About the IPNDV More than 25 countries with and without nuclear weapons which are: Identifying challenges of nuclear disarmament verification Developing.

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Presentation transcript:

Andrew Newman 2019 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee Meeting May 7, 2019

About the IPNDV More than 25 countries with and without nuclear weapons which are: Identifying challenges of nuclear disarmament verification Developing potential solutions to address those challenges Building and diversifying international capacity and expertise

Partners 25+ countries with and without nuclear weapons

History Announced in December 2014 Builds on and complements previous verification and monitoring initiatives: Verification Pilot Project The U.S.-Russia monitoring and verification experience The U.S.-UK Program on Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology UK-Norway Initiative on Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification

Structure On-going effort Three technical working groups that meet several times a year in Joint Working Group meetings and Plenaries Meetings hosted in partner countries

Working Groups & Phases Phase I Phase II Working Group 1: Monitoring and Verification Objectives Working Group 4: Verification of Nuclear Weapon Declarations Working Group 2: On-Site Inspections Working Group 5: Verification of Reductions Working Group 3: Technical Challenges and Solutions Working Group 6: Technologies for Verification Working Groups & Phases

The 14 Steps: IPNDV’s Nuclear Weapons Dismantlement Lifecycle Phase I addressed monitoring and verification activities in steps 6-10 Phase II addresses verification issues and technologies across the wider nuclear disarmament process (all 14 steps)

Phase I Key Judgment While tough challenges remain, potentially applicable technologies, information barriers, and inspection procedures provide a path forward that should make possible multilaterally monitored nuclear warhead dismantlement while successfully managing safety, security, non-proliferation, and classification concerns in a future nuclear disarmament agreement.

Phase II Address verification issues across all 14 steps Further assess technologies and procedures identified in Phase I to develop practical options Engage with other experts and groups addressing nuclear disarmament verification challenges, including the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (GGE) Publish outputs ahead the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon)

Beyond Phase II The Partnership intends to continue its work on nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring beyond Phase II

Work Captured at ipndv.org Phase I Summary Report Walkthrough Exercise Summary Report 40 Working Group Reports and analysis products Related resources collection 14-step dismantlement “lifecycle” Digital interactive of basic dismantlement scenario Event summaries, photos, and remarks www.ipndv.org