Locke, Second Treatise of Government Philosophy 219 Locke, Second Treatise of Government

John Locke 1632-1704 Locke was a younger contemporary of Hobbes, and thus he too lived during a very tumultuous time of English history, encompassing the English Civil War and, in addition, the Glorious Revolution. Though he was not directly involved in the conflicts, his work on behalf a number of prominent Whigs located him solidly on one side of the conflict (the anti-Jacobin side). It was his familiarity with the challenges incumbent on the development of authority from power that led him to write political philosophy.

The Two Treatises Locke’s Two Treatises of Government were written in part to defend armed resistance to the English king in the years preceding the Glorious Revolution of 1689. The First Treatise is an attack on the theory of absolute monarchy. More specifically, he criticizes the theory of a guy named Robert Filmer an English political philosopher. In his Patriarcha, Filmer traces the rights of the monarch to the biblical Adam. Adam’s (supposedly) absolute authority to rule then gets passed along down to the (then) present king of England (James II). So the king is answerable only to God and the subjects are obligated to obey the king’s commands. This is another, but very differently justified, version of monarchical absolutism.

The Point The question for Locke becomes, if sovereigns don’t get their authority from God, via Adam, where do they get their authority? In both of the Treatises, Locke argues for a theory that sets moral limits on the authority of rulers over their subjects. The ground of these limits is a doctrine of human nature. Authority both emerges from and is constrained by the nature of the human beings who make up civil society.

It’s all about relationships. For Locke, civil society is a set of relationships, relationships grounded in a moral choice: the decision to enter into the relationship. Like Hobbes, Locke sees civil society as emerging from an agreement between individuals. Also like Hobbes, for Locke, a theory of human nature plays its part by providing an account of the possibility (maybe even necessity) of these political relationships.

Structure of the Second Treatise As Simmons details in his “Introduction” (360-64), the ST can be divided into three different features of human relationality: Non-Political Relations (Chs. I-VI) Possibility of Political Relations (Chs. VII-IX). Political Relations (Chs. X-XIX)

Chapter II Of the State of Nature On Locke's view, the appropriate place to start if we want to understand political authority is with what we could call the 'natural condition' of human beings. For Locke this condition has two salient features: Freedom: "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature" (365c1); Equality: "wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another" (Ibid.). Perhaps surprisingly, for Locke the S of N is not a state of war. Rather, reason reveals a moral structure in human nature and ultimately reason guides humans to form civil society in order to ensure self- preservation and to provide more freedom.

Morality in the “State of Nature” Principle of Mutual Non-Interference (PMNI): "being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions" (366c1). Principle of Punishment (PP): "the execution of the law of nature is put into every man's hands, whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation" (Ibid.). Principle of Legitimate Power (PLP): the PP establishes the basis for the legitimate exercise of power by one individual (or state) over another. This power is legitimate not only because it is a consequence of the PP, but also by virtue of its scope and intent, "one man comes by a power over another only to retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint" (366c2).

Political Implications If human nature is understood essentially as a rationality capable of positive freedom (the capacity for self-rule), then; the only legitimate governments are those governments which preserve and enhance our humanity - i.e., our rationality/positive freedom/capacity for self-rule.... If consent preserves and follows from our humanity/rationality/positive freedom/capacity for self-rule, then; governments and their laws are legitimate only if they rest on consent of the governed (i.e., as they preserve our essential humanity as rationalities capable of self- rule).

Chapter V: Of Property Every person owns their own body. Nobody else has a right to one’s own body. One also has a right to one’s own labor and work. Whatever is unowned in the state of nature and is worked on by a person becomes the property of that person. Then no one else has a right to it. There are limits to how much we can own. "As much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others” (371c2).

VII. Of Political or Civil Society Locke believes that we are by nature social creatures. Consistent with his emphasis on relations (and echoing Aristotle), Locke identifies the “first society” with the family. The development of civil society is marked by the ceding by individuals of certain of their natural rights, particularly concerning punishment and redress. This is the social contract. An “artificial” relationship constituted by the free agreement of the parties in the civil society (cf. §89, 375c2).

VIII. Of the Beginning of Political Societies Why would people enter into such contracts? In doing so, they must give up their natural powers. Including, 1) to do as they see fit to preserve themselves and their property; 2) to punish those who interfere with their exercise of the first power. Locke, like Hobbes, believes that people have good reasons to form into societies. Locke identifies two: to secure their property; and to live in comfort, safety, and peace.

Why a Democratic Contract? We’ve already considered his critique of monarchy, but that in itself doesn’t justify an insistence that a commonwealth (cf., §133) be democratically constituted. He does offer a positive argument to this conclusion: “it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary that the Body should move the way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue on Body, one Community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority” (376c1). Locke adds the assumption that in the social contract, each individual consented to be ruled by the decision of the majority.

IX Of the Ends of Political Society and Government Locke restates the reasons for leaving the state of nature and forming a political society. The motives should clearly be expressed in the ends or goals of the contract. People sacrifice their freedom for their security and the preservation of their property, which includes, for Locke, their lives, liberties, possessions, and lands.

What are those ends? Locke highlights three different functions of civil society, which he claims address the motives of the individuals in contract. The society can have publicly agreed laws, which will settle disputes between people. In society, there can be an impartial judge who settles disputes according to the law. In society, there can be a system that enforces the rulings of judges. These advantages of living in society explain why it is so rare to find people choosing to remain in a state of nature.

Vive La Revolution! Chapters 27-9 finish Locke’s original argument, justifying in specific conditions and laying out the limits of a revocation of the contract. As the discussion of Usurpation makes clear, these justifications and limits revolve around the concept of authority. When power exceeds authority, or is exercised without it (Tyranny), the parties to the contract have the right to dissolve it and form a new agreement.