Vashek Vylet, RadCon UITF Conduct of Operations Review April 24, 2019

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Activation problems S.Agosteo (1), M.Magistris (1,2), Th.Otto (2), M.Silari (2) (1) Politecnico di Milano; (2) CERN.
Advertisements

1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Presentation to ASAC R. Casey Radiation Shielding: Assumption and Design April 24, 2007.
PROBLEM: Radiation Dose Rate in IR2 When IR1 is Operating (and Vice Versa) Muon Dose Rate > 1 mRem/hr for 0.1% Collimated Halo.
NLC - The Next Linear Collider Project Backgrounds Update Tom Markiewicz SLAC LCWS Cornell 15 July 2003.
C. Theis, D. Forkel-Wirth, S. Roesler, H. Vincke.
UCN Phase 2 Design Status September 10, Design Components Bulk Shielding Target Crypt Cryogenic Insert Target Insert UCN Port Beam Window Cooling.
BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Radiological Design Considerations of Synchrotron Radiation Facilities P.K. Job Radiation Physicist National Synchrotron.
Posting of Accelerator Enclosures Vashek Vylet and Keith Welch DOE Accelerator Workshop SLAC, August 17 – 19,
ALPHA Project Safety Assessment Document Vladimir Anferov.
RADIATION PROTECTION IN DIAGNOSTIC AND INTERVENTIONAL RADIOLOGY
1 Radiation Safety Aspects of the Linear Collider B. Racky, A. Leuschner, N. Tesch Radiation Protection Group TeV Superconducting Linear Accelerator.
Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility Page 1 UITF Progress meeting Approved Labyrinth Fresh air pulled through “chicken wire” gate.
SHMS Optics and Background Studies Tanja Horn Hall C Summer Meeting 5 August 2008.
First AWAKE dump calculations Helmut Vincke. Beam on dump Muon axis inside and outside CERN Distances: Beam impact point to end of West hall: ~300 m Beam.
MSL - SLAC11 Radiation Protection studies for SiD Mario Santana, SLAC / RP 2010 Linear Collider Workshop & International Linear Collider Meeting Tsinghua.
The Status of ESS Accelerator Shielding and Accident Scenarios Lali Tchelidze May 26, 2014.
NLCTA Safety Audit Radiation Safety Review W. R. Nelson 9 November 2001.
Status of Radiation Protection studies in support of ELENA R. Froeschl and J. Vollaire DGS-RP-AS.
Integrated Radiation Measurement and Radiation Protection of BES Ⅲ Zhang Qingjiang, Wu protection group, accelerator center, IHEP,
Introduction From a neutron flux (> 20 MeV), with the Leaching model (Lessard) based on SBMS (Tables 1 and 2):
Beam loads & dump concepts T. Kramer, B. Goddard, M. Benedikt, Hel. Vincke.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES NSLS2 Bulk Shielding calculations Methodology P.K. Job Radiation Physicist Peer Review 2007 March 27, 2007.
Brookhaven Science Associates U.S. Department of Energy RSVP Safety and Environmental Protection Issues E. Lessard Associate Chair for ESHQ Collider-Accelerator.
Overview of HINS Operations and Radiation Shielding Considerations in the Meson Detector Building Bob Webber August 16, 2006.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES Summary of Shielding Calculations for NSLS2 Accelerators P.K. Job Radiation Physicist Peer Review 2007 March
BooNE / NuMI Rad. Protection NBI 2002 S. Childress (FNAL) Radiation Protection for Mini-BooNE & NuMI 18 March, 2002 Mini-BooNE inputs from Peter Kasper.
Radiation Protection studies for the Linac4 / Linac2 interface Joachim Vollaire, DGS-RP 28/09/2015 Linac4 Coordination Meeting.
Radiation Protection and Radiation Safety for Particle Accelerator Facilities J. Vollaire, Radiation Protection Group CERN Compact Accelerators for Isotope.
Summary of radiation shielding studies for MTA Muon production at the MiniBooNE target Igor Rakhno August 24, 2006.
1 BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES NSLS-II Shielding Workshop R. Casey Activation Issues for NSLS-II March 28, 2007.
Ma zhongjian Ding yadong Wang qingbin Wu qingbiao Radiation Protection Group/IHEP.
UITF ODH Assessment UITF Safety Review May 10, 2016.
EURISOL DS Task meeting Orsay, 07 Janvier Preliminary shielding assessment of EURISOL Post Accelerator D. Ene, D. Ridikas. B. Rapp.
1 Implementation at RAL Iouri Ivaniouchenkov on behalf of Elwyn Baynham, Tom Bradshaw, Tony Jones, Jim Rochford Engineering Department, RAL MICE Collaboration.
MI Shielding Machine Protection Credit D. Capista March 7,2010.
Dark Current in ILC Main Linac N.Solyak, A.Sukhanov, I.Tropin ALCW2015, Apr.23, 2015, KEK LCWS'15, Tsukuba, 04/2015Nikolay Solyak1.
CHANGE OF ACCESS CONTROLS TO SERVICE BUILDINGS DURING BEAM PERMIT Vashek Vylet StayTreat, July 17, 2015.
Radiation Protection Standards for Prompt Radiation Don Cossairt, Radiation Protection Manager, ESH&Q Section October 1, 2013.
Prompt dose upstream the 12-ft concrete shielding blocks Igor Rakhno May 4, 2007.
EURISOL, TASK#5, Bucuresti, November 1 Preliminary shielding assessment of EURISOL Post Accelerator D. Ene, D. Ridikas. B. Rapp.
1 Target Station Design Dan Wilcox February 2012.
Dark Current and Radiation Shielding Studies for the ILC Main Linac
Radiation Protection RTMR 284 CHAPTER 20 PART II.
JLEIC MDI Update Michael Sullivan Apr 4, 2017.
Beam Commissioning Adam Bartnik.
Primary Radiation Calculation for Sun Yat-Sen Proton Hospital
Heating and radiological
Shielding Design for LCLS Injector Operation – Phase one
Induced-activity experiment:
UITF – Upgrade Injector Test Facility
Desirable BCM Performance
Radiation protection of Linac4 M. Silari Radiation Protection Group
TI8/WIC Incident & UJ87/UA87 Radiation Levels & Analysis
C100 Activation Status and Projections JLab Ops Staytreat 2016
Radiation Physics requirements for the IR
Resident Physics Lectures
Example Outside (Car Park and seating) Wall A 4.2m 1.3m Wall D Wall B
Vashek Vylet RadCon Manager UITF Internal Safety Review May 10, 2016
Source term test in Hall C
Upgraded Injector Test Facility - UITF
Resident Physics Lectures
Andreas Jansson, Lali Tchelidze
Fassò, N. Nakao, H. Vincke Aug. 2, 2005
Beam Dump Experiments with Photon and Electron Beams
Operations Section Leader
Upgraded Injector Test Facility
Maximum Credible Beam Event Paul Emma et al
T-489: Induced Activity and Residual Dose Rates
UITF Conduct of Operations Review
Radiation Safety Considerations
Presentation transcript:

Vashek Vylet, RadCon UITF Conduct of Operations Review April 24, 2019 UITF Shielding Vashek Vylet, RadCon UITF Conduct of Operations Review April 24, 2019

Outline Shielding Policy Planned Operation Initial shielding estimates Monte Carlo simulations Conclusions

Shielding Policy Normal operation (incl. beam mis-steering) < 250 mrem/y in occupied RCAs < 100 mrem/y in other occupied areas < 10 mrem/y at site boundary (also “design goal” for general employees per RadCon Manual) radionuclides in groundwater per VPDES permit Max. credible accident: <15 rem per incident

Planned Operation A HDIce: operation at 10 MeV for 900 h/y Iav = 5 nA for 80% of time Iav = 100 nA for 20% of time (for tuning) B – Operation at 10 MeV with Iav = 100 mA, with normal (unshielded) losses < 100 nA

Initial Shielding Estimates Source terms and shielding evaluated by semi-empirical methods using data from NCRP reports and other sources Cave 1: Existing shielding : 55”/28” west side, 30” roof thickness (with penetrations) Cave 2: Available 4 ft blocks – adequate for side shielding, not quite enough forward

Initial Shielding Estimates CAVE 1 Scenarios  Dose rate [mrem/h] Note   Side 100% loss 41 RA Side 0.1% loss 0.04 below RCA Side up 0.1% loss 2.6 RCA Roof 100% loss 2973 HRA Roof 0.1% loss 3.0 Roof penetration(1) 100% loss 40621 Roof penetration(1) 0.1% loss 40.6 (1) with current 3.25” local steel slab shield Cave 1 100 mA loss (MeV area) Location Beam loss E [mrem/h] Note Side wall 5% 2.21E-03 below RCA 100% 4.42E-02 Forward 0.28 RCA 5.6 RA Roof 2.76 55.2 Cave 2 100 nA loss

Monte Carlo Calculations Simple estimates: side shielding fine for Cave 1 & 2 if losses < 100 nA Roofs & penetrations > RCA or >RA Challenges: He/ODH vent, skyshine,North Annex 2nd floor, roof and floor penetrations – addressed by Monte Carlo Simulations using FLUKA code helped with shielding improvements, e.g. north wall in Cave 2 and He vent changes

Greenblocks added Top plank

Summary of MC Results Cave 1 10 MeV, 100 mA loss Dose rate [mrem/h] West side floor < 0.3 West side up < 10 Roof (no penetration) < 30 Cable trench exit - Control Room 40 Shielded 10 inch roof penetrations Big vent at Cave 2 boundary 5 Source location HDIce facing maze Electron energy [MeV] 10 5 0.450 0.225 Current lost 100 mA  100 mA  841 mA 3 mA  13.3 mA   Cave 2  Dose rate [mrem/h] Cv2 side* < 2.0 4.0 2.0  - <=0.1  Cv2 maze exit 0.4 6.0  9.0  0.5 <=0.4  Cv2 forward 1st floor** 1.0 0.8  0.4  - -  Roof2 @ He vent 4000 1000  1500  30  <=13 Roof2 @ maze 100 3000  10000  2  <0.2 North Annex, 2nd floor 3 10  <2 

Conclusions Current shielding is adequate for HDIce operation (100 nA) and for 100 mA if routine losses do not exceed 100 nA. Monte Carlo predicts in general lower dose rates, drastically so in case of shielded roof Cave 1 penetrations Analysis of normal operation and accident scenarios shows results comply with Jlab shielding policy

END

EXTRA

Normal Operations Beam Loss/ Termination Point Beam Loss Condition (Watt) Duration Frequency Duty Cycle* Exposure Location Dose rate (mrem/h) Dose/Event (mrem) Annual Dose** Notes Lower beam line opposite maze 1 8 hr Continuous 0.09 Cave 2 entry gate 0.006 0.008 1.1 Represents 0.1% of the beam power (100 nA) for high current operation (100 μA); assumes robustly shielded dump(s) and 100% occupancy. Cave 2 roof is HRA - not routinely occupied. Cave 1 roof is RCA, assumed 100% occupancy. 2nd floor office 0.010 0.016 1.8 Source lab <0.001 <0.008 <0.2 Cave 2 roof 3 24 N/A Cv 1 roof boundary 0.8 6.4 144 HDICE Line 0.05 0.36 All - Conditions all bounded by 100 nA 60 min 2/day West wall <0.005 <0.9 Full loss (100 nA) in low current mode (beam loss, or delivery of tune beam to F-cup)   Roof is posted radiological area and not routinely occupied 0.003 0.54 0.001 0.18 He Vent/C2 roof 4 Gun Test Mode – Not Accelerator Operations 3000 4 hr  Few/year <0.4 <1.6 <6.4 Drifting 225 keV @ 13.4 mA through QCM (off) to FC (without shield)*** 1350 Few/year 0.5 2 8 Drifting 450 keV @ 3 mA through QCM (off) to FC (without shield)*** * Assumes 900 hours operation/y; 20% high-current, 80% lo-current mode (25% of low current running at 100 nA) ** Non-RCA design goal is 10 mrem/y, RCA design goal is 250 mrem/y *** Routine condition is beam delivery to a shielded Faraday cup. Dose rate shown is for off-normal event upstream of FC. CARM probe at entry gate protects.

Beam loss/ termination point Accident Conditions Beam loss/ termination point Beam Loss Condition (Watt) Duration Exposure Location Dose rate (mrem/h) Dose/Event (mrem) Notes Lower beam line opposite maze 3000 15 min West wall 12 3 Worst plausible overcurrent condition at full energy (10 MeV @ 300 uA). Includes assumption of simultaneous, complete beam spill in lower beam line (may not be credible). 2nd floor office 30 7.5 North wall 2.4 0.6 C2 Roof (over loss point) 9000 2250 C2 Roof (He vent) 750 C1 Roof boundary 2400 600 Carve 2 access gate 18 4.5 HDICE Line 1000 <2 <0.5 Overcurrent condition (100 uA) in low current mode; loss point in HDICE line, vicinity of target 0.75 1 0.4 He Vent/roof 4000 <1000 <250 Cave 2 access gate 0.1 4200 2 0.5 Worst plausible overcurrent condition – beam loading degrades gradient to 5 MeV, current is 840 μA. Beam is lost in lower beam line. C2 roof (over loss point) 10,000 2500 9 2.25 All cases result in integrated dose < 15 rem.

Accident Conditions (cont’d) Beam loss/ termination point Beam Loss Condition (Watt) Duration Exposure Location Dose rate (mrem/h) Dose/Event (mrem) Notes QCM Exit 3000 15 min West wall (cont. room) < 0.9 < 0.23 Worst plausible overcurrent condition at full energy (10 MeV @ 300 uA). Includes assumption of simultaneous, complete beam spill at CM exit (may not be credible). Above cont. room < 30 < 7.5 Roof < 90 < 23 Roof penetration* 40,621 10,155 Cable trench (cont. room)** 120 30 Vent duct exit < 15 < 3.75 4200 < 1 <0.25 Worst plausible overcurrent condition – beam loading degrades gradient to 5 MeV, current is 840 μA. Beam is lost at CM exit. Values conservatively scaled from same accident in cave 2. < 33 < 8.5 < 100 < 25 45,090 11,272 133 34 < 17 < 4.5 * Based on analytical methods, modeling expected to reduce value significantly. ** Results without shielding All cases result in integrated dose < 15 rem.

Test Lab including UITF

Initial Estimates: Cave 2 at 100 nA 10 MeV, 100 uA ACCIDENT   Side wall Roof [rad/h] 0.044 55.2 Distance to wall [ft] 18 E [eV] I[A] P[W] Distance to ceiling [ft] 4.5 1.00E+07 1.00E-07 1.00E+00 verified 5/6/16 90 deg src term - photons   1.20E+03 rad.m^2.mA^-1.min^-1 7.20E+07 rad at 1 m per A per h Side wall 100 nA Note SRC term for 5% loss Shield thickness Dist + shield TVL conc Dose rate [mrad/h] @ 1 m [ft] [m] [in] mrad/h 3.60E+02 4 6.7308984 13.5 2.21E-03 below RCA Side wall - mis-steering SRC term for 100% loss 7.20E+03 4.42E-02 Roof 1.75 1.905 2.76E+00 RCA Roof - mis-steering 7200 5.52E+01 RA/RCA Similar approach done for Cave 1

Initial Estimates: Cave 2 at 100 nA

Cave 1 at 100 mA CAVE 1 Dose rate [mrem/h] Note Side 100% loss 41 RA   [mrem/h] Note Side 100% loss 41 RA Side 1% loss 0.4 RCA Side up 1% loss 26 Thinner wall may be an issue for stairs (and ground due to skyshine). Cable penetrations under west wall must be filled with grout or similar 28” 27” 30”

Cave 1 at 100 mA CAVE 1 Dose rate   [mrem/h] Roof 100% loss 2973 Roof 1% 30 Penet* 100% 40621 Penet* 1% 406 * with current 3.25" Fe shield 30” concrete 3” steel 7.8” steel Penetrations are above the beamline – about 8” of steel is needed for same attenuation as the 30” concrete slab. Roof will have to be inaccessible; Depending on results of measurements, full 100 mA may not be feasible at 10 MeV

Cave 1 at 100 mA

Cave 2 at 100 nA Existing side shielding (4 ft) adequate for both 5% and 100% loss RCA on roof, potential for RA for large losses Local shielding needed for FARCs and beam dump Local shielding needed at ODH vent HDIce config & forward shielding to be modeled in detail for forward shielding

Cave 2 at 100 nA 42” dump Side 5% loss Side 100 % Existing shielding is adequate in this regime; HDIce dump to be designed + few other details

Cave 2 at 100 nA Local shielding needs to be added on the roof to keep streaming radiation from ODH vent reaching occupied areas Skyshine on ground and adjacent Areas may be an issue – will be addressed by monitoring

Summary Both caves sufficiently shielded for 100 nA 100 uA in Cave 2 has issues Monitoring layout (CARMs) to be defined (include probes for skyshine) MC calculations needed to address HDIce dump and possible special configurations