The trope theory of Anna-Sofia Maurin

What are tropes Tropes are abstract, simple and particular entities. They constitute all objects.

Two further theses Methodological principle: the trope theory must be able to account for the truth of atomic propositions; Truthmaker theory: an atomic proposition is true if and only if there are some truthmakers for it.

Moorean difficulty How can tropes, that are abstract, account for concrete objects?

Tropist’s answer Objects are bundles of tropes. Ok, but what is the nature of these bundles? Answering we face a problem…

Bradley’s regress Point of departure: the verb «to be» indicates that an object is his qualities related. Point of arrive: this generates a vicious infinite regress. The relation between the qualities of an object is not a necessary condition to account for the existence of that object.

How can we save trope theory? Only challenging the existence of the regress.

The no-relation response (Armstrong) Between universals and particulars there is not a «real» relation: they depend each other. Translating in trope theory… Consequence: a «fixed» world-view

Maurin’s critics Arguments for non-transferibility Maurin’s critics Armstrong: swapping argument Eleatic principle NO strong non-transferibility Molnar: numerical identity Cart before horses Molnar: for «Ockhamist» reasons Rather anche enlarged ontology

The truthmaker argument If tropes were transferable, they would not be truthmakers. We would need something extra

Let’s give anche account of it Let’s challenge another Bradley’s argumentation: relations as entities. Maurin: relations are different entities from the entities they relate. How do relations depend from their relata? Internal/external; symmetric/asymmetric. Internal * ** External a,b depend R X - R depend a,b

Maurin’s solution In (**) Bradley’s problem disappears. The essence of relation is to relate exactly the tropes that it relates.