P: 1 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS (www.cascadas-project.org) Mécanismes de sécurité et de coopération entre.

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Presentation transcript:

P: 1 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Mécanismes de sécurité et de coopération entre nœuds d'un réseaux mobile ad hoc Pietro Michiardi – Institut Eurecom SSTIC 2006

P: 2 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Outline Trust in MANET Cooperation enforcement CORE –Sketch of the protocol –Simulations Analytical validation –Application of game theory

P: 3 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Trust in MANET Managed environment –A-priori trust –Entity authentication correct operation –But: requirement for authentication infrastructure Open environment –No a-priori trust –Authentication does not guarantee correct operation –New security paradigm

P: 4 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Threats in MANET Passive: Selfish Nodes Do not cooperate Priority: battery saving No intentional damage to other nodes Exposure: –Selfish forwarding –Selfish routing Active: Malicious Nodes Goal: damage other nodes Battery saving is not a priority Exposure: –Denial of service –Traffic subversion –Attacks on vulnerable mechanisms –…

P: 5 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( MANET Requirements Wireless & Mobile –Limited energy –Lack of physical security Ad hoc –No infrastructure –Lack of organization Cooperation enforcement Secure Routing Key Management

P: 6 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Cooperation Enforcement in MANET Routing and Packet Forwarding cost energy Selfish nodes save energy for self-interested purposes Without any incentive for cooperation network performance can be severely degraded

P: 7 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Cooperation Enforcement in MANET CORE: reputation based cooperation enforcement Key idea: bind network utilization and reputation metric Reputation not used as additional metric for routing Other approaches: –credit based systems (micro payment) –token based systems (threshold cryptography) –Mitigating routing misbehavior (reputation as routing metric)

P: 8 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Sketch of CORE MonitoringFIR Filter Cooperation switch From the network To the network Reputation Module Analyzer Module Punishment Module Packets Behavior stream Reputation stream Boolean decision … | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | … Hysteresis

P: 9 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( CORE Components Analyzer Module –Based on the watchdog (WD) technique –Extension: variation of the WD frequency based on local reputation Reputation Module –Subjective, Indirect (optional) and Functional reputation values are combined with dynamic weights –Reputation algorithm: FIR B-order filter: initially low-pass, can be more complex (signatures") Sliding-window of size B Punishment Module –Packets from selfish sources are dropped (deals also with selective misbehavior) –Alternatives: Path rater technique, BUT additional node re-integration mechanism Cross-layer punishment: restrict application capabilities (P2P query limits)

P: 10 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Validation of CORE Difficulty raised by reputation-based mechanism Our approaches: –Simulation-based validation Proof of concept Realistic measurements: energy, traffic, … –Analytical model of MANET and node behavior Realistic model of selfishness Infer incentive-compatibility properties of CORE

P: 11 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Simulation-based validation Simulation set-up –Static and Dynamic Network Random waypoint model (no 0 m/s!) –Parameters Pause time, % of selfish nodes, path diversity Simulation metrics –Energy consumption –Punishment efficiency –False positives Basic CORE implementation –Monitoring active only for packet forwarding –No reputation information distribution: no control traffic overhead Selfishness models –Selfish nodes systematically fail to forward packets

P: 12 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Simulation results CORE-enabled legitimate nodes save up to 24% of energy legitimate nodes are better off using CORE Punishment efficiency ranges from 80% to 100%, WITHOUT reputation distribution selfish nodes have strong incentive to cooperate if they want to use the network –Distributing reputation is worthless and unreliable –Further improvements possible using multi-path routing False positives are reasonably low –Simple example: reputation algorithm = sliding-window of size B, doubling B cuts by order of 10 false positives (from 2% to 0.2%)

P: 13 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS (

P: 14 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS (

P: 15 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS (

P: 16 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Limitation of network simulation Selfishness models are STATIC –Also in related work! Need for analytical framework to model DYNAMIC selfish behavior Game theory offers tools to model strategic interaction among rational selfish players

P: 17 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Game Theoretical Validation Basic model: non-cooperative game theory Packet forwarding as a Prisoners Dilemma: –Players: random pair in the set {1,…,N} nodes of the network –Strategy: {C, D} / C=forward, D=drop packet –Payoff matrix utility function (example)

P: 18 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Repeated game theory Fine-grained modeling of COREs reputation algorithm through iterated games –Players do not know when the game will end –SHADOW OF THE FUTURE Important extension to the basic model –Representation of MAC layer failures (interference, collisions, etc.) that affect the watchdog mechanism Comparison with alternative strategies: tit-for-tat (TFT), generous TFT (G-TFT), spiteful, gradual, …

P: 19 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Evolutionary game theory Numerical validation to study robust and stable cooperation strategy (Genetic Algorithms Approach) –START: equal partitioning of population into each competing strategy –ITERATION: round robin tournament Population of bad strategies is decreased whereas good strategies obtain new elements –END: population is stable Perfect vs. Imperfect private monitoring –Misperception noise used to model watchdog mechanism failures

P: 20 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Results With perfect monitoring –CORE and Tit-For-Tat are in equilibrium With imperfect monitoring –CORE outperforms other strategies because of reputation TFT, G-TFT unstable due to errors Reputation buffer (B) size directly proportional to convergence speed

P: 21 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS (

P: 22 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS (

P: 23 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( Limitations of basic model Network topology is not taken into account –Only random pair-wise node interaction Coalitions and group dynamics are not considered Further work not presented today: –Cooperative game theory Study the size (k) of a coalition of cooperating nodes Nash Equilibrium lower bound on k CORE as a Coalition Formation Algorithm –Non-cooperative forwarding Study the impact of network topology on equilibrium strategies

P: 24 / 24 Situated and Autonomic Communications FET Integrated Project CASCADAS ( CORE summary Lightweight approach –CORE execution consumes little energy –Nodes that use CORE consume less than nodes that do not use CORE No traffic overhead –No reputation distribution Effective in presence of misperception Robust against attacks CORE principles can be extended to higher layers –Service discovery –Overlay network formation –…