Ontology 18-19 Lezz. 4-6

Lezione 4 8/10/18

Let's fix some terminology (in part introduced last week) ...

Times and dates instant: minimal "punctiform" amount of time, without a before and an after interval: constituted by a series of instants (alternatively we may take interval as primitive and define instant in terms of interval) time (moment): either an instant or an interval date: non-deictic singular term that refers to a time (sometime "date" is used for the time itself)

Static vs. dynamic events Dynamic event: occupies an interval of time Static event (state of affairs, fact): occurs at an instant see SEP entry on events for this terminology

READING ASSIGNMENT FOR THIS WEEK AND NEXT WEEK On properties: Ch. 1 of Loux; SEP entry on properties (Ch. 2 of Loux on nominalism and tropes; SEP entry on tropes) More to come ...

PRPs: abundant vs. sparse predicate/sentence vs. property, relation/proposition Abundant vs. Sparse (Lewis) Type I (concepts) vs. Type II (qualities) (Bealer) water vs. H2O: two abundant properties (concept) and one corresponding sparse property (quality)

Lezione 5 9/10/18

Abundant vs sparse and A vs B A-properties and B-relations: we may take them for granted as abundant attributes. Are there corresponding sparse attributes, or are they exemplified? The answer may vary, depending on the different theories of time

Being, existence, everything, something Absolutely general term: entity, item (thing, object) Standard view (Frege, Russell, Quine): being (something) = to exist, hence everything exists Meinong: there "are" things that do not exist, hence being (something)  to exist In temporal ontology the standard view is typically assumed possible topic: connect this dispute to temporal ontology (Meinongian presentism)

events as unrepeatables Kim's conception: an event is a complex entity <F, x, t> <F, x, t> = <F', x', t'>  (F = F' & x = x' & t = t') Davidson's conception: an event is a simple entity identified by its causes and effects

Lezione 6 10/10/18

Events as repeatables Exemplifications of properties or relations that may re-occur No temporal parameter in Kim's representation: <F, x> Tom's standing Alfred's being tired Mary's kissing John, <K, <m, j>>

The problem of unity What accounts for the unity of events (states of affairs, facts) understood as complex entities? An event is made up of different things (it is a complex). Why is it ONE? Hand-out on the problem of unity for states of affairs and Bradley’s regress