Resilience and Enablement Khan Jahier Enablement and Resilience Section Defence Policy and Planning Division NATO International Staff For seventy years, NATO has protected its Allies. But, today, the threat landscape is more complex and multi-faceted than any time in its history. We are now witnessing more attempts to intimidate and destabilize Allies, through a range of threats, including cyber attacks, disinformation, propaganda and efforts to undermine our democratic institutions. And even the use of chemical weapons like in Salisbury. So we must continue to show solidarity and resolve and, above all, we must develop stronger tools to deal with these hybrid threats. Improving understanding and situational awareness is a vital part of preparing against hybrid threats. Another perhaps less exciting, but nonetheless critical element in preparing against and deterring hybrid attacks is building resilience and readiness to resist. This is what I am here today to talk about. NATO UNCLASSIFIED 1 1

The new strategic reality Threats from East and South Instability is the new strategic reality Need for long-term adaptation Over the last couple of years, we have seen dramatic changes around us. From the annexation of Crimea in the East to the collapse of the Arab Spring in the South. These developments are part of a larger trend. Our neighborhood – and the global security situation more broadly - are getting more dangerous and more difficult to predict. There are new developments almost every day. This is demonstrated by the unprecedented refugee crisis that is affecting Europe. By the turmoil in Syria, Libya, Yemen and the Sahel. And by the tragic attack two weeks ago in Ankara. And then, we have Russia to worry about. Its ongoing actions in Ukraine. Its aggressive posture in the Baltic Sea area. Its substantial military build-up in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. And its violation of Turkish and NATO airspace. The point is: the instability around us is not a passing phenomenon. It is becoming our new strategic reality. And this new strategic reality will be with us for the long-term. So, we – the Alliance - must also adapt for the long-term.

Security environment is changing Key messages Security environment is changing Need to reinvest in civil preparedness Resilience is a shared responsibility I have three key messages today First: We live in a fundamentally changed security environment. This new security environment demands that we strengthen our collective defence. Second: As we re-invest in defence, we also need to re-invest in civil preparedness. Third: NATO has an important role to play, because resilience is a shared responsibility. In an Alliance, everyone is only as strong as the weakest link. So we need to develop clear expectations for resilience and preparedness of the Allies.

Signed Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 Background Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” The principle of collective defence is enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States. North Atlantic Treaty, Signed Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Signed Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 Background Article 3: “In order more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” During the Cold War, Allies recognised the importance of building resilience and addressing these vulnerabilities. NATO has from its very inception been concerned with Civil Preparedness. Under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, all Allies are obligated to “develop and maintain the capacity to resist attack.” The implication here is that readiness and resilience is not just the concern of individual nations, but also a collective concern. Allies should support each other’s efforts in meeting these responsibilities including through NATO as an organisation. To this end, in the Cold War era, extensive civilian crisis management structures were in place at NATO and in Allied nations to ensure resilience and readiness to withstand attack. After the Cold War ended, we could afford to let our guard down and consider other challenges further afield. The aforementioned structures and capabilities were dramatically scaled back, both in Allied nations and in NATO’s civilian and military structures. North Atlantic Treaty, Signed Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Three Core Functions of Civil Preparedness Continuity of government Continuity of essential services to the population Civil support to military operations NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Civil Preparedness in NATO National and NATO military forces need to be adequately supported with civilian resources and infrastructure at all times First and foremost, this is to ensure that NATO military forces can at all times be supported with civilian resources and infrastructure. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Civil Preparedness in NATO Helps nations reduce their vulnerabilities, and improves their resilience, including against hybrid attacks Second – and this is the part most relevant to our discussion today – civil preparedness is about reducing nations’ vulnerabilities and improving their resilience to the full range of threats, especially those kinds of threats which aim for “soft” civilian targets, such as critical infrastructure or the civilian population. One of the defining features of hybrid warfare is the use of a range of techniques tailored to exploit specific vulnerabilities. This is not new. It is the bread and butter of military strategy through the ages: targeting the soft underbelly of an adversary, or, in military terms, their centres of gravity. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

but….without civil preparedness Forces cannot deploy Continuity of government at risk Civilian population fearful But …….without adequate civil preparedness and arrangement in place, none of this will be effective. Without civil preparedness, our forces cannot deploy or sustain themselves; the continuity of government and continuity of essential service in our member states is at risk; and our civilian population is an easy target for info operations and political blackmail (which is a particular concern given RUS hybrid warfare tactics)

Why civil support to the military matters 90% of military transport through commercial means By 2020, 70% of military satcom through commercial means 75% of host nation support sourced from civilian sector 85% of military requirements for food and water resources from commercial sector Let me illustrate this with a few examples: NATO military relies on civilian assets for movement and transport. Typically, in large operations, around 90% of military transport is accomplished using civilian assets chartered or requisitioned from the commercial sector. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Warsaw Summit Resilience Commitment In 2014, with Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Allies began a long process of adapting to a new set of security challenges, marked by a resurgent interest in strategy and political-military thinking about collective defence. The importance of the Alliance’s adaptation was highlighted in 2016 at the Warsaw Summit, where Heads of State and Government decided to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and to endorse a Commitment to Enhance Resilience. Both of these landmark decisions included an unwritten aspect of deterrence by denial. This means addressing vulnerabilities and weaknesses by ‘hardening’ the targets of hostile attacks in order to make the success of such attacks less likely, thereby preventing or obstructing them from being carried out in the first place. On resilience, HoSG pledged to achieve “seven agreed baseline requirements” for national resilience.

Warsaw Summit Resilience Commitment July 2016 ”…we are today making a commitment to enhance resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction.” ”…we will strive to achieve the agreed requirements for national resilience. We will strengthen continuity of government, continuity of essential services, and security of civilian critical infrastructure; and we will work to ensure that our national and NATO military forces can at all times be supported with civilian resources, including energy, transportation, and communications. This marks an important step – NATO leaders have never before commented on resilience in this way and at this level. Most significantly, they committed to achieving baseline requirements for national resilience. Let us now take a look at these seven baseline requirements. [CLICK]

Resilience Baseline Requirements Agreed seven baseline requirements: assured continuity of government and critical government services resilient energy supplies ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people resilient food and water resources ability to deal with mass casualties resilient civil communications systems resilient civil transportation systems. These seven baseline requirements, as we call them, – you can see them on this slide – outline the critical civilian functions that underpin our ability to defend ourselves. And they represent the level of resilience that each Ally is expected to meet so that the core functions of continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to the military are at all times maintained - even under the most demanding circumstances in the most demanding scenarios. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Continuity of Government First, Allied governments need to plan effectively for continuity of government. In a NATO context, this baseline requirement is aimed at safeguarding Allied governments’ ability to make decisions, to communicate those decisions, and to enforce them at all times and under all circumstances, especially during catastrophic events. To achieve this baseline requirement, Allies need to have in place national continuity plans to ensure mitigation measures for essential communications, and alternatives for the provision of critical services and for the establishment of secure crisis management centres. Allies also have to ensure that critical staff members are trained, systems are tested, and the continuity plans are exercised at regular intervals. [CLICK]

Resilient Energy Supplies Next, Allies need to ensure resilient energy supplies, that is to say energy systems that can withstand disruptions. This has obvious relevance to the Baltic Sea region, where energy infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to physical attack. The baseline requirement foresees identification of critical supply chains and interdependencies, in particular cross-border interconnections, identification of alternative supply options, identified robust and sustainable back-up plans, training and exercising, cyber security, and prioritisation arrangements.

Mass Movement of people Third, Allies also need to deal effectively with large population movements – both to ensure stability when faced with a sudden influx of people, and to ensure coordination and deconfliction with possible military deployments to avoid gridlock in strategic transport nodes. The NATO requirement is for Allies to have an integrated civil military plan to handle a mass influx of people exceeding 2% of a nation’s total population. This plan would need to take into account basic human needs including health care, food, water, shelter, security and transportation. While many large movements of people come about as a result of natural disasters, there are examples of adversaries deliberately ‘weaponising’ migrants to foment instability and put strain on government resources. In 2016, Russia was accused by Estonia of doing just this in the Baltic States, and similar accusations were levelled against the Syrian government when large numbers of Syrian refugees crossed the border into Turkey as the conflict in Syria escalated.

Resilient Food and Water resources Fourth, our food and water resources need to be resilient against disruption or sabotage that might lead to contamination. This baseline requirement recommends a tried and tested system to monitor and detect contamination of food and water sources, as well as the development of contingency plans to foresee alternative sources of food and water when necessary.

Ability to deal with Mass Casualties Fifth, Allies must have the ability to deal with mass casualties. This includes de-confliction of civilian and military demands on the national health systems, up-to-date inventories of civil and military capabilities, integrated warning and reporting systems to alert the population, and contingency plans for shifting surge capacities to ensure that national responses are swift and coordinated.

Secure Communications The sixth baseline requirement is to ensure security and availability of key national civil communications networks. Such networks can easily become the target of hybrid attack or other types of sabotage that aims to disable governmental systems or disrupt other vital social or economic functions. Again, the Baltic Sea region is particularly vulnerable in this area given the large concentration of undersea cables in the region which might be vulnerable to attack. The loss of data cables could lead to service disruptions which might then impact on other civil sectors like banking, energy, transportation and food and water supplies. The requirement is for Allied nations to have robust, sustainable redundancy capacity and restoration options, as well as priority access to civil communications networks for government and military purposes responses in crisis situations. And, of course, there is a need for robust cyber security. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Secure Transportation systems Last but not least – secure transportation systems and infrastructure. Any event of crisis that requires a response from NATO, requires resilient transportation systems that can facilitate rapid movement of NATO forces across the Alliance territory. Civilian services must also be able to rely on robust transport networks, even in times of crisis. Under this baseline requirement, work is underway at NATO to ensure that Allies’ are simplifying their procedures for the movement of NATO troops, that Allies protect critical transportation infrastructure, that they make provisions to be able to deny transportation networks to an adversary as a defensive measure, and that they put in place war risk insurance and indemnification mechanisms to ensure that commercial providers can continue to provide transportation assets in times of tension or conflict. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Interdependencies between seven baseline sectors Cascading effects: an attack on one area may cause unforeseen consequences in other sectors I should reiterate the point here – it’s something I alluded to earlier – that the seven baseline areas are inextricably linked. If one area is impacted, another area may suffer as a result, creating cascading effects. For example, a mass influx of people would have serious effects on other critical sectors, such as transport, food and water, as well as on military posture and preparedness. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

NATO Tools Resilience Advisory Support Teams Counter Hybrid Support Teams Planning guidance (e.g. Population Movement, Mass Casualty Planning, Priority Allocation Systems for Communications) Assessment through the NATO Defence Planning Process NATO Crisis Response System Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre Training and exercises To support our member nations in achieving these requirements, we have put in place a range of support tools. We have established a Resilience Advisory Support Team – a team of pre-identified resilience experts to provide, upon request, tailored support to Allies in improving their resilience. This team could also be available to partner nations, if requested, and if agreed by Allies. We are also establishing Counter Hybrid Support Teams, to assist, advise, and support national efforts on a temporary basis to prepare for or respond to hybrid threats. CHSTs offer Allies a simple way of accessing a wide array of expertise in the build-up to or during a hybrid campaign, according to the needs of the targeted Ally. We are also assessing the state of civil preparedness in all Allied nations in accordance with the NATO Defence Planning Process. The last assessment was finalised end of 2018. We have also updated our planning and exercising to ensure that our military planning are complemented by civilian crisis response planning, and that these are exercised together regularly. We also continue to offer training to our member nations in various aspects of resilience, including train-the-trainer courses for CBRN first response. [CLICK] NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) Created in 1998 to coordinate international assistance in case of natural and man made disasters Operational 24/7 Acts as a clearing house mechanism, coordinating requests and offers of assistance from all Allies and partners (70 countries) In 2001, EADRCC has been given an additional coordinating role for response to terrorist attacks involving CBRN agents Maintains a inventory of CBRN assets/resources potentially available from Allied nations to assist response and protection of the population. In 2013, EADRCC became a full member of the Inter-Agency Committee for Radiological Emergencies Liaison arrangements: NMAs; EU Emergency Response Coordination Center; UN-OCHA; International Atomic Emergency Agency.

Partners in resilience European Union Private Sector Partner Nations It is clear that no single entity holds all the tools necessary to achieve resilience. And that’s why the Warsaw Summit Resilience Commitment underlined the need for continued support to partners and cooperation with other international organisations in addressing vulnerabilities to make the Alliance, NATO’s neighbourhood and the wider international system more secure. NATO’s resilience and civil preparedness work is complementary with the European Union’s activities. We are working with the European Union to bolster resilience to hybrid threats. In view of NATO’s collective defence role, the Alliance can leverage these and other EU’s tools to promote Allied preparedness, while influencing the EU to take better account of security and defence considerations. This could be achieved by further enhancing practical staff-to-staff cooperation between the organisations but also joint committee meetings between the two institutions. In the second half of 2019, NATO and EU staff will work on mapping civil preparedness efforts between NATO’s Resilience Baselines and the EU’s Prevention and Preparedness work-streams and set out proposals for further co-operation, as part of the 74 proposals for improving EU-NATO cooperation. NATO-EU staff-to-staff cooperation has improved through collaboration with the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. This includes active participation of staff from both organisations in scenario based discussions, workshops and exercises, including in the field of bolstering resilience. We are also engaging the private sector, since they are the owners and operators of much critical infrastructure covered by our resilience baseline requirements. And we are offering capacity building assistance to partners in Eastern Europe, South Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, particularly in establishing robust crisis management systems and in training. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Important deterrent effect Conclusions Why focus on building resilience? Important deterrent effect Can prevent low-level attacks and minimise impact of hybrid incidents Builds long term advantage against other potential adversaries and emerging threats To conclude, I’m not going to pretend that building resilience is a panacea against hybrid attacks. It is a small component of our countering hybrid warfare strategy, which takes into account not just ‘below the threshold’ attacks but incidents across the spectrum of conflict, including those more kinetic in nature. NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland is one example of a more robust approach needed to deter and, if necessary, defend against an armed attack. In this way, eFP is not designed to address hybrid warfare itself, as it is a conventional tool. However, its strategic design seeks to impose costs and increase the effort required for attempts to coerce, intimidate or commit aggression, as well as compel an adversary to commit to and “own” escalation. Equally, the important deterrent effect of building resilience should not be underestimated. In the here and now, it can ensure that low level attacks are prevented, with adversaries often reluctant to attempt attacks that might fail. And its mitigation effects are also important. Even if an attack is successful, if the target of hybrid activity is resilient, its effects will be minimised. Building resilience against hybrid threats helps build a longer term advantage too. It makes perfect sense to build resilience not only against current adversaries but also against potential ones. NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Questions? NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Resilience and Enablement Khan Jahier Enablement and Resilience Section Defence Policy and Planning Division NATO International Staff NATO UNCLASSIFIED 27 27