Analytic Ontology 18-19 lezioni 13-15

Lezione 13 29/10/18 Per i riferimenti bibliografici (con formato NOME, (ANNO DI PUBBLICAZIONE)) nelle slides, vedi bibliografia tratta da F. Orilia, Filosofia del tempo, 2012, messa nel sito del corso

READINGS FOR NEXT WEEK

metric tensed sentences (1) three minutes ago John was tired; (2) John will be tired in three minutes. (1a) it was the case three minutes ago that John is tired; (2b) it will be the case in three minutes that john is tired.

tenseless sentences No indexical reference to the present. it is typically assumed that they are not subject to alethic change Abstracta sentences: (1) two is a prime number. B-relational sentences: (2) Garibaldi’s meeting Vittorio Emanuele II in Teano precedes Armstrong’s landing on the moon. Neutrally dated sentences (3a) Garibaldi meets Vittorio Emanuele II in Teano at 8:30 a.m., on October 26, 1860. (3b) Garibaldi’s meeting Vittorio Emanuele II in Teano occurs at 8:30 a.m., on October 26, 1860.

Tensedness or tenselessness? In the begginning, the A theory embodied the idea that there is really no tenseless language; all prima facie tenseless language is reducible to tensed language (Prior) (Very) serious tensism Contrariwise, according to the old B theorists, there is really no tensed language, or at least there should be none; all prima facie tensed language is reducible to tenseless language (Russell, Reichenbach, Quine ...) No tensism Nowadays, the landscape is more complicated

Theoretical landscape Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18 A versus B Dominant position: B theory (Russell, Reichenbach, Broad, Grünbaum, Putnam, ...) Alternatives: A theory (presentism, pastism, A-eternalism, ...) (Prior, Broad, ...) M. Dorato, Che cos'è il tempo, Carocci, 2013 F. Orilia, Filosofia del tempo, Carocci, 2012 Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18 A theory Priority to A-properties Objective (mind-independent) distinction between past, present and future Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18 A-Eternalism past FUTURE NOW Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18 Pastism PASt NOW Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18 Presentism NOW Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18 B theory (B-eternism) BEFORE AFTER presentness is subjective like 'being here' or 'being near' Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

The B theory

The B theory (a.k.a tenseless or static) There is no objective presentness More generally, no A-properties are objectively exemplified; there are no tenses in reality (ontological no-tensism); thus the name tenseless theory of time The old B theory also accepts semantic no-tensism There are objective B-relational facts Time is "spatialized": analogy between here (near) and now Eternalism is implied because all events of all times are equally real ...

B-eternalism "what was but has ceased, or what will be but has not begun, nevertheless is [tenselessly]" (Williams 1951, p. 57) The tenses however are not to be taken at face value William 1951, p. 59: " 'the present' ... simultaneous with the uttering of the phrase" In contrast in A-Eternalism what was has pastness and what will be has futurity

Lezione 14 30/10/18

No absolute becoming since what was or will be is, becoming is only relative to a time: " 'novelty' or 'becoming' ... the existence of an entity ... at one time in the world continuum which does not exist at any previous time "(Williams 1951, p. 62)

No tensional change (no time passage) Tensional change is change in the exemplification of A-properties No (exemplification) of A-properties => no tensional change And thus the name static theory of time

qualitative change? Persistence: endurance vs. perdurance (Lewis 1986) Perdurance: objects have temporal parts or phases: an apple has an unripe part and a ripe part (Quine 1960) eternalism seems to lead to perdurance (Merricks 1995) "things, persons and events are strung along with respect to the time axis ... " (Williams 1951, p. 61)

Alethic change? In the old B theory there is no room for alethic change. There are just tenseless propositions, whose truth values are fixed by the manifold of events Hence, no open future This is taken to be compatible with free will (Wiliams 1951, p. 63): a volition at t1 (freely) causes an event at t2 Alethic change in the new B theory

Lezione 15 31/10/18

Supporters of the B theory Many important philosophers have supported it last century, e.g., Bergmann (1960, pp. 237-38), Broad (1921), Goodman (1951, Ch. 11), Quine (1960, § 36), Reichenbach (1947, §§ 50-51). D.C. Williams' "the myth of passage" (1951) is a well-known defense of the B theory. Among the many current supporters of the B theory, there are, e.g., Dorato (1997), Le Poidevin (1991), Oaklander (Ph.D. thesis in the 60's, 2004) and Hugh Mellor (1981, 1998) ....

SUDDENLY LAST SUMMER (as Dr Cukrowicz)

Arguments for the B theory It flies in the face of common sense; the burden of proof is on its supporters (accept common sense unless it is proven guilty!). So, why supporting it? exploitation of McTaggart's argument: if A-properties are rejected, the problem of their alleged incompatibility disappears (Oaklander) What is the rate of time passage? (A che velocità scorre il tempo?) If there is no time passage, the problem disappears (Williams 1951, p. 59) Relativity theory (We shall go back to this). Simultaneity is relative to a reference frame and thus there cannot be an absolute present (Putnam 1967). It is assumed that common sense must yield to science.

Williams 1951 on relativity theory He says (p. 63) that "the theory of the manifold" (as he calls the B theory) is neutral with respect to relativity theory. In a sense it is true, because one could accept it independently of relativity theory. But undoubtedly relativity theory has been used to motivate the B theory (as is noted in the little intro to Williams' paper in the reprint (in Hoy and Oaklander, Metaphysics) that I have given you

Old B theory (1) Elisabeth II is seated on the throne; (2) Elisabeth II was seated on the throne;  (3) Elisabeth II will be seated on the throne. No tensism. Why? If the tenses are not paraphrased away, the truthmakers for these sentences could be taken to involve A-properties: (1a) /e is present\ (2a ) /e is past\ (3a) /e is future\ This seems presupposed: language mirrors reality rather straightforwardly.