A note on efficient computation of cube roots in characteristic 3

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A note on efficient computation of cube roots in characteristic 3 Paulo S. L. M. Barreto1 Escola Politécnica, Universidade de São Paulo. Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, tr. 3, 158. BR 05508-900, São Paulo(SP), Brazil. pbarreto@larc.usp.br Abstract. The cost of the folklore algorithm for computing cube roots in F3m in standard polynomial basis is less that one multiplication, but still O(m2). Here we show that, if F3m is represented in trinomial basis as F3[x]/(xm + axk + b) with a, b = ±1, the actual cost of computing cube roots in F3m is only O(m). 1 Introduction The fastest method known for computing the Tate pairing on supersingular el-liptic curves over F3m is the Duursma-Lee algorithm [1], which involves the com-putation of cube roots in that finite field. An efficient foklore algorithm for cube root extraction in standard polynomial basis (described e.g. in [3, section 5.2], whereby taking roots reduces to two multiplications by constant field elements. Since the degree of one of the involved factors in each multiplication is at most m/3, the overall cost of the “folklore” algorithm is actually about two thirds of one F3m multiplication. While this algorithm improves upon other methods like solving a linear equa-tion, it still takes O(m2) operations. It turns out, however, that further improve-ments are possible when F3m is represented as F3[x]/(xm + ax + b) with k ≡ m (mod 3). Specifically, we will show that the other factors involved in the multi-plications are a binomial and a trinomial, so that the incurred cost is only five shifts. Better yet, the degrees and the shift amounts are such that no reduction is needed (that is, all terms resulting from these operations have degrees smaller than m). A similar technique has been devised to take square roots in characteristic 2 by Fong et al. [2]. Clearly, it also generalizes to higher characteristic p, although the number of relevant cases allowed by the condition k ≡ m (mod p) becomes quite restricted. 2 The folklore algorithm We assume throughout this note that m is prime and that F3m is represented as F3[x]/(xm + ax + b), with a,b = ±1. As we will see, the folklore algorithm

∴3√r = ∴3√r = Xu i=0 Xu i=0 Xu i=0 Xu i=0 involves multiplications by x1/3 and x2/3. The other factor in these products has degree not exceeding m/3. For any c E F3m, we denote by cn the value cxn, which is c left-shifted by n positions and suitably reduced when necessary. Let r = Pm−1 i=0 rixi E F3m. The goal is to compute 3√r. 2.1 Case m 1 (mod 3) Let m = 3u + 1. The folklore algorithm reads: r = m−1Xi=0 rixi = Xu i=0 3i + r3ixx · u−1Xi=0 r3i+1x3i + x2 · 3i r3i+2x . ∴3√r = Xu i=0 r3ixi + x1/3 · u−1Xi=0 r3i+1xi + x2/3 · r3i+2xi. Defining c0 = Eui=0 r3ixi, c1 = Eu−1i=0 r3i+1xi, c2 = Pu−1 i=0 r3i+2xi, we have simply 3√r = c0 + x1/3 · c1 + x2/3 · c2. 2.2 Case m 2 (mod 3) Let m = 3u + 2. The folklore algorithm reads: r = m−1Xi=0 rixi = Xu i=0 3i + r3ixx · 3i + 2 r3i+1xx · 3i r3i+2x . ∴3√r = Xu i=0 r3ixi + x1/3 · r3i+1xi + x2/3 · r3i+2xi. Defining c0 = Eui=0 r3ixi, c1 = Eui=0 r3i+1xi, c2 = Eui=0 r3i+2xi, we have simply 3√r = c0 + x1/3 · c1 + x2/3 · c2. 3 Exploiting trinomial representation Using a trinomial representation is advantageous for implementing modular re- duction. We now show that a careful trinomial choice is also advantageous for taking cube roots when k ≡ m (mod 3). We consider separately the cases m ≡ 1 (mod 3) and m ≡ 2 (mod 3). Notice that in either case no modular reduction is needed, since all terms are smaller than m.

3.1 Case m 1 (mod 3), k 1 (mod 3) Let m = 3u + 1 and k = 3v + 1. We observe that x3u+1 + ax3v+1 + b = 0 =⇒ x2/3 = −bxu x1/3 = x2u+1 +1 — abxv+1 − axu+v+1 + x2v+1. Thus Vx2v+1) 3 r = c0 + x1/3 · c1 + x2/3 · c2 = c0 +c1(x2u+1 − axu+v+1 − 1 + abxv+1) = c0 + c12u+1 − acj<u+v+1 + crv+1 bcfu+1 − abcfv+1. c2(bxu+ 3.2 Case m 2 (mod 3), k 2 (mod 3) Let m = 3u + 2 and k = 3v + 2. We observe that x3u+2 + ax3v+2 + b = 0 =⇒ x1/3 = −bxu+1 − abxv+1 =⇒ x2/3 = x2u+2 − axu+v+2 +x2v+2. Thus 3√r = c0 + x1/3 · c1 + x2/3 · c2 = c0 − c1(bxu+1 + abxv+1) + c2(x2u+2 − axu+v+2 +x2v+2) = c0 − bcu+1 − abcv+1 + c2u+2 − acu+v+2 + c2v+2. 1 1 2 2 2 4 Examples Several fields of interest for pairing-based cryptosystems admit an irreducible trinomial xm + axk + b with the optimal property k ≡ m (mod 3); in table 1 we list a few with a = 1 and b = −1. finite field irreducible trinomial F397 x97 + x16 − 1 F3167 x167 + x92 − 1 F3193 x193 + x64 − F3239 x239 + x26 − Table 1. Trinomials xm + xk − 1 such that k = m (mod 3). Timings for the Duursma-Lee algorithm are given in table 2. These timings refer to a C++ implementation running on an Athlon XP 2GHz; the pairing algorithm itself was implemented according to the guidelines in [4]. We see that the overall pairing time decreases by about 10% with the use of trinomials. finite field plain trinomial F397 4.828 4.328 F3167 27.047 24.625 F3193 33.922 31.062 F3239 63.562 57.344 Table 2. Timings of the Duursma-Lee (in ms).

5 Conclusion 6 Acknowledgements References We described an improvement for the folklore cube root algorithm in character- istic 3, an important operation for the efficient computation of the Tate pairing on supersingular elliptic curves. The complexity of our technique is only O(m) rather than O(m2). 6 Acknowledgements We are grateful to Mike Scott for bringing [2] to our attention, and to FréVercauteren for pointing out the folklore status of the basic cube root algorithm. References I. Duursma and H.-S. Lee. Tate pairing implementation for hyperelliptic curves y2 = xp − x + d. In Advances in Cryptology – Asiacrypt’2003, volume 2894 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 111–123, Taipei, Taiwan, 2003. Springer-Verlag. K. Fong, D. Hankerson, J. L´opez, and A. Menezes. Field inversion and point halving revisited. Technical report CORR 2003-18, University of Waterloo, 2002. R. Granger, D. Page, and M. Stam. Hardware and software normal basis arithmetic for pairing based cryptography in characteristic three. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/157, 2004. M. Scott and Paulo S. L. M. Barreto. Compressed pairings. In Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Santa Barbara, USA, 2004. Advances in Cryptology – Crypto’2004, Springer-Verlag. to appear.