Kant, Anderson, Marginal Cases Three Views AMC Essentialism Contextual Rights For Next Time: Read Singer “Famine Affluence and Morality”

Kant Recap We must always respect rational agents by never treating them merely as a means in our maxims Our duties can be direct or indirect All duties relate to rational agents (ourselves or others) Non-human animals are not rational agents; we owe them only indirect duties

Kant and PET Kant seems to be arguing that we can point to a morally relevant difference between human beings and non-humans: The ability to set our maxims and constrain them to principles of reason We do not owe any direct duties to beings that are not capable of setting maxims in this way Some philosophers argue that this commits Kant to undesirable moral conclusions

Marginal Cases Kant’s argument appears to imply that non-rational agents do not deserve any direct moral consideration Marginal agents (infants, comatose persons, patients with severe dementia, etc) are not rational agents in Kant’s sense Does this imply we only have indirect duties to them?

Elizabeth Anderson The Argument from Marginal Cases (AMC) assumes that rights are derived from individual capacities Rights only make sense in a human social context The degree to which species goods are compatible with integration into human society matters

Three Views Anderson begins by outlining the three most common types of theories offered to grant equal moral standing to non-humans Welfarist Views: The only morally relevant property is ability to feel pain. We have a moral duty to minimize the amount of pain in the world and all pain is weighed equally Rights-Based Views: All beings with a point of view (the ability to have experiences, desires, emotions, and a life that can go better or worse) deserve rights. These rights can not (ordinarily) be violated

Three Views (2) Environmental Views: Biodiversity and eco-systems are intrinsically good. Individuals are only good insofar as they are a part of a natural eco-system Anderson does not argue that these views are necessarily false. She believes that each does accurately capture something of value but that each view is incomplete or too simplistic Although all three views accord non-humans moral consideration they do so in different ways, to different degrees, and for different reasons

Example The Cane Toad was introduced into Australia in 1935 Without any natural predators, toad populations exploded and the Cane Toad has destroyed several habitats that are unique to Australia How might the Welfare, Rights, and Environmental views respond to this?

Argument from Marginal Cases Anderson does argue that the welfare and rights views commit the same error: They both assume that the equality of human rights must be grounded only on a capacity all humans share This assumes that individual rights are grounded on individual capacities, it ignores the social context that makes rights meaningful

The Problem with the AMC Anderson argues that the AMC fundamentally misunderstands and misrepresents the nature of rights Human rights are not derived purely from our capacities AMC leaves out the background social context in which human rights make sense in order to secure equality but this is a mistake Our shared human social context is not shared with all other non-humans An important aspect of this shard context is membership in the human species

Essentialism / Species-Level goods Anderson argues that what is good for a being partially depends on things that are good for its species as a whole There are goods that are essential to a species (essential for that species to have a good life) and these must be taken into account Several non-humans have demonstrated the capacity for at least rudimentary language but this capacity does not grant them a right to be taught a language These species-level goods work differently than AMC would require

Species-Level Good Homo-sapiens, as a species, are social creatures It is good for us, all things considered, to live in communities and to be seen by and interact with other members of our species This species-level good applies to all members of the species irrespective of the particular capacities of any member of that species Species-level goods can generate duties that we owe to human beings (a right to be taught a language) that are not owed to non-humans with similar cognitive capacities

Dignity Human dignity is a species- level good. Dignity consists of the requirements necessary to be presentable in human society Dignity is a species-relative property The dignity of a cat is the species-specific way of making cats presentable in human society

Rights Rights are generated from (they only make sense in), Anderson argues, a human social context Rights must be recognizable and enforceable. Only humans can be enforcers of rights (though non-humans can be recipients) Rights do not derive directly from capacities but instead from the way a non-human’s species-level goods interact with human species-level goods Some non-humans may have more rights than other non- humans even if both non-humans are the same species

Context and Rights Rights only make sense in a human social context but our history with a non-human can affect the type (and amount) of rights it has Wild dogs and domesticated dogs are members of the same species but they have different rights, according to Anderson, because domesticated dogs have been purposefully incorporated into human society The degree of incorporation into society matters A dog’s species-level goods are also compatible with our own

Rights (2) Rights can vary for reasons beyond context: Wild: a wild animal’s species-level goods are satisfiable without human interaction. Wild animals typically have a right to non-interference for this reason Domesticated: we can domesticate a species by incorporating it into human society. This grants domesticated members significant rights Vermin: the species level good of vermin are incompatible with our own. Vermin only have minimal rights, they can be painfully killed but not wantonly

A Schema for Rights + / - Y Y (dignity) N Y [3] ? (dignity) ?   Needs for survival met [5] Incorporated into society Deep incorporation (right to punishment) Protection from wanton cruelty Right not to be incorporated Protection from being hurt by humans [2] Right not be killed Humans Y Y (dignity) N Wild Y [3] Captured ? (dignity) ? Domesticated Dom & cap of rec relationships Vermin (rats, ticks, viruses) [1] Great Apes [4] N (unless caged)

For Next Time Monday is a university holiday For next Wednesday read Peter Singer’s “Famine Affluence and Morality”