Risk analysis Workshop November 15-16, 2016 on the theme «Evaluation of risk within the fields of health, industry and society» Jørn Vatn Professor at NTNU http://folk.ntnu.no/jvatn/ppt/RiskAnalysis_NTNU_SeminarNov2016.pptx

4 domains as a basis for risk definition Real world domain Observables such as number of gas leakages next year Scientific cause and effect domain What is the relation between the observables, which theories exist? We do not claim to possess true knowledge in this domain Uncertainty domain (we do not know with certainty) Lack of sure (certain) knowledge regarding future values of observables, current values of observables, and cause & effects Value and preferences domain How desirable the various outcomes in the real world are

Types of uncertainty Aleatory = Variability Temperature 1.st of January (next 10 years) Will a (general) person with some value of risk factors commit a crime for a given period of time Epistemic = Lack of knowledge Average temperature 1.st of January 2050 Will Per commit a crime next year? (I do not know)

What is risk? Conceptual definition: risk is to be understood as the uncertainty regarding the occurrence and the severity of events) Operational definition (expressing uncertainty) R = {<ei,pi,Si>} ei = undesired events pi, = an expression of the uncertainty regarding occurrence of events, i.e., probability statements are the quantitative language to express uncertainty (not an inherent property of the system) Si = Severity of the event, also uncertain, i.e., we need probability statements to express Si

The issue of conditional risk A risk statement is never unconditional, it should reflect many aspects U = the relevant information, the theories, the understanding, the assumptions etc. which are the basis for the risk assessor when risk is assessed D = the result of dialog processes and risk communication processes conducted in order to agree upon which elements of severity to focus on (e.g., fatality rate vs gross accidents) “Ambiguity” V = the result of the verification processes to verify the correctness of the assessment given U and D  R = {<ei,pi,Si>} | D, U, V Be as explicit as possible regarding D, U, V

What about probabilities and uncertainty? A probability statement is an uncertainty statement: pi = Pr(ei | D, U, V) There is no additional “uncertainty” regarding this “probability” Several steps are required to come to the actual number for pi These steps often include assessing risk parameters and risk influencing factors, where uncertainties regarding a parameter value is part of D, U and V The expected number of attacks could be such a risk parameter

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt The standard that must be met by the prosecution's evidence in a criminal prosecution: that no other logical explanation can be derived from the facts except that the defendant committed the crime, thereby overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty. G = event = “the defendant committed the crime” Pr(NOT G | U, V) should be very low to prove guilty

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Det heter at det er bedre at ti skyldige går fri enn at én uskyldig blir dømt.  Pr(NOT G | U, V) < 10% to prove guilty

Of “sound mind” (Strafferettslig tilregnelig) S = The person is of sound mind NOT S  Medical treatment = MT Should we «prove» beyond a reasonable doubt that S is true in order to put the defendant to prison? If so, Pr(NOT S | U, V) should be very small to put the defendant to prison The implication of this is then  MT And further Pr(MT of a sound minded person) is very high, which is ethically not acceptable

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Forvaring = protective custody Event: C = Protective custody required To pass a sentence on custody, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” principle should then require: Pr(NOT C | U, V) should be very small pass a sentence on custody For example Pr(NOT C | U, V) = 20% might not be sufficient to pass a sentence on custody, but: Pr(C | U, V) = 80% and hence there is a very high threat to third persons or even the victim of a violent criminal act considered OK?

Background – Case study 2 NOKAS (Norsk Kontantservice AS) was established 1st of July 2001 The business concept of NOKAS is to deliver reliable, effective and profitable solutions to banks for treatment, control and distribution of Norwegian and foreign cash In Stavanger NOKAS operates from three different locations up to May 2004 In order to improve security, NOKAS decides to move to new premises at Frøystad outside the centre of Stavanger The building application was approved in February 2003 Frøystad Barnehage (Kindergarten) achieve a neighbour notice, and the NOKAS- building emerges People are concern about vehicle traffic related to the premises, and the lack of parking places

Police officer shot to dead in brutal robbery It was the 53 year old police officer Arne Sigve Klungland that was shot and killed under an armed robbery of Norsk Kontantservice in the centre of Stavanger Monday morning 5th of april 2004

NOKAS relocation to Frøystad The focus at Frøystad is not traffic issues, or parking places any more: In one month a cash depot will start operating in the neighbourhood With the brutality demonstrated in the NOKAS robbery in the centre of Stavanger, there is a fair that something could happed to the children And especially in the Kindergarten located only eight meter from the NOKAS building

Neighbours Kinder-garten NOKAS

Next events … The Kindergarten and some of the neighbours organize themselves into a group which attempts to stop NOKAS from moving into their new premises The municipal demands NOKAS to consider Societal Security NOKAS moves into their new premises May 2004 A consultant company performs the risk consideration on behalf of NOKAS The cooperation with the neighbours fails, and thus there is no trust in the risk analysis report The report is also heavily criticised by Professor Terje Aven from University of Stavanger

Why was the consultant report so bad? Terje Aven: The Scandpower report claims that there exist an objective risk which is hard to assess. From Avens point of view, risk does not exist objectively Also, the Scandpower report claims that the risk is acceptable, which is not a statement to be claimed by the consultant It is the decision maker, e.g., NOKAS, or the politicians in this situation that should make the value statement regarding which risk to accept

The municipal of Stavanger takes lead The situation has become an issue for the local press in Stavanger Dailey reportages: ”We are fearing a bloodshed” ”We are not fearing NOKAS as a neighbour” The municipal of Stavanger asks SINTEF to contribute The work is divided in two parts A set of dialogue meetings to enhance risk communication A quantitative assessment of the risk picture based on the qualitative findings from the dialogue meetings The SINTEF work will from the basis for a case to be presented for a political decision SINTEF = Britt-Marie & Jørn

Dialogue meetings – Risk communication Elements An initial mass meeting was arranged to inform about the process to come Group meetings to discuss the threats and risk reducing measures Neighbours with children in the Kindergarten Neighbours without children in the Kindergarten Employees in the Kindergarten Employees at NOKAS Representatives for the Stavanger police force The results from the group meeting was discussed in a new group, now with one representative from each group The result was continuously documented in a protocol available to all (after quality checks)

Some results from dialogue meeting The two step procedure worked according to it’s intention The discussion between the group representatives acted as an informal information channel where issues could be discussed in a relaxed environment. In fact this meeting was seen as a first promising step in a future dialogue. The perceived risk was an important issue for the neighbors and the employees in the kindergarten. These representatives argued in terms of that something will happen, the question is when it will happen The representatives from NOKAS and the police had sympathy to the neighbors whish to have more information related to the security issues A central dilemma is that some information cannot be communicated opened, e.g., information about security systems, and the arrangements made by the police force From the neighbors point of view lack of information, and lack of control leads to increased perceived risk. Increased trust is therefore an important factor in the future dialogue and problem solving process A relatively large number of risk reducing measures were proposed. These measures covered both the short- and the long time horizon.

Risk quantification Risk was calculated based on six identified scenarios The scenarios were primarily a result of the group discussions The scenarios were structured in order to facilitate quantification Background data and assumptions comprised historical events, input from NOKAS, the police force in Stavanger and Oslo, available reports, and SINTEF judgements

Scenarios Robbery of a money conveyance without intention to enter the cash depot Hijacking of a money conveyance with the purpose to enter the cash depot Use of explosives with the purpose to enter the cash depot Taking hostages in order to enter the cash depot Use of “insiders” to get access to the cash depot Robbery of a larger money conveyance

Scenario modell

Scenario modelling The most important risk scenario was: Robbery of a money conveyance without intention to enter the cash depot Main parameters to assess What is the likelihood of the scenario? Will the police force interfere if an attack occurs?  Number of bullets fired off Probability of hitting 3rd person Probability of escape route passes playing children In the analysis statements regarding these aspects are discussed and presented

Assessment of parameter values Different aspects applies when assessing parameters What type of statistical material exists? E.g., how many robberies take place every year, and how many NOKAS like facilities exist, and are they comparable? How relevant is the data? How to use the “similarity principle”, i.e. is Stavanger equal to Oslo? Will the police force keep away according to their statement: “Why interfere when we at the end of the day will capture the robbers, as we did last time”

Risk picture summary

Risk evaluation

The interpretation by the media Stvng Aftenbl. Frøystad Kindergarten is safe NRK: High risk of robbery

The political process The scope of SINTEFs work was not to interfere with the political processes that were running in Stavanger at the time of the study. However, the two SINTEF reports (Risk + Dialouge) should make a basis for the political discussions in Stavanger The statement of the case from the city manager to the politicians in the City of Stavanger contained two parts Part one was a general discussion about the risk involved, both the assessed risk by SINTEF, and the result from the risk communication that had taken part in the spring of 2005 Part two was an explicit proposal to vote about. This proposal reads

The politician voted for the following: The societal security related to third persons in the neighbourhood of the new NOKAS facilities is not worsened in such a way that moving the kindergarten nor the NOKAS facilities is necessary The city of Stavanger will actively contribute to reduce the perceived risk in the neighbourhood by allocating necessary resources for dialog and communication The city of Stavanger assumes that those measures NOKAS had suggested based on the SINTEF report will be implemented

Comments and discussion