Can Investors Time Their Exposure to Private Equity?

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Presentation transcript:

Can Investors Time Their Exposure to Private Equity? David T. Robinson Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business

Can investors time their exposure to private equity? Gregory Brown, Robert Harris, Wendy Hu, Tim Jenkinson, Steve Kaplan and David T. Robinson UNC Kenan-Flagler, UVA Darden School, Burgiss Group, University of Oxford, University of Chicago, and Duke University Paper available on SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241102 Private Equity Research Consortium Working Paper http://uncipc.org/index.php/initiativecat/private-equity/

Timing Private Markets Many investors are worried about committing to funds when purchase multiples, leverage multiples, equity markets, and dry powder are at high levels Sound familiar?! But are there timing strategies that work for private equity?

Fundraising and subsequent performance (Table II) There is a strong negative relationship between fundraising and performance, as measured by IRRs and multiples – for example these are regressions for buyouts: The relationship to PMEs is, however, generally insignificant – reflecting the high correlation between PE fundraising and general market conditions

Why Timing Might Work Private equity returns are cyclical – with periods of high fund- raising being associated with subsequent low returns Can investors time their exposure to private equity to take advantage of this observed correlation? If so, how large are the potential gains from implementable strategies? There are, of course, potential practical issues regarding big changes in asset allocations reflecting market conditions A key issue is that investors commit capital to funds, but the funds decide when to invest in, and exit from, portfolio companies

Timing strategies We analyze different types of timing strategies: Fixed allocation each vintage year Strategies that require foresight (and are thus infeasible) Provide bookends for the best/worst you could expect to do Strategies that are investible in a statistical sense, but may be difficult to implement (involving large swings in allocations) Strategies that are feasible from a statistical and organizational perspective

Steady as she goes strategies We first analyze various versions of constant $ strategies Allocate a constant $ amount, no matter the market conditions Since distributions are pro-cyclical, assuming that distributions are re-invested immediately will result in pro-cyclical commitments, as well as being impractical, so we explore 2 cases Distributions held in cash until next commitment to GP Distributions held in the index until next commitment to GP

Strategies requiring foresight Such strategies are not investible but allow us to establish bounds on the potential gains from timing private equity commitments Foresight strategy: invest double in the best half of the vintages and nothing in the worst half Anti-foresight strategy: do the reverse Note, in practice we have seen far more extreme timing than this (e.g. Calpers committed $27bn to the 2007 & 2008 vintages and $2.2bn to the 2009 & 2010 vintages

Cyclical strategies We then explore investible strategies, based upon information that was available at the time. We estimate how ‘hot’ the private market is for each vintage year using two measures: Current and prior year total commitments to PE (buyout and VC) scaled by CRSP total market index at the start of the vintage year Capital commitments to buyout and VC (separately) relative to average of last 3-years’ commitments Such strategies may present organizational challenges regarding dynamic asset allocation

Commitment strategies (Table I)

Allocations over time

Data We use Burgiss data, from 1987 – 2016Q3 Includes the complete transactional history We focus on buyout and VC funds We focus on vintage years up to 2013, although the more recent vintages will be largely un-realized In total we have 1,826 buyout funds and 1,845 VC funds All returns are net of fees and carried interest, and so represent the returns received by investors

Buyout returns, by timing strategy (Table III)

VC returns, by timing strategy (Table III)

Alternative strategies For buyouts there is a modest gain from allocating to more established GPs, whereas for VC such a strategy yields large retuns … but may not be feasible

The Rub Actual Contributions (capital calls) Actual Distributions (capital return)

Limited portfolios These results assume investors allocate to all funds in a vintage, which is clearly infeasible But the distributions of randomly selected funds suggest that reasonable sized random portfolios may generate similar results, especially for buyouts

Why are timing benefits weak? The gains over a constant $ allocation rule are surprisingly limited The explanation comes from the fact that diametrically opposed commitment strategies lead to patterns of capital calls that are only modestly negatively correlated; and distributions are highly positively correlated LPs control when they make commitments; GPs control entry and exit decisions, which are endogenously determined and influenced by market movements And public and private returns are highly correlated – so less impact on PME

Entry and exit decisions (Table VII) GP decisions on when to invest and divest are driven by the market and the potential gains from delegating the entry/exit decision are significant

Conclusions Investing in private equity involves commitment risk: The investor pledges capital but does not control when it is put to work or returned. Actual entry and exit decisions depend on market conditions GP decisions on capital calls and distributions ‘undo’ much of any LP timing decision The gains from market timing for buyouts are limited potential gains for VC are greater but may not be achievable in practice