Game Theory Game 10 Winner’s Curse.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Economics 100B u Instructor: Ted Bergstrom u T.A. Oddgeir Ottesen u Syllabus online at (Class pages) Or at
Advertisements

1 Auctions, I V.S. Subrahmanian. Fall 2002, © V.S. Subrahmanian 2 Auction Types Ascending auctions (English) Descending auctions (Dutch) Vickrey Auctions.
Bidding Strategy and Auction Design Josh Ruffin, Dennis Langer, Kevin Hyland and Emmet Ferriter.
Michael R. Baye, Managerial Economics and Business Strategy, 3e. ©The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1999 Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter.
1 Chapter 6: Auctions SCIT1003 Chapter 6: Auctions Prof. Tsang.
Auction. Types of Auction  Open outcry English (ascending) auction Dutch (descending) auction  Sealed bid First-price Second-price (Vickrey)  Equivalence.
Adverse Selection The good risks drop out. A common story.  Insurer offers a new type of policy.  Hoping to make money.  It loses money.  Reason.
Liz DiMascio Paige Warren- Shriner Mitch Justus DUTCH AND ENGLISH AUCTIONS IN RELATION TO THE TULIP MARKET.
Think more, think better… think strategically Juan D. Carrillo and Simon Wilkie University of Southern California Masiv 2014.
“Everything is worth what its purchaser will pay for it.”
1 of 22 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall · Economics · R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien, 3e. Chapter 17: The.
Auctions. An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bid ( The price at which a buyer is willing to close.
Project: – Several options for bid: Bid our signal Develop several strategies Develop stable bidding strategy Simulating Normal Random Variables.
Class 21: Bidding Strategy and Simulation What is a “bidding strategy”? –System of determining what to bid –For example: signal with winner’s curse subtracted.
19 - Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments.
Simulating Normal Random Variables Simulation can provide a great deal of information about the behavior of a random variable.
Chapter Seventeen Auctions. Who Uses Auctions? u Owners of art, cars, stamps, machines, mineral rights etc. u Q: Why auction? u A: Because many markets.
Simulations There will be an extra office hour this afternoon (Monday), 1-2 pm. Stop by if you want to get a head start on the homework. Math 710 There.
Auctions under Foreign Influence By Zoë Cullen & Benjamin Harrell.
Can you use your clicker? 1. Yes 2. No. Let A = we won the first game, B = we won the second game, and C = we are first in the league. The following sentence.
Game Theory Objectives:
Silly Putty™ Petroleum Mandy Gunville Cody Scott Matt Shucker Catherine Strickland Sample pages from report.
Spreadsheet Demonstration
Introduction to Game Theory
The cost of uncertainty in competitive bidding Professor Joel Huber Fuqua School of Business Electronic Commerce.
Chapter 18 Price Setting in the Business World. How are prices set by business people? Costs provide a price floor. See what substitute products are priced.
Games People Play. 12: Auctions Games People Play. Auctions In this section we shall learn How different types of auctions allocate goods How to buy.
1 M14 Expected Value, Discrete  Department of ISM, University of Alabama, ’95,2002 Lesson Objectives  Understand the meaning of “expected value.” (Know.
Copyright 2013, 2010, 2007, Pearson, Education, Inc. Section 12.4 Expected Value (Expectation)
Math Meeting Write today’s date __________________________ How many weeks and extra days are there until May 1 st ?_______________ Time: _______________________.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Chapter 12 Section 4 - Slide 1 P-4 Probability Expected Value (Expectation)
Game Theory Game 3 Your Value to a Game. You:  Director of a commercial-free music video channel  Cable companies pay to carry you  You make a take-it-or-leave.
MM1D2d: Use expected value to predict outcomes
CHAPTER 19 Behavioral Finance. McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2004 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Behavioral Finance Traditional financial.
Warm Up If Babe Ruth has a 57% chance of hitting a home run every time he is at bat, run a simulation to find out his chances of hitting a homerun at least.
WOULD YOU PLAY THIS GAME? Roll a dice, and win $1000 dollars if you roll a 6.
Agent Based Models and Common Value Auctions B. Wade Brorsen.
EXPECTATION “EXPECTED VALUE”. E XPECTATION – TELLS YOU THE AVERAGE AMOUNT OF MONEY YOU SHOULD EXPECT TO WIN OR LOSE IN A LOTTERY. PA Daily number: Play:
Auctions serve the dual purpose of eliciting preferences and allocating resources between competing uses. A less fundamental but more practical reason.
 Objective: In the game “Win to spin”, the winning player will be the one that accumulates the most of the points by spinning the spinner and hoping.
First Price common value auctions: Bidder behavior and the winner’s curse John Kagel, Dan Levin, Raymon Battaglio & Donal Meyer.
Bidding for an Item of Unknown Value The item you see will be won by the highest sealed bid. Write down your: 1) best value estimate, 2) lower and upper.
1 Types of Auctions English auction –ascending-price, open-outcry Dutch auction –descending-price, open-outcry 1 st price sealed bid auction –known as.
A game is played using one die
Discussion 3: FFTW-Introductions
Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Economics 100C April 6, 2010.
Credit cards discussion
Warm Up Construct a probability distribution and draw a graph for drawing a card from a deck of 40 cards consisting of 10 cards numbered #1, 10 cards numbered.
Further Information on MISO FTR Auctions
Bidding on an Antique.
Expected Value Practice
Expected Value.
The STOCK MARKET.
Economics 100C.
Expected Value.
Game Theory II Solutions 1
ROULETTE Yasmina, Phoebe, and Roshen.
Optimize Your Profits Build an Environment not just a Store
Investments Consumer Education.
BATTLESHIP! You will be re-creating the battle of the Monitor and Merrimack by playing the game Battleship! The pairs will face off, with the winner earning.
Game 1 The P-beauty Contest
Expected Value.
In Class Game Winner’s Curse
Warm Up – 5/7 - Wednesday A single bag contains 4 red and 3 yellow discs. Two discs are pulled from the bag and not replaced. A) Draw a tree diagram modeling.
Game 3 Your Value to a Game
Section 12.4 Expected Value (Expectation)
Game Theory Game 9 Incentive Pay.
Odds and Evens Here is a set of numbered balls used for a game:
Presentation transcript:

Game Theory Game 10 Winner’s Curse

Bidding for a Company Uncertain Valuation Synergy Adverse Selection A company is worth between $0 and $1000 per block of shares Synergy Worth of company increases by 50% if purchased Adverse Selection Offer only accepted if company is worth less than offer

value 1500 1000 bid 1000

value 1500 1000 bid 1000

value 1500 loss profit 1000 bid 1000

value 1500 loss profit 1000 bid 1000

Why? Expected value of the company is irrelevant! Consider only the expected value of the company if you win! 1000 500 ½b b 1000

Expected Profit Bid b dollars Expected value if you win: ½b If win, company’s value between 0 and b Synergy: 50% added value: ¾b 1.5 x ½b = ¾b if win: pay b but receive ¾ b Expected Loss if you win: ¼ b Probability of winning: b / 1000 Expected loss: b2 / 4000

100 Random Company Values Place a Bid of 500 711 134 680 269 217 698 356 948 578 366 197 595 863 389 681 533 566 976 921 995 638 404 255 91 729 440 527 129 975 334 51 485 400 20 177 570 350 39 706 365 867 257 894 675 285 419 452 598 594 207 536 142 919 815 558 428 131 624 489 923 810 275 519 763 582 90 109 688 267 390 336 897 926 808 972 705 725 34 163 898 704 848 112 120 790 817 573 494 472 917 383 398 94 14 86 58 854

49 Eliminated ( V > 500) 711 134 680 269 217 698 356 948 578 366 197 595 863 389 681 533 566 976 921 995 638 404 255 91 729 440 527 129 975 334 51 485 400 20 177 570 350 39 706 365 867 257 894 675 285 419 452 598 594 207 536 142 919 815 558 428 131 624 489 923 810 275 519 763 582 90 109 688 267 390 336 897 926 808 972 705 725 34 163 898 704 848 112 120 790 817 573 494 472 917 383 398 94 14 86 58 854

Value with Synergies ( 1.5 V ) 201 404 326 534 549 296 584 606 383 137 660 194 501 77 728 600 30 266 525 59 548 386 428 629 678 311 213 642 197 734 413 135 164 401 585 504 51 245 168 180 741 708 575 597 141 21 129 87

Profits and Losses ( Value minus Bid ) 299 96 174 34 49 204 84 106 117 363 160 306 1 423 228 100 470 234 25 441 48 114 72 129 178 189 287 142 303 87 365 336 99 85 4 449 255 332 320 241 208 75 97 359 479 371 413

Summary -479, -470, -449, -441, -423, -413, -371, -365, -363, -359, -336, -332, -320, -306, -303, -299, -287, -255, -234, -204, -204, -204, -189, -174, -117, -114, - 99, - 96, - 87, - 72 241, 234, 228, 208, 178, 160, 142, 129, 106, 100, 97, 85, 84, 75, 49, 48, 34, 34, 25, 4, 1

Summary for a Bid of 500 Lost Auction: 49% Won but Lost: 30% Profit of 0 Won but Lost: 30% Average Profit of -279 Won but Won: 21% Average Profit of 108 Overall profit: 49%(0) + 30%(-279) + 21%(108) = - 61

Simulated Profits for a Bid of 750 losses don’t win gains (avg = $375) (avg = $188) Average Profit = - 140

Results Winners bid (near) $0, lost $0 Cursed bid $1000, lost $250 Tyler, Tyler, Justin V., Bella Cursed bid $1000, lost $250 Adam, Sameer, Xue

Quality of Information Game 1 Information is very poor On average, you can’t win Game 2 A company is worth between $1000 and $2000 per block of shares On average, you can’t lose

Expected Profit Bid b dollars Expected value if you win: 500 + ½ b Synergy: 50% added value: 750 + ¾ b 1.5 x (500+½b) Pay b but receive 750+¾b Expected Gain if you win: 750 - ¼ b Probability of winning: (b-1000) / 1000 Expected winnings increase with the bid

Game 2 Most profitable bid: Least profitable bid: Bid 2000, win 250