Computing a Nash Equilibrium of a Congestion Game: PLS-completeness

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Presentation transcript:

Computing a Nash Equilibrium of a Congestion Game: PLS-completeness based on Chapters 19 & 20 of Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory, Tim Roughgarden

Global Connection Game G=(V,E): directed graph ce: non-negative cost of the edge e  E player i has a source node si and a sink node ti Strategy for player i: a path Pi from si to ti Given a strategy vector S, the cost of player i costi(S) =  ce/ke(S) ePi ke(S): number of players whose path contains e G 8 t1 2 6 s1 =s2 4 cost1=7 cost2=6 N(S) 1 t2 8

Global Connection Game potential game a NE always exists better-response dynamics always converge to a NE Facts no one knows how to define a dynamic converging to a NE in poly-time no one knows how to compute a NE in poly-time question: can we derive an evidence that the probem is hard? (tricky) answer: theory of PLS-completeness

Congestion Game costi(S) =  ce(ke(S)) E: set of resources k players player i picks a strategy Si from an explicit set of strategies Si  2E each resource eE has possible costs ce(1), ce(2),…, ce(k) Given a strategy vector S, the cost of player i is: costi(S) =  ce(ke(S)) eSi ke(S): number of players whose chosen strategy contains e

properties of CG (S) =   ce(i) Congestion Game is a potential game Rosenthal potential function: ke(S) (S) =   ce(i) eE i=1 a NE always exists (any local minimum of  is a NE) better response dynamic converges to a NE

CG-NE problem Given an instance of Congestion Game, find any NE can we prove that CG-NE is NP-hard? ….if yes, this would yield to quite surprising consequences.

Addressing a typechecking error an NP problem is a decision problem admitting short (polynomial size) witnesses for YES-instances and poly-time verifier inputs accepted by the verifier are called witnesses CG-NE is not a decision problem class FNP (Functional NP): problem just like NP probems except that, for YES-instances, a witness must be provided also called search problems An algorithm for an FNP problem: takes as input an instance outputs a witness for a YES-instance or say “No”.

Reduction from one serch problem L1 to onother one L2 Two polynomial-time algorithms: - A1 mapping instances xL1 to instances A1(x) of L2 - A2 mapping witnesses of A1(x) to witnesses of x (and “no” to “no”) Notice: if L2 is solvable in poly-time then L1 is solvable in poly-time as well.

Theorem CG-NE is not FNP-complete unless NP=coNP proof Assume we have two poly-time algs - A1 that maps every SAT formula  to instances of CG A1() A2 that maps every NE S of A1() to a satisfying assignment A2(S) of , if one exists, or to the string “no” otherwise. Then NP=CoNP. Let  be unsatisfiable SAT formula, S be a NE of A1(). S is a short, efficiently verifiable proof of the unsatisfiability of  A poly-time verifier: compute A1() verify that S is a NE of A1() verify that A2(S) returns “no” Note: we’re using only the fact that every instance of CG has a NE

TFNP (total FNP): problems in FNP for which every instance has at least one witness. Theorem If a TFNP problem is FNP-complete then NP=coNP.

FNP TFNP can we prove that CG-NE is TFNP-complete? problem of finding a mixed-strategy NE for a finite game factoring … TFNP can we prove that CG-NE is TFNP-complete? no: no complete problem is known for TFNP (and people think no one can exist) Syntactic classes Semantic classes vs

FNP TFNP PLS can we prove that CG-NE is TFNP-complete? problem of finding a mixed-strategy NE for a finite game factoring … TFNP PLS can we prove that CG-NE is TFNP-complete? no: no complete problem is known for TFNP (and people think no one can exist) which is the right class for CG-NE? PLS: abstract local search problems

Maximum Cut problem Input: X Y Solution: Measure (to miximize): an undirected graph G=(V,E,w) with non-negative edge weights Solution: a cut (X,Y), where X and Y are a partition of V Measure (to miximize): the weight of the cut, ∑ w(x,y) X Y 4 8 10 4 1 3 (x,y)E: xX,yY It is NP-hard

A natural heuristic: Local search algorithm - initialize with an arbitrary cut (X,Y) while there is an improving local move do take an arbitrary such move improving local move: move a single vertex v from one side of the cut to the other side, if this improves the weight of the current cut. local optimum: cut with no improving local move available.

local optimum vs global optimum X Y 1 4 2 5 6 3 local opt of weight 15

local optimum vs global optimum 1 X 4 2 5 6 Y 3 global opt of weight 17

local optimum vs global optimum is finding a local opt easier than finding a global opt? sometimes strictly easier: unweighted graphs - max cut is still NP-hard for unweighted graphs - local search algorithm converges in poly-time facts: no known poly-time local search alg for finding local opt for general weights - no known poly-time alg for computing a local opt for general weights

local Max-Cut problem Given an instance of Max Cut, find any local opt. ….this problem is PLS-complete.

Ingredients of an Abstract Local Search Problem 1. The first polynomial-time algorithm takes as input an instance and outputs an arbitrary feasible solution. 2. The second polynomial-time algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution, and returns the objective function value of the solution. 3. The third polynomial-time algorithm takes as input an instance and a feasible solution, and either reports “locally optimal” or produces a solution with better objective function value.

A PLS reduction from L1 to L2 Two polynomial-time algorithms: - A1 mapping instances xL1 to instances A1(x) of L2 A2 mapping every local optimum of A1(x) to local optimum of x Notice: if L2 is solvable in poly-time then L1 is solvable in poly-time as well.

Definition. A problem L is PLS-complete if LPLS and every problem in PLS reduces to it. Theorem (Johnson, Papadimitriou, Yannakakis ’85, Schaffer, Yannakakis 91) Computing a local maximum of a maximum cut instance with general non-negative edge weights is a PLS-complete problem. Theorem (Johnson, Papadimitriou, Yannakakis, ’85, Schaffer, Yannakakis 91) Computing a local maximum of a maximum cut instance with general non-negative edge weights using local search can require an exponential (in |V|) number of iterations, no matter how an improving local move is chosen in each iteration.

Theorem CG-NE is PLS-complete. proof CG-NE  PLS (Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, Talwar 2004) CG-NE is PLS-complete. proof CG-NE  PLS 3 algorithms of the formal definition: Alg 1: given the instance, returns any strategy profile S Alg 2: given a strategy profile S, compute (S) Alg 3: given a strategy profile S, computes a better response for any player, if any, or report “S is a NE”. completeness: reduction from MaxCut

proof (S) =   cr(i) =W-W(XS,YS) W =  w(e) a player for each vertex v two resources re and re for each edge e two strategies for player v: Sv = {re : e (v)} Sv = {re : e (v)} cost of a resource r  {re , re}: cr(1)=0 and cr(2)=w(e) bijection between 2|V| strategy profiles and cuts of the graph cut corresponding to strategy profile S: (XS:={v : v plays Sv in S}, YS:=V\XS) kr(S) (S) =   cr(i) =W-W(XS,YS) rR i=1 W =  w(e) eE (XS,YS) is a local maximum cut iff S local minimum for (S)

what about the problem of computing mixed Nash Equilibria?

MNE problem Given an instance of a 2-player game in normal form (bimatrix game), find any mixed NE Nash’s theorem guarantees that a mixed NE always exists MNE TFNP no polynomial time algorithm is known for MNE what is the right class for MNE problem?

PLS: abstract local search problems nodes: feasible solutions edges: improving moves generic reason of membership: solvable by local search, i.e. by following a directed path to a sink vertex. witnesses

PPAD canonical source in- & out-degree at most 1 s generic reason of membership: solvable by following a directed path from the source to the sink vertex. witnesses

PPAD: polynomial parity argument in a directed graph canonical source in- & out-degree at most 1 s generic reason of membership: solvable by following a directed path from the source to the sink vertex. witnesses class PPAD introduced in 94 by Christos H. Papadimitriou

Theorem FNP TFNP PLS PPAD (Daskalakis, Godberg, Papadimitriou 06, Chen,Deng,Teng 06) Computing any MNE of a bimatrix game is PPAD-complete