Use of EAPOL-Key messages

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Doc.: IEEE /684r0 Submission November 2002 Martin Lefkowitz, Trapeze NetworksSlide 1 Extended Keymap ID Martin Lefkowitz Trapeze Networks.
Advertisements

Doc.: IEEE /0061r1 SubmissionJae Seung Lee, ETRISlide 1 Probe Response frame transmission interval Date:
Submission doc.: IEEE /1034r4 September 2012 Jeongki Kim, LG ElectronicsSlide 1 Enhanced scanning procedure for FILS Date: Authors:
Doc.: IEEE /2215r4 Submission August 2007 Ganesh Venkatesan, Intel CorporationSlide 1 Proposal –Radio Resource Measurement Capability Enabled.
Submission November 2010 doc.: IEEE /1236r0 Enhancements to Enablement Procedure Slide 1 Santosh Abraham, Qualcomm Incorporated Date:
Doc.: IEEE /0485r0 Submission May 2004 Jesse Walker and Emily Qi, Intel CorporationSlide 1 Management Protection Jesse Walker and Emily Qi Intel.
Doc.: IEEE /0059r1 SubmissionJae Seung Lee, ETRI Selection of the AP for Scanning Date: Slide 1.
Submission November 2010 doc.: IEEE /1237r0 Over the Air Database Access for Mode 2 Capable Devices Slide 1 Santosh Abraham, Qualcomm Incorporated.
Robust Security Network (RSN) Service of IEEE
PAD and Probe Request/Response frames
Data Function Frames Date: Authors: Jan 2009 Month Year
doc.: IEEE /xxxr0 Mike Moreton
Triggering the Broadcast Probe Response
802.1X and key interactions Tim Moore November 2001
Fast Authentication in TGai
Random Access RU Allocation in the Trigger Frame
Extended Usage of STKSA
Triggering the Broadcast Probe Response
BSS Max Idle Period and Sleep Interval
Martin Lefkowitz Trapeze Networks
Non-Automatic Power Saving Delivery
TDLS TPK Handshake Date: Authors: May 2010 May 2010
Defense Against Multi-Channel Man-in-the-Middle (MITM)
BSS Scanning through Low Power Radio
BSS Transition Improvements
Use of EAPOL-Key messages during pre-auth
Pre-Association Security Negotiation (PASN) for 11az
Limiting Degrees of Freedom for Measurement Requests
Integrity Check for Disassociate/Associate/Re-associate
Proposed Modifications in TGh Draft Proposal
July 2002 Threat Model Tim Moore Tim Moore, Microsoft.
Security for Measurement Requests and Information
Security for Measurement Requests and Information
CID#102 - Channel Allocation
Random Access RU Allocation in the Trigger Frame
Fair Quiet for DFS Date: Authors: February 2008
A Review of the Site Reporting Protocol in IEEE802.11k Draft 0.2
Jesse Walker and Emily Qi Intel Corporation
Security for Measurement Requests and Information
AP Location Capability
Random Access RU Allocation in the Trigger Frame
AP Power Down Notification
Reducing Overhead in Active Scanning with Simulation Results
Prioritized Active Scanning in TGai
GCMP Restriction Date: Authors: January 2011 May 2010
AID Reassignment Protocol
Fast Authentication in TGai
Channel Allocation March 2008 Authors: Date: Month Year
AID Reassignment Protocol
TGr Security Architecture
EAPOL-Key Clarifications
Broadcast Service Advertisements
Reducing Overhead in Active Scanning with Simulation Results
Mutliband-60GHz-Location-Capability-Publishing
Triggering the Broadcast Probe Response
CR for CID 1115 Date: Authors: May 2019
Interference Signalling Enhancements
FILS Frame Content Date: Authors: February 2008
Beacon Protection Date: Authors: May 2018 January 2018
Power Efficient WUR AP Discovery
AP Connection Period in TDLS
Group Key Optimizations
Pekko Orava, Henry Haverinen, Simon Black (Nokia)
TGu/TGv Joint Meeting Date: Authors: May 2008 Month Year
Broadcast Service Advertisements
Extended Usage of STKSA
On ESS Mesh Device Discovery
CR for CID 1115 Date: Authors: May 2019
Request for Legacy IE ID for RSN Extension
Enhancement of Low Power Medium Access STAs
Presentation transcript:

Use of EAPOL-Key messages Month 2002 doc.: IEEE 802.11-04/xxxr0 May 2004 Use of EAPOL-Key messages Tim Moore Microsoft Tim Moore, Microsoft

May 2004 Introduction 802.11i defines how and when key material is available for protection and encryption 802.1X and EAPOL-Key frames 802.11i EAPOL-Key frame is extendable Any IEs can be sent using EAPOL-Key messages and be protected (and encrypted) Non IEs can be sent using EAPOL-Key messages as KDEs. New KDEs can be added (5 are defined by 802.11i) There is already a EAPOL-Key frame format that doesn’t send keys EAPOL-Key frames can also be used without security Tim Moore, Microsoft

Secure channel exists between STA and AP as soon as PTK is available May 2004 Secure channel exists between STA and AP as soon as PTK is available Either add an IE or KDE to an existing EAPOL-Key message Send an EAPOL-Key message with the IE or KDE STA can send an EAPOL-Key message not in respond to the AP by setting the Request bit Tim Moore, Microsoft

Requesting for information May 2004 Requesting for information 802.11d defines an IE to request for IEs Request Information IE Used in probe requests Define a KDE for action frame content Add entry to Table 26 (11i) Limited to action frames 255 octets in size Tim Moore, Microsoft

Examples AP advertising information AP querying for an IE from the STA May 2004 Examples AP advertising information Send an EAPOL-Key message, may or may not be encrypted AP querying for an IE from the STA Send an EAPOL-Key message containing a Request KDE sending the request required Tim Moore, Microsoft

Conclusion Do not need a new encryption mechanism for 802.11k May 2004 Conclusion Do not need a new encryption mechanism for 802.11k Put IEs in an EAPOL-Key frame Define a KDE for sending measurement requests Tim Moore, Microsoft