Summary of RCM TIG formation Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Summary of RCM TIG formation Date: 2019-05-13 Authors: Name Affiliation Contact Amelia Andersdotter Article19 amelia@article19.org Slide 1 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 1 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Abstract This document summarizes the discussions on MAC randomization in IEEE P802.11 between 2017-2019, and presents a collection of academic research, as well as previous IEEE standardisation work relating to randomized and changing MAC addresses. Slide 2 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 2 John Doe, Some Company

More information These slides are based on 11-19/588r2. Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 More information These slides are based on 11-19/588r2. For references, articles, links, and more information, please consult 11-19/588r2. Slide 3 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 3 John Doe, Some Company

It has previously been introduced in: Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Background to randomized and changing MAC: History in IEEE, mobile networks and aim It has previously been introduced in: IEEE 1609.4 WAVE (in relation to vehicular privacy) Mobile OS (e.g. Android, iOS) Broadly, the aim of randomized and changing MAC is The protection of geolocational privacy to some extent (i.e. reducing the privacy threat posed by profiling someone’s patterns, behaviour, whereabout or habits). Slide 4 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 4 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Background to randomized and changing MAC: Regulatory and research overview Geolocational tracking in WiFi networks has been subject to regulatory attention in, for instance, Sweden, Netherlands, the US and France. Geolocational tracking in WiFi networks using the MAC address has also been subject to academic research (Cunche (2013), Sapiezynski (2015)) It is broadly agreed that merely randomizing a MAC address might not be sufficient for privacy protection (Matte et al (2016), Vanhoef et al (2016), Martin et al (2017)) Slide 5 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 5 John Doe, Some Company

Background to randomized and changing MAC: Previously in IEEE 802 LMSC Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Background to randomized and changing MAC: Previously in IEEE 802 LMSC In addition to work already undertaken in IEEE 1609, the following work has been done in IEEE 802 LMSC: The privacy threat mitigation potential of MAC randomization was studied by IEEE 802 Privacy ECSG with outcome documents privescg-14-0026-01-0000, privecsg-14-0025-01-0000, privescg-15-0028-00-0000. IEEE 802.1 SEC TG document P802E: Recommended Practice for Privacy Considerations for IEEE 802 Technologies (draft 1.4) in clauses 7.2 and 8.1 (requires member’s log-in) .11aq Pre-Association Service Discovery amendment to the 802.11-2016, with MAC Privacy Enhancements. Slide 6 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 6 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Current status: Effects of .11aq amendment and future mission of RCM TIG #1 Randomized and changing MAC addresses are not in themselves new. There have existed standard tools for changing a device’s MAC identifier for a long time. Nevertheless, standardising systematically changing MAC identifiers have raised some concerns: In September 2018, three months after the publication of the official 802.11aq amendment, the IEEE 802.11 WG received a liaison statement from the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) detailing network operator concerns with the disappearance of clear-text sufficiently-permanent unique device identifiers (11-18-1579-00-0000). The ARC SC made efforts to address the concerns raised by the WBA in a response approved by the 802.11 Working Group in November 2018 (11-18- 1988-02-0arc). In this response, the Working Group noted that some issues raised by WBA merit further consideration. RCM TIG is set up to enact this consideration. Slide 7 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 7 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Current status: Effects of .11aq amendment and future mission of RCM TIG #2 The network analytics and device identification issue was discussed in the IEEE 802.1 OmniRAN Task Group in its F2F meeting on 15 January 2019 (omniran-19-0005-02-00TG). The assertion was made that device manufacturer identification and network analytics and troubleshooting would be an issue in the absence of MAC identifiers (omniran-19-0002-00-CQ00). It is not within currently within RCM TIGs to consider the aspects raised in IEEE 802.1 OnmiRAN TG, however OmniRAN has agreed to produce a "draft protocol proposal for secure signaling of a static device identifier to the access network" and "functional requirements describing the need to provide the possibility of fixed device identifiers" (omniran-19-0005-02-00TG). This calls, at least, for collaboration and coordination? Slide 8 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 8 John Doe, Some Company

Proposed problem: Band steering Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Proposed problem: Band steering A single device may end up using different MAC addresses in different bands and/or different SSIDs. IEEE 802.11 has agreed that this should be considered further, and may require recommendations about SSID assignment. IEEE 802.11 has also suggested this could require coordination with WiFi Alliance. Slide 9 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 9 John Doe, Some Company

Proposed problem: Client steering Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Proposed problem: Client steering Clients may use the broadcast SSID in probe requests, causing instability in MAC address. IEEE 802.11 has acknowledged that this could be considered further. Slide 10 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 10 John Doe, Some Company

Proposed problem: Network analytics and troubleshooting Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Proposed problem: Network analytics and troubleshooting Network analytics and troubleshooting may require at least semi- permanent identifiers (cf. 802.1 OmniRAN discussion referenced above). IEEE 802.11 has agreed to look into this. Suggestion: coordination with 802.1 OmniRAN seems appropriate. Slide 11 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 11 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Concrete tasks: • Current and planned implementations of random and changing MAC addresses in devices, and • Current and planned 802.11/802 Standards treatment of randomized MAC addresses • Impact on 802.11 features from randomized MAC addresses and/or changing addresses during: ◦ Pre-association (stateless) ◦ Preparing for (creating shared state) and during associations • Potential mechanisms to address the above impacts, through: ◦ Implementation options, or possible guidelines document ◦ Modifications to the Standard, if any, and recommend continuing work (Study Group/PAR) Slide 12 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 12 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Presentations P802.1CQ MAC Address Assignment Requirements, Max Riegel (Nokia), 11-19/851r0 Slide 13 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 13 John Doe, Some Company

Starting up #1 May 2019 In relation to the following two goals: Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Starting up #1 In relation to the following two goals: • Current and planned implementations of random and changing MAC addresses in devices, and • Current and planned 802.11/802 Standards treatment of randomized MAC addresses Examples from practical experience, research, or customers can be brought to the group on a continuous basis. Slide 14 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 14 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Starting up #2 Impact on 802.11 features from randomized MAC addresses and/or changing addresses during: ◦ Pre-association (stateless) ◦ Preparing for (creating shared state) and during associations Suggest we collect a number of use-cases that relate to pre-association, preparing for association and what happens during association. Use-cases should preferably be connected to already identified issues on slides 9-11. Challenge: there is evidence to suggest MAC randomization is not very wide- spread (Matte, Cunche, 2018), so “real-life” scenarios may be scarce. Slide 15 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 15 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Starting up #3 Potential mechanisms to address the above impacts, through: ◦ Implementation options, or possible guidelines document ◦ Modifications to the Standard, if any, and recommend continuing work (Study Group/PAR) This will be easier if we have an understanding for the situations in which we believe we may have problems. Slide 16 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 16 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 References IEEE 802.1 SEC TG, P802E: Recommended Practice for Privacy Considerations for IEEE 802 Technologies, March 2019. Available: https://1.ieee802.org/security/802e/ OmniRAN, F2F meeting minutes (omniran-19-0005-02-00TG), Hao Wang. January 2019. https://mentor.ieee.org/omniran/dcn/19/omniran-19-0005-02-00TG-jan-2019-f2f-meeting-minutes.docx OmniRAN, Random MAC impact (omniran-19-0002-00-CQ00), Max Riegel, January 2019. https://mentor.ieee.org/omniran/dcn/19/omniran-19-0002-00-CQ00-random-mac-impact.pptx Privacy ECSG, Secure Moderated Random MAC Addresses (privecsg-14-0026-01-0000), Robert Moskowitz, January 2015. https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/dcn/14/privecsg-14-0026-01-0000-secure-moderated-random-mac-addresses.ppt Privacy ECSG, WiFi Privacy network experiment_x000b_at IETF91 (privecsg-14-0025-01-0000), C. J. Bernardos, F. Giust, A. de la Oliva, J.C. Zuniga, January 2015. https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/dcn/14/privecsg-14-0025-01-0000-wifi-privacy-network-experiment-at-ietf91.pptx Slide 17 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 17 John Doe, Some Company

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 May 2019 Privacy ECSG, WiFi Privacy network experiment_x000b_ at IEEE 802 May plenary and IETF91 meetings (privecsg-15-0028-00-0000), C. J. Bernardos, A. de la Oliva, J.C. Zuniga, July 2015. https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/dcn/15/privecsg-15-0028-00-0000-wifi-privacy-network-experiment-at-ieee-802-may-plenary-and-ietf91-meetings.pptx Privacy ECSG, Tracking 802.11 stations without relying on the link layer identifier (privecsg-16-0003-00-0000), Mathieu Cunche, April 2016. https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/dcn/16/privecsg-16-0003-00-0000-tracking-802-11-stations-without-relying-on-the-link-layer-identifier.pdf IEEE 802.11 WG, 2018-09- Liaison from WBA re: MAC randomization impacts (11-18-1579-00-0000), September 2018. https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/18/11-18-1579-01-0000-2018-09-liaison-from-wba-re-mac-randomization-impacts.docx IEEE 802.11 ARC SC, Proposed response to liaison from WBA on MAC Address randomization impcats [sic!] (11-18-1988-02-0arc), November 2018. https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/18/11-18-1988-02-0arc-proposed-response-to-liaison-from-wba-on-mac-address-randomization-impcats.docx C. Matte, M. Cunche, Spread of MAC address randomization studied using locally administered MAC addresses use historic. [Research Report] RR-9142, Inria Grenoble Rhône-Alpes. 2018. <hal-01682363> Slide 18 Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19) Page 18 John Doe, Some Company