STIR / SHAKEN for 911 use of SHAKEN 8/7/2019

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Presentation transcript:

STIR / SHAKEN for 911 use of SHAKEN 8/7/2019 Martin Dolly Lead Member of Technical Staff Core Network & Gov’t/Regulatory Standards and Director, SIP Forum md3135@att.com 5/1/2019

Topics to Consider for 911 use of SHAKEN What is being Attested to? Is there a need to Attest to the Calling Party in addition to the Priority Attestation? Will a CVT be invoked? Are 911 calls ever diverted? Are new “Verstat” values needed? Discussion on Standards Work Plan ATIS/IPNNI committees 3GPP IETF

The PASSporT “shaken” extension The PASSporT “shaken” extension shall include both an attestation indicator (“attest”), as described in section 5.2.3 and an origination identifier (”origid”) as described in section 5.2.4. The SHAKEN PASSporT token would have the form given in the example below: Protected Header { "alg":"ES256", "typ":"passport", "ppt":"shaken", "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cert" } Payload "attest":"A", "dest":{"tn":["12125551213 "]}, "iat":1443208345, "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}, "origid":"123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426655440000" In addition to attestation, the unique origination identifier (“origid”) is defined as part of SHAKEN. This unique origination identifier should be a globally unique string corresponding to a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) (RFC 4122). The origid will identify: Signing Carrier Carrier Customer/Access Carrier Entry Gateway

Signing RPH for NS/EP This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rph", which provides an assertion for information in ’SIP Resource-Priority’ header field. The creator of a PASSporT object adds a "ppt" value of "rph" to the header of a PASSporT object, in which case the PASSporT claims MUST contain a "rph" claim, and any entities verifying the PASSporT object will be required to understand the "ppt" extension in order to process the PASSporT in question. A PASSPorT header with the "ppt“ included will look as follows: { "typ":"passport", "ppt":"rph", "alg":"ES256", "x5u":"https://www.example.org/cert.cer" } Page 4

Signing RPH for NS/EP Specifically, the "rph" claim includes an assertion of the priority level of the user to be used for a given communication session. The value of the "rph" claim is an Object with one or more keys. Each key is associated with a JSON Array. These arrays contain Strings that correspond to the r-values indicated in the ’SIP Resource- Priority’ header field. After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed, their signature is generated normally per the guidance in [RFC8225] using the full form of PASSPorT. { "orig":{"tn":"12155550112"}, "dest":{["tn":"12125550113"]}, "iat":1443208345, "rph":{"auth":["ets.0", "wps.0"]} } Page 5

RFC 7135 - Registering a SIP Resource Priority Header Field Namespace for Local Emergency Communications This document creates the new Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Resource Priority header (RPH) field namespace 'esnet' for local emergency usage and registers this namespace with IANA. Below is an example of a Resource-Priority header field using the 'esnet' namespace: Resource-Priority: esnet.0 The relative priority order for the 'esnet' namespace is as follows: (lowest) esnet.0 esnet.1 esnet.2 esnet.3 (highest) esnet.4 Defined in the NENA i3 standard (NENA-STA-010). NENA-STA-010 specifies the use of "esnet.1" for 9-1-1 calls (i.e., emergency calls that traverse an ESInet) and "esnet.0" for callback calls (at least within the ESInet). "esnet.2" is defined for "Calls related to an incident in progress which are deemed critical" e.g., calls between agencies/PSAP authorities. Uses for "esnet.3" and "esnet.4" are not defined.

Proposed PASSporT object and Claim for Emergency Services NETwork { "typ":"passport", "ppt":"rph", "alg":"ES256", "x5u":"https://www.example.org/cert.cer" } { "orig":{"tn":“CgPN"}, "dest":{["tn":“911 or URN-SOS"]}, "iat":1443208345, "rph":{“ESorig":[“esnet,x"]} } { "orig":{"tn":“EmergNet Num"}, "dest":{["tn":“CgPN that originated emergency call"]}, "iat":1443208345, "rph":{“EScallback":[“esnet,x"]} }

Deployment Assumptions for NS/EP RPH signing is only performed by the authenticating NS/EP service provider The authenticating NS/EP service provider will remove TN Identity Header prior to performing NS/EP authentication NS/EP call information will never be provided to a 3rd party CVT for data analytics An NS/EP carrier will use the same certificates for signing RPH, as they use for TN signing Based on local policy, an NS/EP service provider may choose to honor NS/EP calls without a signed RPH or process with normal priority This may change over time taking into account maturity of signed PRH deployments and knowledge of the adjacent carrier As with TN siging, RPH signing will not survive if there is interworking with the PSTN Page 8

Signaling Verification Verstat TN Validation Passed TN Validation Failed No TN Validation Future: same values above for CNAM Security Considerations The Verification Function must drop a verstat tel URI parameter received in an INVITE If the terminating UE does not support the "verstat" parameter value, it must discard the parameter The terminating UE will act on the "verstat" parameter value, if the 200 (OK) response to the UE REGISTER includes a Feature-Caps header field, as specified in RFC 6809°[190], with a "+g.3gpp.verstat" header field parameter tel URI parameter in the P-Asserted-Identity or FROM header field in a SIP requests P-Asserted-Identity: tel:+14085264000;verstat=TN-Validation-Passed

Topics to Consider for 911 use of SHAKEN What is being Attested to? Is there a need to Attest to the Calling Party in addition to the Priority Attestation? Will a CVT be invoked? Are 911 calls ever diverted? Are new “Verstat” values needed? Discussion on Standards Work Plan ATIS/IPNNI committees 3GPP IETF © 2015 AT&T Intellectual Property. All rights reserved. AT&T and the AT&T logo are trademarks of AT&T Intellectual Property. AT&T Proprietary (Internal Use Only) Not for use or disclosure outside the AT&T companies except under written agreement. 10

© 2015 AT&T Intellectual Property. All rights reserved © 2015 AT&T Intellectual Property. All rights reserved. AT&T and the AT&T logo are trademarks of AT&T Intellectual Property. AT&T Proprietary (Internal Use Only) Not for use or disclosure outside the AT&T companies except under written agreement.