states emerging from civil war in which “state capacity” is limited will face major challenges (wider peacekeeping or transitional administration)

Keys to Success in Peace Operations Peace keeping and peace operations are an important tool in limiting, preventing or reversing instrastate conflict However, future peace operations will continue to produce a mixture of successes, failures and uncertain outcomes They will continue to receive mixed support from the international community because of the uncertainty and costs of implementation Despite improvements in UN actions, significant problems remain in the areas of funding, training, bureaucratic coordination, and the lack of a permanent operational peacekeeping force

The End