Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 9, 2016.

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Presentation transcript:

Lecture 5 CSE 331 Sep 9, 2016

HW 1 posted

Take note of the many(!) notes

Small changes Post questions on Piazza! We might tweak the autograder a bit over the weekend These changes should not affect your score Post questions on Piazza!

Can you guess the correlation?

Another comment Discomfort with proofs I will not cover proof basics in class Please read support pages and talk to us in person if you need help

Lecture pace Mid-term

Questions/Comments?

Gale-Shapley Algorithm Intially all men and women are free While there exists a free woman who can propose Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to w proposes to m If m is free (m,w) get engaged Else (m,w’) are engaged If m prefers w’ to w w remains free Else (m,w) get engaged and w’ is free Output the set S of engaged pairs as the final output

Today’s agenda Prove correctness of the GS algorithm Run of GS algorithm on an instance Prove correctness of the GS algorithm

Preferences Mal Wash Simon Inara Zoe Kaylee

GS algorithm: Firefly Edition Mal Inara 1 2 3 4 5 6 Wash Zoe 1 Simon Kaylee

Once a man gets engaged, he remains engaged (to “better” women) Observation 1 Intially all men and women are free While there exists a free woman who can propose Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to w proposes to m If m is free (m,w) get engaged Once a man gets engaged, he remains engaged (to “better” women) Else (m,w’) are engaged If m prefers w’ to w w remains free Else (m,w) get engaged and w’ is free Output the engaged pairs as the final output

If w proposes to m after m’, then she prefers m’ to m Observation 2 Intially all men and women are free While there exists a free woman who can propose Let w be such a woman and m be the best man she has not proposed to w proposes to m If m is free If w proposes to m after m’, then she prefers m’ to m (m,w) get engaged Else (m,w’) are engaged If m prefers w’ to w w remains free Else (m,w) get engaged and w’ is free Output the set S of engaged pairs as the final output

Questions/Comments?

Why bother proving correctness? Consider a variant where any free man or free woman can propose Is this variant any different? Can you prove it?

GS’ does not output a stable marriage