Topics in moral psychology VARIETIES OF RESPONSIBILITY Matt Bennett mpb74@cam.ac.uk drmattbennett.weebly.com

Varieties of Responsibility Thus far, I have tended to talk of responsibility by using a few phrases interchangeably: Being held responsible Being accountable Being the (appropriate) object of reactive attitudes Being blameworthy Being blamed Being the object of moral assessment But it turns out these phrases refer to different phenomena

Being and Holding Responsible Angela Smith ‘On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible’ The Journal of Ethics 11.4 2007 I can consistently judge that a person is responsible for and that I should not hold them responsible Consider: we do not ordinarily talk of holding someone responsible for good actions Also: I can judge a person culpable for a wrong and still think I ought not to actively blame them

Being and Holding Responsible Angela Smith ‘On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible’ The Journal of Ethics 11.4 2007 Additional requirements for active blaming: Is the person already self-blaming (feeling guilty)? Considerations about me (would it be hypocritical?) and my relationship to the person (friends should be forgiving) The very possibility of forgiveness indicates the difference between being and holding responsible

Scanlon on blame Example: I discover my friend was joking with others at my expense Three features of my response: Interpret the meaning of the action (attitude of my friend, its compatibility with our friendship) Consider what attitude I should take towards the friend given 1 Act on 1 and 2 e.g. by demanding justification

Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability What kind of blaming action we take is partly determined by the relevant relationship-norm Some norms specify behaviour conducive to a flourishing relationship (e.g. attentiveness in marriage) Some norms specify minimal requirements for a functioning relationship (e.g. fidelity in marriage) Transgression of the latter warrants sanctioning behaviour. A person is accountable for those transgressions only David Shoemaker ‘Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability’ Ethics 121.3 2011 (an elaboration of Scanlon’s theory of blame)

Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability Reminder: Smith’s attributability theory maintains that we are responsible for the thoughts and actions entailed by our evaluative judgements Objection 1: irrationality can be attributed to us, but is not something we can justify Objection 2: we can attribute non-rational attitudes to people, but it makes no sense to ask for reasons for those attitudes Conclusion: attributability is not co-extensive with answerability (read: open to demands for rational justification) David Shoemaker ‘Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability’ Ethics 121.3 2011 (an elaboration of Scanlon’s theory of blame)

Active and Passive Responsibility In (almost?) all contemporary accounts of responsibility, responsible people are the object of a verb We blame or forgive Sophie We hold Sophie responsible/accountable We demand justification from Sophie We assess Sophie in a certain way We attribute something to Sophie But consider: being a responsible parent/student/teacher/etc. is not (just) about being the appropriate object of a judgement or attitude when things go wrong One must also conduct parenting in a responsible way

Varieties of Active Responsibility Taking Responsibility Accepting what I have done Accepting blame for a collective failure Stepping Up Taking the lead in meeting a collective obligation – a group of people, at least one of whom must ensure X, but of whom none is individually obligated to ensure X (workplace examples may count) Acting to correct a structural injustice e.g. volunteering with a charity Acting Responsibly An attitude towards what we do that is not required by duty

A Theory of Active Responsibility Active forms of responsibility are: Actions (or ways of acting) Supererogatory (not obligated/duty bound) Voluntarist (these kinds of responsibility need to be willed by me, in some sense, in order for them to hold) Fallible (i.e. I can get this wrong)

Possible Objections Obj1: Taking responsibility is just a way that we can alter passive responsibilities Like promise making, it can generate obligations As a form of contrition, it can absolve blame Reply1: the phrase “taking responsibility” can, but does not always, refer to actions that alter passive responsibilities e.g. the acknowledgement of wrong required for forgiveness differs from the acknowledgement of wrong required for therapeutic acceptance Obj2: Acting responsibly means making sure we have good reason for what we are doing Reply: yes, but our reasons are not always reasons of justification – they are reasons of what is worthwhile