to the USAF Air War College Biological Weapons Presented by Dr. Kenneth Alibek to the USAF Air War College November 1, 1999 HADRON, INC.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Chemical Biological Nuclear TACTICAL STRATEGIC

Factors in BW Effectiveness Choice of agent Deployment method Formulation Manufacturing process Meteorological and terrain conditions

Types of BW Threat Bacterial weapons Viral weapons Rickettsial weapons Fungal weapons Toxin weapons Peptide weapons (a variant of toxin weapons)

Partial Listing of Known Biological Weapons Agents

BW Deployment Methods Vector Contamination of food and water sources Aerosol (the most effective deployment method)

Soviet Biological Weapons Developed and Approved for Use Tularemia Glanders VEE Smallpox Plague Anthrax Q Fever (<1990) Marburg (>1990) STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL

Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s NATURAL STRAINS Ebola Bolivian hemorrhagic fever Argentinian hemorrhagic fever Melioidosis Lassa fever Japanese encephalitis Russian spring-summer encephalitis

Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s GENETICALLY ENGINEERED STRAINS Antibiotic-resistant (AR) plague AR tularemia AR anthrax Antibiotic- and sulfonamide-resistant glanders Immune system-overcoming (IO) plague IO tularemia IO anthrax Smallpox with VEE genes inserted

Types of Biological Weapons DRY Tularemia Anthrax Brucellosis Marburg LIQUID Smallpox Plague Anthrax VEE

BW Manufacturing Capacities Ministry of Defense Sverdlovsk facility--anthrax 100+ tons stockpiled Production capacity > 1000 tons annually Kirov facility--plague 20 tons stockpiled Production capacity ~ 200 tons annually Zagorsk facility--smallpox Production capacity ~ 100 tons annually Strizhi (new facility)

BW Manufacturing Capacities Biopreparat Berdsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders Production capacity > 1000 tons annually Stepnogorsk facility--anthrax, tularemia, glanders Omutninsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders

BW Manufacturing Capacities Biopreparat (cont.) Kurgan facility--anthrax Production capacity > 1000 tons annually Penza facility--anthrax Koltsovo facility--Marburg, smallpox Exact production capacity unknown; dozens of tons annually

BW Manufacturing Capacities Ministry of Agriculture Pokrov facility--smallpox, VEE Production capacity > 200 tons annually

Munitions, Submunitions, Delivery Means Aviation bombs with “biological” bomblets for strategic and medium bombers Spray tanks installed on medium bombers Multiwarhead ballistic missiles with bomblet warheads Cruise missiles with special disseminating devices (under development)

Epidemiological Pattern of Smallpox Weapon New foci of secondary infection Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Epidemiological Pattern of Tularemia Weapon Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Epidemiological Pattern of Plague Weapon New foci of secondary infection Contaminated zone Infected zone Zone of initial explosion

Epidemiological Pattern of Anthrax Weapon Contaminated zone Zone of initial explosion Infected zone

Modes of Infection PRIMARY AEROSOL Caused by aerosols that form immediately after dissemination Affect “target objects” before sedimentation SECONDARY AEROSOL Caused by aerosols which have already sedimented, but have aerosolized again due to wind or activity (building ventilation, vehicular activity, street cleaning, maintenance, etc.)

Modes of Infection (cont.) SECONDARY DROPLET Caused by droplet aerosols secreted by people who were infected by primary or secondary aerosols Seen only with agents contagious by respiratory droplet infection SECONDARY NON-AEROSOL Transmitted by infected animals (rodents, insect parasites) directly or via objects, food or water, OR Transmitted by contaminated objects (without involving aerosolization)

Effectiveness of the USSR’s BW Specific expenditure value (Q50) = amount of BW required to affect 50% of the population evenly distributed over one square kilometer (open area) Smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, plague, VEE, glanders: Q50 ~ 3-5 kg/km2 Marburg, dry form (and theoretically dry Ebola): Q50 ~ 1 kg/km2

Current Defenses Against Biological Weapons Physical: Early Detection Limited Capability Protective Gear Inadequate Unrealistic

Current Defenses Against Biological Weapons Medical: Vaccines Available for < 10% of known agents Genetic engineering can render ineffective Weeks / months to become effective Supplies inadequate Not cost effective Pre-treatment Depends on luck Treatment Marginal success

Medical Research Targets Treating and preventing a broad spectrum of infections by modulating the immune system Treating and preventing specific infections caused by biological weapons

Dr. Kenneth Alibek HADRON, INC. 7611 Little River Turnpike Suite 404W Annandale, VA 22003 (703) 642-9404 kalibek@hadron.com