PSS Verification and validation

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Presentation transcript:

PSS Verification and validation Paulina Skog On behalf of Protection Systems Group www.europeanspallationsource.se 14 May, 2019

Content Personnel Safety Systems scope (PSS) at ESS 2019-05-14 Personnel Safety Systems scope (PSS) at ESS Verification and validation goal Verification and validation flow Content Paulina Skog Protection Systems Group

Protection Systems Group PSS scope at ESS PSS0: It aims to mitigate high voltage electrical hazards for personnel arising from operating the ISrc and LEBT test stand PSS1: It aims to mitigate hazards for personnel arising from operating the normal conducting section of the accelerator. Accelerator PSS: It aims to mitigate hazards for personnel arising from operating the (whole) accelerator, including the super conducting and transport to target areas. PSS for target PSS for neutron instruments 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

Verification and validation goal Prior to any beam operation or energisation of the systems interlocked by PSS, the PSS shall be verified and validated. This entails all Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) described in the safety requirements specification for PSS shall be verified and validated. SIF01 (PSS0): If the ISrc HV OFF button is pressed, de-energise the HV PS by removing its supplied power. 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

Verification and validation flow for general PSS 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

Dependencies for parent systems If there is any hazards concerning the following: Ionising X-ray radiation Electrical hazards Non-ionising radiation (radio frequency) Magnetic fields ODH The parent system needs to provide their equipment before PSS can start the FIT. The FIT will always be before the SRR. This means no handover or SRR before validation! 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

Thank you Questions? www.europeanspallationsource.se 14 May, 2019

PSS1 Interfaces with ISrc 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

PSS1 Interfaces with RF Systems (RFQ&DTL1) Spoke cavities, medium beta and high beta cavities used the same interface strategy. 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

PSS1 Interfaces with RF Systems (MEBT bunchers) 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group

Protection Systems Group Dependencies for PSS Ion source: Extraction system HV PS Plasma Magnetron RF systems: Modulators Remove incoming power Removable waveguides - To enable RF to run with no RF to tunnel LLRF (Low Level Radio Frequency) Co-axial switch 2019-05-14 Paulina Skog, Protection Systems Group