V-22 Osprey Development to Deployment TX-SX: Title of presentation Presenters Name 4:49 PM V-22 Osprey Development to Deployment LtCol Gregg Skinner, USMC Michael Belcher PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM

TX-SX: Title of presentation Presenters Name Intro LtCol Gregg Skinner MV-22 Chief Engineer PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM Gregg.Skinner@Navy.mil Michael Belcher V-22 RM&A Lead PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM Michael.S.Belcher@Navy.mil

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Outline Program Overview Capabilities Acquisition Road Map V-22 Reliability Past / Present / Future Reliability Improvement Process FRACAS Database Corrective Action Projection Models Validation Strategic Nacelle Initiative Summary 4 4 4

Delivering Innovation

V-22 Osprey System Description Mission: Provide operating forces with a supportable, reliable advanced Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft weapon system capable of satisfying Marine Corps assault vertical lift; Navy fleet logistics, special warfare, combat search and rescue; and SOCOM long-range special operations lift. Description: The V-22 tiltrotor aircraft combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. It is powered by two turboshaft engines. Platforms: The V-22 aircraft is able to operate from air capable ships and unimproved landing sites throughout the world. It is capable of in-flight refueling. Employment: In addition to the Marine Corps assault vertical lift mission, the special operations aircraft (CV-22) consists of the baseline V-22 aircraft (MV-22) configuration plus a terrain following radar, additional fuel tanks, radios, flare/chaff dispensers, radar jammer and warning receiver.

V-22 Osprey Program Summary Prime Contractor: Joint Bell Boeing Customer: USMC, USAF, USN POR Configuration: MV – Marines (360) CV – Air Force (50) MV – Navy (48) Contracted/Plan: 288/459 FRP Decision: September 2005 IOC: MV – Complete (2007) CV – Complete (2009) Fuselage: Ridley Park, PA Final Assembly: Amarillo, TX Source: PMA-275 Current Status MYP I: FY08-FY12 (Executing) MYP II: FY13-FY17 (Planning) Fielded: 133 (115 MVs/18 CVs) Block Status: MV: Blk A/B – fielded Blk C – on contract CV: Blk 0/10 – fielded Blk 20 – Increment 3 on contract 7

Effective and Survivable MV Deployment at Sea MV Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments Deployed 16 OCONUS deployments since 2007 In the Fight Raids, assaults, direct action, CASEVAC, long-range logistics support Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief CV Deployments Source: HQMC APW Deployments to date: USMC: 9 (3 x OIF, 3xOEF, 3xMEU) AFSOC: 5 HQMC cleared for public release

V-22 Defines Capability Leap Unprecedented agility and operational reach Operation Enduring Freedom Operation Iraqi Freedom CH-46E Combat Radius 75 nm / 12 pax MV-22B 325 nm / 24 pax Source: HQMC APW Takeaway: Exponentially greater speed and range over legacy assets (CH-46E example) allows the V-22 to cover the entire theater of operations. Effective and Survivable – Executing Full Array of Missions HQMC cleared for public release

HQMC cleared for public release MV-22 Safety Source: HQMC Safety Division The mishap rate is calculated as a ration of class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours. From 1 Jan 2001 to 31 Jan 2011, the MV-22B has the lowest class A mishap rate of any Marine tactical rotorcraft MV-22: 1.357 USMC average: 2.46 CH-46E: 1.361 HQMC cleared for public release

Most Survivable Rotorcraft Ever Built SUSCEPTIBILITY I N T E L G M S O P A THREAT SUPPRESSION RANGE SPEED SIGNATURE CONTROL Radar Infrared Visual Acoustic Electronic Emissions COUNTERMEASURES & SIGNATURE CONTROL Radar Warning System Missile Launch Warning Countermeasures DIRCM (CV Only) SIRFC (CV Only) DETECTION ACQUISITION AVOIDANCE KILL TOLERANCE SURVIVABILITY ENGAGEMENT HIT AVOIDANCE VULNERABILITY VULNERABILITY REDUCTION Fire Suppression Broom Straw Controlled Wing Failure Ballistic Tolerance CBR&N Component Redundancy (with Separation) Source: HQMC APW Key takeaway: The V-22 is the most survivable rotorcraft ever built Survivability is a function of three key elements: susceptibility, vulnerability, and crashworthiness. Susceptibility is the probability of being hit; vulnerability is the probability of surviving, if hit; and, crashworthiness is the probability the occupants will survive an emergency landing or ground impact without serious injury. The V-22 reduces its susceptibility through the use of speed, range, altitude, situational awareness for the aircrew, the aircraft survivability suite sensors and countermeasures, as well as infra-red signature reduction. Ballistic tolerance and system redundancy combine to reduce the Osprey’s vulnerability. The V-22 capitalizes on the fatigue resistance and damage tolerant properties of composites which allow the V-22 to continue flight after sustaining impacts from projectiles. Cockpit seats are armored to withstand a 7.62mm small arms round. Fuel tanks are self-sealing and contain inert nitrogen gas to reduce the possibility of vapor ignition. The flight control system provides redundant flight control computers and hydraulic systems powered by redundant electrical subsystems. All major flight systems are physically separated to prevent loss of system functionality following loss of a single system. An emergency lubrication system provides 30 minutes of flight following loss of the primary proprotor transmission system. V-22 crashworthiness is a function of design. Heavy components, such as the engines and transmissions, are located away from the cabin and cockpit area. The proprotors are designed to fray or “broomstraw” rather than splinter on impact with the ground. The energy-absorbing landing gear system is designed to attenuate most of the energy for hard landings up to 24 fps. The wing is constructed to fail outboard of the wing/fuselage attachment in a manner that absorbs kinetic energy and ensures the cabin area will not be crushed, thereby protecting the occupants. An anti-plow bulkhead prevents the nose from digging in on impact, and the fuselage provides a reinforced shell that is designed to maintain 85% of its volume during a crash. Aircrew and embarked troops receive additional protection from crashworthy seats that stroke vertically to absorb energy. In any combat operation against a determined foe when assault support aircraft deliver supplies or troops to a contested area, there is the chance that hostile fire will impact the aircraft. Valuable lessons have been learned recently in the kinetic fight of Operation Enduring Freedom. Through the course of their operations, MV-22B's have taken surface to air fires on multiple occasions. No one can say with certainty how many 'misses' there have been, but we do know that the aircraft have received hits from various small arms fire on several occasions. Due to the robust ballistic tolerance of this airframe, in all instances the affected aircraft have been able to safely return to base with no injuries to embarked personnel or crewmembers. Moreover, in each instance the aircraft were repaired at the organizational (squadron) level and were returned to the flight schedule in short order. Battle damage in OIF/OEF due to enemy fire Every instance the aircraft returned safely to base with no injuries HQMC cleared for public release

Location / Operational Inventory V-22 Osprey Location / Operational Inventory

Strategy Development- Philosophy MS I MS II+ MS III MS II S Cost Readiness Capability Cost Readiness Win Win Trust Objectives Measures Actions Safety Reliability Logistics Trust Investing in Resources #1 - People

Acquisition & Lifecycle Management Source: HQMC APW Takeaway: Exponentially greater speed and range over legacy assets (CH-46E example) allows the V-22 to cover the entire theater of operations. HQMC cleared for public release

Analogy/Parametric/Engineering Methods RCM Failure Management Process Analogy/Parametric/Engineering Methods Actual Method

Reliability Past / Present / Future In Service - Reliability Performance Actual Environment Usage 16 16 16

Reliability Past / Present / Future 0.37 hrs 0.9 hrs LRIP (2000) Block A (Present) Block B Block C (Jan 2012) 1.0 2.0 3.0 Hours 1.3 hrs 1.5 hrs Mean Flight Hour Between Failure Growth Threshold: 0.9 hrs 17 17 17

MV-22 Incremental Acquisition Mission and R&M Improvements Block D Block C P3I Block B ECS Upgrade Wx Radar Troop Commander Station Forward ALE 47 Crash Position Indicator Enhanced Stby Flt Instruments Improved Engine Starter Valve Improved engine starter valve TBD Capabilities Block A Enhanced R & M Safe and Operational Wing Aux Tanks Clam shell doors Retractable ARP Icing Clearance Hoist / Fast Rope DAMA SATCOM Dual DIGMAP Line Clearance Flight Control Software IETM / NATOPS Standdown 12/00 - 5/02 FY 01 - 05 FY 06 - 08 FY 09 - ?

Reliability Improvement Process Fleet Operational Data MV and CV Aircraft Identify Reliability Readiness Degraders Root Cause Component System Corrective Action Material Non-Material Implementation Off Aircraft Testing Establish Aircraft Validation Plan Implement CA into Fleet Aircraft Monitor Fleet Operations Validate CA Effectiveness

Identify Readiness Degraders V-22 Critical Item Logistics Review (CILR) Process TMS Team FST Readiness Degraders PMA-275 Reliability Degraders Mission Dependability Operational Supportability Multiple Criteria used in determining Degraders Individual criteria ranked Establish Composite Score Analyze degraders Supply Maintenance Reliability Develop Goals Implementation Plan Validate CILR Composite Score

V-22 FRACAS Database V-22 CARTS database R&M Tool Kit Production Suppliers MV Fleet CV Fleet R&M Tool Kit R&M Metric reports Failure Mode Identification Corrective Action Plans AMSAA Projection

Root Cause & Corrective Action Integrated Product Team (IPT) Engineering Investigation Supplier Findings Repair Data Corrective Action Addresses Root Cause Findings Target Corrective Actions Safety Impact to readiness & Cost

CA Implementation Strategy Fielded Aircraft Production Aircraft Attrition When old part fails, replace with new configuration part Production Aircraft Affectivity is Identified Force Retrofit Old configuration part is forced off the targeted fielded aircraft

Validate Corrective Action Establish Validation Goals Failure Mode or Component Characteristic Life Mean Time To Remove Establish Test Profile Operational Aircraft Sets Expectations to PM Establishes Plan Line Staggered Introduction Monitor aircraft progress

Validate Corrective Action Completed Hydraulic Actuator Validation TPM Target Threshold Upper Threshold 0 Failures, T = 27,128 FH Successful Validation Point Nov 2009 Jan 2011 Crosses Flight Hours Mean Time To Remove

Corrective Action Validation Summary March 2011

Corrective Action Validation Summary March 2011

Strategic Nacelle Initiative

Single Assessment POA&M POA&M repeated for each of 8 assessments

TX-SX: Title of presentation Presenters Name Summary Educate your PMs Test Document your assumptions Leave breadcrumbs Alignment Tell stories…they travel better than facts

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