Where are the Drivers of Governance Reform?

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Presentation transcript:

Where are the Drivers of Governance Reform? 40 Years of Bangladesh: Retrospective and Prospective Where are the Drivers of Governance Reform? Pierre Landell-Mills

Purposes of Presentation 1.To place Bangladesh’s progress towards better governance in the context of the North paradigm for state building 2. In light of this discussion to explore who might become the drivers of governance reform 3. To examine how donors might contribute constructively to supporting these drivers

North-Wallis-Weingast Paradigm for State Building Fragile  basic mature natural state limited access -> open access Essence of a ‘natural state’: Competition among factions of the elite for power: outcome depends on access to the means of violence Rulers need resources -> negotiate with owners and creators of wealth Resources ->power-> accumulation of resources

Limited access state Institutions are personalized Means of violence is dispersed  security forces are not fully controlled by the state Elite enjoy privileges not accessible to ordinary citizens qualified rule of law  corporations not treated equally (monopolies, rigged procurement, etc.)

Open access state Impersonal elite relationships  Perpetually lived institutions Security forces under full state/civilian control Impartial rule of law Privileges converted into rights under the law available to all citizens Open and fair competition among political parties, corporations, and CSOs All citizens equal under the law

Limited access  open access: Transition Limited access  open access: Privileged relationships  open competition Arbitrary justice  rule of law for all Dispersed means of violence  state monopoly under civilian control Increasing transparency and accountability

“Doorstep Conditions” Rule of law for elites Perpetually lived institutions both public and non-state Consolidated control of the means of violence (military and police)

Good governance Impartial rule of law Open and fair competition among political parties, corporations,and CSOs Impersonal (i.e.meritocratic) bureaucracy Transparency and accountability of all state institutions -> free press, separation of powers, etc.

How does Bangladesh fit the paradigm? Personalized relations -> competing elite factions Deficient and partial rule of law Security forces capable of acting independently + other forms of violence Weak institutions of accountability Lack of transparency Limited access state

Why bother? Who would gain? Steady growth: true that poverty remains severe but improvement in social indicators has been impressive Progress falls far short of potential: growth/incomes, public services, human rights Paradox: economic dynamism, but poor governance ->better governance could raise GDP growth 2-3% p.a. (World Bank)

near-universal agreement State of governance near-universal agreement Highly politicised institutions, both state and non-state, divided along party lines Formally, ‘modern’ laws and institutions are in place, but informal realities are what matter: weak accountability, lack of restraints, disregard for rule of law; little access to justice; inefficiency and corruption in judiciary and police; use of violence/criminality in politics Most citizens are ‘prisoners’ in a neo-patrimonial system based on unaccountable informal power

Governance issues: Most public transactions involve corruption -> e.g. procurement, contracting, appointments, services, etc. Systems of accountability are ineffective -> parliament, audit, ACC, etc. Dysfunctional bureaucracy: not merit-based; highly centralised Trends: generally considered as mixed, some positive trends (digital Bangladesh); some worsening (judiciary); some uncertain RTI? Media?

Why poor governance? Patronage-based systems for securing and exercising power Socio-cultural and historical: deep structures (prisoners and escapees) Constitutional: first-past-the-post, winner takes all; elections promote short-termism; institutions of accountability are ineffective Economic: hamstrung businesses -- politics seen as way to make money Slow political renewal: low turnover among senior politicians

Drivers of governance reform? Business groups Independent media Professional associations Policy research and advocacy centres NGOs

Business groups Strong incentives to promote reform Ample resources Politically divided and captured Short term horizons Global links Prefer not to rock the boat

Independent media Resource dependent -> risk capture No strong traditions Weak investigative skills Need a lot of support for building capacity

Professional associations Very varied group Politically divided Have yet to play a strong role Potentially highly influential Need to assistance to build up capacity

Policy research and advocacy centres Less politically aligned than other groups Important role in promoting awareness and debate Heavily dependent on external funding Vulnerable Potentially key players

Development NGOs Numerous with wide geographical coverage Well resourced but heavily donor dependent NGO have conflicting goals Internal governance issues Support role

Special cases CSOs that are dedicated to governance reform TIB BRAC-IGS Manusher Jonno Key players

Is there a role of the donors in governance reform? Can donors help? Is there a role of the donors in governance reform? Official donors work with and through governments  they accept the rhetoric and pretend to ignore the reality Governance reform is very politically sensitive  work through 3rd parties

Can Donors Help? Major constraints: An ‘open access state’ mindset Mixed motives (idealism v. self interest) Inappropriate timeframe Opportunities: catalyst  new ideas from outside money  support non state actors Switch from supply to demand side from supporting state agencies to NSA

Donors Incentives Incentives : HQ driven priorities , risk avoidance, technical versus political considerations, and quick wins, leading to: A short term perspective Blue-print v. learning approach Preference for technical ,supply side, capacity building interventions, with milestones and measurable value for money Too little time to learn about local conditions, understand local politics and build personal relationships

Conditions for greater donor effectiveness: Donors need to: Obtain a better understanding of the political economy context Map and seek ways to support the potential drivers of governance reform Accept that governance reform is a slow iterative process – needs a 20+ year time frame, a learning approach, dogged persistence, And hence, staff willing to stay at least 5-7 years in post

Thank you.