Analytic Ontology Lezioni 10-12

Lezione 10 22/10/18

Nella nostra biblioteca (Filos XIX 502):   UniMC - Filosofia e scienze umane Documenti Contenuti 4  Esame dei documenti localizzati nella biblioteca The *philosophy of time / edited by L. Nathan Oaklander. - London ; New York : Routledge, 2008. - 4 v. ; 24 cm.

Let's conclude our discussion of unity and Bradley's regress

Geography of attempted solutions

Internalist approaches Internal exemplification relation. Problem: triggers the internalist BR and thus for no finite n we can say that Fa has n constituents. Infinitary internalist BR (according to Vallicella, found in McTaggart; but see also Broad). (Given Cantor) assume Fa has an infinite number of exemplifications as constituents, which provides the requested explanation: ... E4 E3 E2Fa . Problem: each E turns out to work as argument (as in “exemplification is an interesting relation” as opposed to “Socrates exemplifies wisdom”). Non-relationisn. the unifier is a non-relation tie or nexus, N (Strawson, Bergmann). Problem: a “tie” is a “relation but in name” (Lewis). Moreover we can still ask: What is the difference between a world with NFa and one with simply N, F, a (Vallicella). We can charitably understand this as a version of BFA.

Internalist approaches (cont.) Frege's unsaturatedness or Russell's (POM) double nature of universals. Problem: even if we assume that F is unsaturated, we can still have a world with F and a, without Fa. Tractarian unsaturatedness of all the constituents of a fact (cf. § 2.03). Problem: even if both F and a are unsaturated we can still have a world with F and a, without Fa.

The only picture with Russell and Wittgenstein together in the cover of this book

Identity approach facts unify themselves: "Fa holds F and a together" (Armstrong, A world of states of affairs) Problem: Either we do not understand "Fa holds F and a together" or we should take it to be false just like "the bicycle holds its wheels and pedals together."

Externalist approaches: Vallicella Vallicella’s transcendental subject (God) as unifier. But *God views F and a as unified* is itself a fact whose unity must be explained beside: killing an ant with a cannon? (David Lewis’s “incredulous stare”).

Externalist approaches: Fact infinitism We accept the externalist BR and claim that the existence of Fa is explained by the existence of E2Fa and so on ad infinitum: turtles all the way down Given a Cantorian acceptance of actual infinities, this regress is not obviously vicious. Or is it? Maurin argues it is

Entities that supervene on their constituents Sets, unrestricted mereological sums, propositions supervene on their constituents, i.e., they necessarily exist if their constituents exist. In contrast, (universalist) states of affairs and ordinary objects are not such. Do we have a problem of unity for the supervenient items? Vallicella says no. I am inclined to say yes (with Russell and Gaskin) If so, even the tropist's "f and g are perfectly similar" corresponds to a state of affairs with a unity to be explained.

Lezione 11 23/10/18

McTaggart's proof

Basic assumption 1: change is essential According to MT, change is essential for time. He means change due to A-properties of "positions in time" (events or times) (I call it "tensional") But there are other kinds of change ...

Kinds of change Tensional change: a time or event changing A-properties, e.g. time t was past; time t is present or my lecturing was future; my lecturing is present Qualitative change: any entity changing properties, eg., the stick was straight; the stick is bent, the apple was unripe (sour); the apple is ripe Absolute change (becoming): coming to exist; ceasing to exist Alethic change: change in truth value of a proposition, sentence or statement

Basic assumption 2: A-properties are more fundamental The A and B series are equally essential to time, which must be distinguished as past, present and future, and must likewise be distinguished,as earlier and later. But the two series are not equally fundamental. The distinctions of the A series are ultimate. We cannot explain what is meant by past, present and future. We can, to some extent, describe them, but they cannot be defined. We can only show their meaning by examples. " Your breakfast this morning," we can say to an inquirer, " is past; this conversation is present; your dinner this evening is future. (p. 463) B-relations are just internal relations that connect two "positions in time" (events or times) on the basis of their A-properties (Oaklander, The Ont. of time 2004).

The argument in short (M1) Each event has the A-properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. (M2) The A-properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are incompatible. (M3) The propositions (M1) and (M2) are jointly inconsistent. Hence, (M4) time is unreal.

Details (Ma) Time is real (hypothesis for reductio ad absurdum) (Mb) change in A-properties is essential for the reality of time (basic assumption 1) These theses lead to (M1) Each event has the A-properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. Yet, (M1) leads to a contradiction ((M2)-(M3)), Hence, rejection of (Ma): (M4) Time is unreal

The obvious objection (considered by MT) We should not say (M1) Each event has the A-properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. We should rather say, given a certain event e, (M1a) e is present, will be past, has been future. However, according to MT, the use of the tenses cannot be taken for granted, it must be explained. How? he considers 2 alternatives and concludes that the first one leads to a vicious circle and the second one to a vicious infinite regress.

Alternative 1 (M1a) e is present, will be past, has been future (M1a') e has first the property ‘future’, then ‘present’ and then ‘past’: the futurity of e precedes its presentness, which in turn precedes its pastness. Yet, in speaking thus, we presuppose the B-series (the B-relation ‘precedes’) and this according to McTaggart is wrong, because the B- series is less fundamental than the A-series (basic assumption 2): the B-series arises from (supervenes on, is defined on the basis of) the A- series.

Alternative 2 (M1a) e is present, will be past, has been future (M1a'') e is present at a present moment t1, past at a future moment t2 and future at a past moment t0 Here we interpret (M1a) by assuming a temporal series of moments to which we ascribe the properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. But then moments themselves have the 3 incompatible A-properties: they are future before being present wherefrom they are then past. Dilemma ...  

Dilemma from alternative 2 Either we go back to the first alternative thereby asserting that the pastness of a moment t follows its presentness, which in turn follows its futurity, thereby illicitly taking B-relations for granted, OR ...

Dilemma from alternative 2 (cont.) ... or we appeal to a new temporal series, with 'second-level' moments, which brings to a new new temporal series wih 'third-level' moments, and so on ad infinitum: t1 is present in a present moment s1 of second level, although it is past in a future moment s2 of second level and future in a past moment s0 of second level; s1 in turn is present in a moment of 3d level r1, etc. the regress is vicious, since at any new stage (wherein we get because we cannot take B-relations for granted, e.g. t1 precedes t2) A- properties re-apper and their use must again be explained.

Lezione 12 24/10/18 READINGS FOR NEXT WEEK: I'll send you a message; or look at the course site

The C-series the battle of Stalingrad is in between the battle of Marathon and my lecture now

Isn't the appearance of time in time? According to MT, time would then be only appearance (as in Parmenides, contra Eraclitus). But this problem arises: “If we reduce time and change to appearance, must it not be to an appearance which changes and which is in time, and is not time, then, shown to be real after all?” (“The unreality of time”, p. 474) MT tells he will reply on another occasion (see THE NATURE OF EXISTENCE). Sprigge (Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, vol. II, p. 483) summarizes MT's account thus: “The appearance of time must be the appearance … of some genuine non-temporal layout of events (the C series) and MT’s suggestion is that each timeless spirit contains a system of Chinese box-like parts one inside another, each a seeming moment of its life … such that the containing parts experience the contained as their past and anticipate what contains them as their future. The self as a whole, for the other members of the C series, lies at the end of time while for itself and in truth it is their timeless consummation.”

McTaggart 1927 In ch. 33 of vol. II of The nature of existence, the argument is the same McTaggart replies to Russell and considers his at-at theory of change There is also a criticism of Broad's growing block theory (passatism)

Teoria A vs. Teoria B (M1) Each event has the A-properties ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’. (M1a) e is present, will be past, has been future MT's arguments has not been convincing, but has generated a subdivision into supporters of the A theory (a.k.a tensed or dynamic) and of the B theory (a.k.a tenseless or static) In the A theory (M1) is rejected in favor of (M1a), typically because tenses are taken at face value, as ontologically significant; they need not be analyzed. In the B-theory (M1) is rejected because A-properties (as primitive and objectively attributed) are rejected. They must be analyzed in terms of B- relations.

(old) B theory Earliest supporter: Russell Take B-relations as fundamental Reduce tensed language to tenseless language Tensed vs tenseless ...

tensed sentences Implicit indexical reference to the present qua present or now. It is typically assumed they are subject to alethic change (1) John is (presently, now) seated (1P) John was seated; (1F) John will be seated Prior's analysis: (1a) [presently (now), ] John is seated (1Pa) In the past, John is seated; (1Fa) In the future, John is seated Other tensed examples ...