UN BWC Meeting of States Parties Biochemical Security 2030 Project Report UN BWC Meeting of States Parties Dr Brett Edwards University of Bath

Central Project Question How to ensure that advances in S&T do not undermine the prohibition against biological and chemical Weapons?

Key Aspects of Project (1) Three meetings First Project Meeting, University of Bath Workshop on Regional Innovation Biochemical Security Network, University of Bath Biological and Chemical Security in an Age of Responsible Innovation, The Royal Society, London

Key Aspects of Project (2) Down the slippery slope? A study of contemporary dual-use chemical and life-science research potentially applicable to incapacitating chemical agent weapons (October 2014) – By Dr Michael Crowley and Professor Malcolm Dando –  Paper 8 BTWC: Learning from Alternative Models of Science and Technology Review  (July 2014) – By Dr Catherine Rhodes – Paper 7 Convergence at the Intersection of Chemistry and Biology- Implications for the Regime Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons   (July 2014) – By Dr Ralf Trapp – Paper 6 To What Extent Was The Review Of Science And Technology Made More Effective And Efficient At The 2013 Meeting Of BTWC States Parties? (May 2014) – By Prof. Malcolm Dando – Paper 5 Beyond the Horizon: “Wide Area” Riot Control Agents Means of Delivery and Their Relevance to the CWC, BWC and UNSCR 1540 (February 2014)- By Dr Michael Crowley and Dr Dana Perkins – Paper 4 The Growth of Amateur Biology: A Dual Use Governance Challenge? (November 2013) – By Dr Catherine Jefferson – Paper 3 The 2013 Meeting of Experts to the BWC, with a Focus on the Standing Agenda Item Review of Science and Technology Developments (November 2013) – By Prof.  Kathryn Nixdorff – Paper 2 Application of the OPCW Mechanisms for Reviewing and Addressing Science and Technology Developments: the Case of Incapacitating Chemical Agents (ICAs) (November 2013) – By Dr Michael Crowley – Paper 1

Key Aspects of Project (3) Forthcoming Publications The central role of nanotechnology in targeted delivery of biological agents: implications for biosecurity Professor Kathryn Nixdorff Attempts to identify and assess security challenges posed by synthetic biology in the context of the BTWC and CWC Dr Brett Edwards and Dr James Revill Arms control, non-proliferation and Resilience Dr Brett Edwards and Professor David Galbreath

Key Findings and Questions

Findings Regional Innovation Biosecurity Network Feasibility Study Meeting University Health and Safety typically deal with security aspects and training i.e containment, CWC reporting Support for sharing good practice Especially as legislative approach not seen as feasible Wide range of professional and informal networks already exist Support for education Need for institutional innovation security policy to be more forward looking. For example it was suggested that there was need for greater security consultation when new laboratories were being designed and built. Education initiatives directed scientists would be of value to many of the stake-holders. Universities as: Producers and Consumers

Looking forward: What do we want from S&T review processes? Advances in S&T Outputs Underlying systems of tech generation Tech Governance Changing role/structure of CBW regimes Convergence Arms control to Risk Management Rise of Networks Cross- article/ Cross-treaty nature of challenges Security Environment Terrorism Changing nature of Conflict Changing approaches to National Security For discussion see Kelle, Dando and Nixdorff 2014 and (Kelle, Dando, and Nixdorff 2013, Daoudi, Hart, Lele and Trapp 2014 ). Examples Output: (i.e discovery of new s new botulinum toxin serotype, improved synthesis techniques) Underlying systems of tech generation: Models of innovation, diffusion of capacities Broader trends in bio/chem innovation governance: I.e

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