Iran and P5+1 agreement, where do we go from here? Presentation at: Canadian Society of Iranian Engineers and Architects October 7, 2015 Mehdi Sarram, PE

Agenda What is enriched uranium and what percentage is needed for research and power reactors and for nuclear weapons? Brief history of Iran's nuclear program from 1955 to 2015 Why was Iran's case referred to UNSC in 2006? Was Iran in violation of NPT in 2006? What are Iran's commitments under the signed July 14 agreement with P5+1?

Cont What are the P5+1 commitments? Is this agreement good for the peace of the world? What is the role of IAEA and how are Iran's nuclear facilities inspected? Also a brief discussion on the book: “Nuclear Lies, Deceptions and Hypocrisies

What is enriched uranium and what percentage is needed for a research reactor and for nuclear weapons? Natural uranium: 0.7% U 235, rest is U 238,… Enriching uranium used to be done by large diffusion plants (US used them for the Hiroshima bomb) More recently, centrifuge machines are used for enriching uranium Nuclear power plants for electricity need 3-5% uranium

Cont Nuclear research reactors in 60s used 90+% uranium, more recently use 20% uranium Nuclear weapons use 90+% uranium Pu 239 can be produced from U 238 in a reactor U-238 + n -> U-239 -> Np-239 -> Pu-239

Cont US has used weapons both from Pu 239 and U 235 in Japan Centrifuge machines simply spin the UF6 gas inside U 238 is slightly heavier and gets attracted to the outside vs U 235 stay closer to center Then U 235 is separated and fed to more machines until the desired enrichment is achieved IAEA criteria for inspectors: SQ for U 235: 25Kg, for Pu 239: 8 Kg

Iran nuclear program, 1955-1979, 1/3 US Government Atom for Peace Program -President Eisenhower, 1950s 1957: US and Iran sign a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement as part of the US Atoms for Peace program 1957: The Institute of Nuclear Science, under the auspices of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), moves from Baghdad to Tehran The Shah shows personal interest in peaceful nuclear energy The Shah’s policy on nuclear energy was peaceful, no desire or ambition to pursue nuclear weapons Iran had strong military; no threat by neighbors 7

Iran nuclear program, 1955-1979, 2/3 1959: The Shah orders establishment of Tehran University Nuclear Center-TUNC 1960: Iran purchases a 5 MW research reactor from US-AMF, Tehran University Research Reactor (TURR), now TRR/center of controversy? Turkey and Pakistan purchase same identical reactor package Sept 1967, at Tehran Mehrabad International airport, a team of TUNC staff under my supervision received 5.153 Kg of HEU (>90% enriched) and a small Po-Be neutron source shipped from the US under INFCIRC 66/Rev 2 (NPT did not exist) 8

Iran nuclear program, 1955-1979, 3/3 5 MW reactor made critical on Nov 11, 1967 at 7:20 pm-full power of 5 MW reached 3 weeks later July 1, 68: Iran signs NPT, Feb 2, 1970: Iran’s Parliament ratifies NPT Iran among FIRST countries to sign/ratify NPT Iran was in strict compliance with IAEA safeguards requirement, first under INFCIRC/226/Rev 2 and later under NPT (INFCIRC/153) IAEA quite satisfied with routine inspection of TURR fuel and reactor operation Iran starts a massive nuclear power program 23,000 MWe Atomic Energy Organization of Iran established in early 1974, grew from a few people to few thousands and a budget of over $3B 9

New government, Feb 1979 AEOI goes into stand still mode, budget cuts, some staff leaving Iran Feb 79: AEOI essentially shutdown, no major activity Most nuclear staff came to US/Europe/Canada Busher, 2x1200 MWe German plants partly damaged during the 8 year war Darkhovain nuclear plants (2x900 MWe-French) construction stops, not as advanced as Busher site

Cont Germany under US pressure told Iran it will not continue construction of Busher plants (Unit 1 nearly 85% complete) Iran signed a $1B contract with Russia to complete construction of Busher nuclear plant, required design change, construction started in 1995, delays, VVER design Germany under US pressure told Iran it will not continue construction of Busher plants (Unit 1 85% complete) 2 enrichment facilities, Natanz and Fordo

Why was Iran's case referred to UNSC in 2006? Natanz enrichment facility started operation in 2005 IAEA Director General had visited Natanz in 2003 IAEA under political pressure had issued numerous reports on Iran regarding its enrichment program and nuclear facilities Iran started negotiations on its nuclear enrichment program with EU for a few years but failed in 2007 Political pressure was increasing in the US and its allies

Cont Due to same pressure, IAEA referred Iran’s case to UNSC UNSC Sanctions: 1696 on 2/4/06, 1737 on 12/23/06, 1747 on 3/24/07, 1803 on 3/13/08, 1835 on 9/27/08, 1929 on 6/19/10 Article 92 of UN Charter states such cases should be referred to International Court of Justice The SC has neither the mandate to act an International Judicial Body

Cont International law professor Daniel Joyner, who has written a book about the NPT, argues that "the IAEA applies incorrect standards, exceeds its legal mandate and is acting ultra vires with regard to Iran" In 2006, was Iran’s nuclear program a threat to international peace and security? So why was Iran’s case referred by the IAEA to UNSC in 2006? UNSC can take action if a country is a threat to international peace and security

Was Iran in violation of NPT in 2006? A complex legal question Iran was not transparent to IAEA when it obtained the centrifuge technology from AQ Khan/Pakistan Hence this can be considered a violation with respect to the NPT requirements Iranian scientists developed about 200 centrifuge machines by 2006

Cont In 2015, this increased to 19,000, many advanced ones The West claims Iran is in violation of its NPT commitments and Additional Protocol (AP) requirements regarding the enrichment program –hence UNSC sanctions Iran clams its Parliament never ratified AP, hence it is ONLY required to report a nuclear facility (Natanz or Fordo) 180 days before the operation of facility Fact: Iran on a volunteer basis signed AP in 2003 and after negotiation with EU failed, in 2007 Iran told IAEA it is withdrawing from AP

Cont For 4 years Iran complied with the requirements of AP: reported to IAEA any conceptual design/construction of any nuclear facility immediately So, it is the war of He said-She said between Iran and IAEA/West, the lawyers in Iran and the West disagree on the interpretation of AP/Code 3.1 As such, West/IAEA claims Iran’s enrichment facilities are in violation of NPT-AP Iran rejects this claim With UNSC sanctions, P5+1 won the legal battle My own position

What are Iran’s commitments under JCPOA Why the Senate opposition, agreement VS Treaty Key parameters agreed on July 14, 2015 Agreement: 159 pages, UNSC Res 2231: 104 pages Iran will reduce its centrifuges from 19,000 today to 6,104 All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years – concession by Iran

Cont Iran has agreed to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for15 years – concession by Iran Note: Iran needs 3-5% fuel for its Busher plant and 20% fuel for the medical isotope research reactor-has neither Iran has committed that under no circumstances it will seek or develop nuclear weapons Iran’s breakout timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework

Cont Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordo facility for at least 15 years Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordo for 15 years, 1000 centrifuges remain but no enrichment Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s facilities Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance , IAEA seals and cameras

Cont All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordo and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol, Code 3.1 --- what does it mean? Latest, Sept 27: Amano visited Parchin military site, sample taken and shipped to Vienna-IAEA happy and a second visit not needed Iran has agreed to redesign Arak heavy water based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns

Cont The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments, IAEA and not P5+1 has the power regarding all verifications on Iran’s actions on JCPOA

What are the P5+1 commitments? After IAEA reports its satisfaction with Iran implementing its commitments: EU lifts its sanctions US Senate lifts its sanctions, gradual subject to Senate approval All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions IAEA, on behalf of P5+1 will oversee and supervise the implementation of JCPOA in Iran in next 10-25 years

Is this agreement good for the peace of the world? I believe Iran and P5+1 agreement is good for the world peace The US and P5 lost NOHING, just agreed not to impose more sanctions and release Iran’s own frozen assets Iran lost financially, over $100B of its investments in enrichment facilities and other nuclear facilities, ARAK heavy water reactor, fuel manufacturing,….over the last 30 years The claim by US and P5 that they made many concessions to Iran is not correct

Cont Money given back to Iran is Iran’s money, was frozen for years Oct 5: A committee of Iran’s parliament gave its support to Iran’s nuclear agreement with world powers on condition there would be no foreign inspections of military sites and no curbs on developing its missile program

What is the role of IAEA and how are Iran's nuclear facilities inspected? IAEA, the most important UN agency, has direct access to UNSC Several hundred trained inspectors work and inspect NPT nation’s declared nuclear facilities Inspectors do not inspect military sites, not permitted Inspectors use special equipment to detect diversion of special nuclear materials MUF: Material Unaccounted For (25 KG U235 or 8 Kg Pu 239)

Cont India, Pakistan, N. Korea and Israel are not NPT signatories After implementation of JCPOA, Iran will be inspected more than many combined, resident inspectors, increased IAEA budget for Iran and state of the art technology for inspections Iran has 17 declared nuclear facilities ready for IAEA inspections

Looking into the next 5-15 years Implementation by Iran in early 2016 Not clear how Iran will get 20% fuel for its research reactor The Iran deal is a non-binding agreement, not a TREATY like NPT or NAFTA—Did NOT need US Senate approval Any country can withdraw anytime I am optimistic this agreement will hold and all parties will abide by their commitments

My Book: Nuclear Lies, Deceptions and Hypocrisies Dr. Hans Blix, the former Director General of IAEA has endorsed my book and 12 other senior experts 462 pages, discussing the lies and deceptions of 7 countries: Iraq, Syria, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India and the US in the last 50-60 year Available on publisher’s site at: www.gmbooks.com Also available on Amazon Also available as eBook, Kindle, etc. for $3.99

University of Michigan 2 MW Ford Nuclear Reactor 1963

5 MW TURR, September 1967

Nov 11, 1967, TURR First Criticality

April 10-14,1977 Persepolis Conference: Transfer of Nuclear Technology

April 10-14,1977 Persepolis Conference: Transfer of Nuclear Technology

Q&A-Nuclear Happy Face msarram@gmail.com