Phillips 66 Explosion and Fire PassadenA, Texas, 1989 Nurlita IRFIANI MKK152014

INTRODUCTION Since 1956 Phillips 66 HDPE Regular Maintenance operating Since 1956 Phillips 66 HDPE having producing Regular Maintenance October 23, 1989 Failure in either line or valve which carried flammable gas Operating since 1956, the 6.5 hectare Phillips Petroleum Houston Chemical Complex (Phillips 66) produced high-density polyethylene (HDPE) for milk bottles and other containers. By 1989 it was producing 20% of the US HDPE supply, and employed 950 staff and some 600 daily contractors. On October 23, 1989, a massive explosion demolished the Phillips 66 Company polyethylene plant in Pasadena, Texas. The accident resulted from a failure in either a line or valve which carried ethylene and/or isobutene gas during regular maintenance operations on one polyethylene reactor. In addition, 23 lives were lost and 314 people were injured. Causing $715 million worth of damage plus an additional business disruption loss estimated at $700 million. occured A series of massive explosion damaged 23 deaths, 314 injuries, $715 million worth of damage and $700 million business disruption loss

PE blockage lodged failed to Highly flammabel gas leaked Cause of the explosion (On the second settling leg) PE blockage lodged failed to fully remove Valve was opened Maintenance work (clear three of the settling legs on the reactor 6) Leg was isolated from the main reactor Highly flammabel gas leaked Explosion and Fire Air hoses to valve were not to be disconnected prior to maintenance One of the settling legs was undergoing regular maintenance to remove a solidified PE blockage. But on the second leg, worker had failed to fully remove the PE blockage lodged below the valve. Approximately 2 minutes later the vapour cloud ignited. It was some 85,000 lbs of highly flammable gas escaped through the open valve. The FBI laboratory found that the valve was open at the time of the release because the air hoses that supplied pressure to open or close it had been connected the wrong way round, ensuring the valve would not shut. But this, OSHA found, was only one of a series of unsafe conditions at the plant: the valve’s actuator mechanism had no lockout device; the air hose connectors on both the open and closed side of the valve were identical, allowing the valve to be opened when the operator might have intended to close it. Air supply valves for the actuator mechanism air hoses were open, allowing the flow of air to rotate the valve when the hoses were connected; and the valve lockout system for the maintenance operation was inadequate to prevent someone deliberately or mistakenly opening the valve. Fig. Typical Piping Settling Leg Arrangement

Scale of accident Aerial view of the Phillips 66 plant taken before the explosion A massive explosion demolished two PE production plants of the Phillips 66 Company. Initial explosion (around 1 pm) – its force as equivalent to 2.4 tonnes of TNT or a 3.5 magnitude earthquake (registered on Rice University seismograph). Threw debris as far away as six miles. Second blast occured in two 75,000-litre isobutane tanks, followed 25 to 45 minutes later by failure of a second PE plant. More than 85,000 lbm flammable material (700 lbm per square inch pressure) was instantaneously released to the atmosphere. In all, 23 people were died and 314 people were injured. Capital losses estimated > $715 million. Business disruption losses were nearly $700 million. View of the Phillips 66 plant from west to east taken after the explosion

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