Public Goods Goods that are normally provided by Governments Goods that are not provided by the private market or are insufficiently provided by the private market Goods that are non-rivaled: consumption of good does not reduce availability of good for consumption by others Goods that are non-exclusive: no one can be easily or effectively prohibited from using the good

Type of Goods Excludable Non-Excludable RivalrousPrivate Goods: food, Clothing, cars, homes, furniture, toys Common goods: water, fish, hunting game Non-rivalousCollective good: Cable, Phone, Access to Internet Public Goods: National defense, national parks, clean air, clean oceans

Collective versus Individual Interests Global Politics revolves around one key problem: How can a group – such as two or more states – serve its collective interests when doing so requires its members to forego their national interests? Example: Problem of global warning. Solving it can only be achieved by many countries acting together. Collective goods problem The problem of how to provide something that benefits all members of a group regardless of what each member contributes to it

Free Rider Problem Free riders are those who consume more than their fair share of the public good yet do not contribute their fair share in providing it 1. National Defense: no one individual can be excluded from being defended by a states military forces 2. Public Parks: no one individual can be excluded from its use regardless of his/her contribution to its up-keep

Small Groups Versus Large Groups In general, collective goods are easier to provide in small groups than large ones. Small group: defection (free riding) is harder to conceal and has a greater impact on the overall collective good, and is easier to punish. Collective goods problem occurs in all groups and societies Particularly acute in global politics No central authority such as a world government to enforce on individual nations the necessary measures to provide for the common good Also acute for domestic politics of a state when de facto sovereignty is weak, the state is failed, or widespread corruption at the level of government

How can we assure that a Collective Good is Provided Internationally Three basic principles offer possible solutions for this core problem of getting individuals or states to cooperate for the common good without a central authority to make them do so. Dominance Reciprocity Identity

Table 1.1

Dominance Solves the collective goods problem by establishing a power hierarchy in which those at the top control those below Status hierarchy Symbolic acts of submission and dominance reinforce the hierarchy. Hegemon The advantage of the dominance solution Forces members of a group to contribute to the common good Minimizes open conflict within the group Disadvantage of the dominance solution Stability comes at a cost of constant oppression of, and resentment by, the lower-ranking members of the status hierarchy. Conflicts over position can sometimes harm the groups stability and well-being.

Reciprocity Solves the collective goods problem by rewarding behavior that contributes to the group and punishing behavior that pursues self-interest at the cost of the group Easy to understand and can be enforced without any central authority Positive and negative reciprocity Disadvantage: It can lead to a downward spiral as each side punishes what it believes to be the negative acts of the other. Generally people overestimate their own good intentions and underestimate those of opponents or rivals.

Identity Identity principle does not rely on self-interest. Members of an identity community care about the interests of others in the community enough to sacrifice their own interests to benefit others. Family, extended family, kinship group roots, citizenship, ethnic/national identity In domestic and international politics, identity communities play important roles in overcoming difficult collective goods problems. Non-state actors also rely on identity politics.

Mancur Olsen and the Problem of Collective Action The Logic of Collective Action (1968): Mancur Olson argued that people have no reason to join groups when the fruits of the groups efforts are available to nonmembers as well as members. F.ex.: Why should a worker join a union when the wage rise it negotiates goes to all employees? Why should a company pay a fee to join an industry association when the benefits the group obtains will help all the firms in that sector? Smart move: to free-ride

Problem of Collective Action Olson suggests that free riders do hinder collective organization. He argues that interest groups will only emerge in specific conditions. Membership is compulsory: closed shop When groups offer selective benefits, marked members only, rather than collective goods for the constituency at large Olsons analysis poses the problem of collective actionthe difficulty of organizing rational actors to achieve what is in their collective interest.