THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

CONTEXT Rise of China Autonomy for Latin America Breakdown of ideological consensus Securitizing U.S.-Latin American relations Source: Domínguez, “Changes in the International System”

THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER Unipolar? Multipolar? Flat? Pyramid? Source: Smith, “Global Scenarios,” CR # 4

THE NEW LEFT: ORIGINS Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

THE NEW LEFT: MEMBERSHIP Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006) Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2010) Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011) Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009) Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006, 2010) Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010) Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008) Mauricio Funes, El Salvador (2009) Ollanta Humala, Peru (2011) Near-Miss: Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

CLARIFICATION #1 Differentiation: right/center/left Contending leaders in/for Latin America: Felipe Calderón (Mexico) Lula and Dilma (Brazil) Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

CLARIFICATION #2 Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ Leftist candidates for office ≠ Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ Hugo Chávez Notes: Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized Rivalries and defections

THE NEW LEFT: GOALS Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech Sits atop petroleum Puts money where his mouth is Breaks established rules of the game Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power Challenges Washington Consensus Goes for high stakes Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

THE ODD COUPLE: HUGO AND JORGE George’s “gifts” to Hugo: discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural) caricature of “ugly American” unpopularity of foreign policies inattention to Latin America And Hugo’s reciprocation: exaggerated rhetoric potential threats to neighboring countries authoritarian tendencies Q1: What would Hugo do without George? Q2: What about oil?

CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA: GWB AND USA Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States Unified—under U.S. leadership Peaceful—in view of unanimity Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

REALITY CHECK #1 Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA Ideology = diversity rather than unity Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong among large share of population (improving with Obama) Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

REALITY CHECK #2 Not everyone wants the same thing…!

GWB and Latin America: Comparative and Historical Perspective _________Latin America as Priority___________ ______ Low _______ _______ High _____ Operational Mode for U.S. ____ Unilateral Ad hoc Systematic imposition intervention (Bush 2001-09) (Reagan 1981-89) _______ _________________ __________________ Intermittent, Consistent, Multilateral low-level high-level diplomacy engagement (Clinton 1993-2001) (Kennedy 1961-63) ____________________________________________________________

Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy ___Partners___ __Targets___ U.S. Policy (Mexico, (Cuba, __Rivals___ ___Bystanders__ __Configuration__ _Bush II__ __Colombia)__ __Venezuela)__ __(Brazil?)__ ___(Others)____ Low priority 1 4 2 1 4 + Unilateral Low priority 2 3 1 2 2 + Multilateral High priority 3 1 4 4 3 High priority 4 2 3 3 1 Note: As presented here, ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the first-place (most preferable) choice, 2 for the second-place choice, 3 for the third-place choice, and 4 for the fourth-place (least preferable) choice.

The End.