PHY Security SRD Text Update

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Presentation transcript:

PHY Security SRD Text Update Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 PHY Security SRD Text Update Date: 2017-11-07 Authors: SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple John Doe, Some Company

SFD (0462r5) Recap 6. Security [May 2017] Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 SFD (0462r5) Recap 6. Security [May 2017] (1) The security setup to be negotiated in a separate optional step prior to the 802.11az protocol parameter negotiation Note that in lieu of security negotiation, keys derived using an out-of- band mechanism may be used to secure the exchange between the initiator and the responder [May 2017] (2) The REVmc, HEz, and VHTz FTM modes, the fields over which range measurements are performed shall be protected against a Type B adversary attack [May 2017] SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple John Doe, Some Company

SFD (0462r5) Recap (cont’d) 6. Security [May 2017] Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 SFD (0462r5) Recap (cont’d) 6. Security [May 2017] (3) The DMGz and EDMGz FTM modes, the fields over which range measurements are performed shall be protected against a DMG/EDMG Type B adversary attack (TGaz R37) (4) In the PHY Security mode (VHTz, HEz, DMGz, EDMGz), the field used for channel/ToA measurement shall not include any form of repetition in time domain or structure that is predictable [September 2017, 1373r1] SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple John Doe, Some Company

Proposed additional SFD Text Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 Proposed additional SFD Text (5) In the PHY Security mode (VHTz, HEz, DMGz, EDMGz), the training waveform shall be transmitted with zero power (no signal) guard intervals preceding and following the field(s) used for channel/ToA measurement. (Note that zero power guard interval shall be inserted following the last sounding symbol if the last sounding symbol is followed by non- zero power signal) SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple John Doe, Some Company

Proposed additional SFD Text (Cont’d) Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 Proposed additional SFD Text (Cont’d) (6) In the PHY Security mode (VHTz, HEz, DMGz, EDMGz), the field used for channel/ToA measurement shall be derived from (a) random sequence(s) known by the authorized I-STA and R-STA only SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple John Doe, Some Company

Straw Poll 1 Do you support to add the proposed text as shown in slide 4 & 5 to the SFD? Result: Y: N: A: SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple

Month Year doc.: IEEE 802.11-yy/xxxxr0 Motion 1 Move to incorporate text as shown in slide 4 & 5 to the SFD Result: Y: N: A: SK Yong and Mingguang Xu, Apple John Doe, Some Company

Sept 2017 Motion 1 Move to adopt the text, instruct the editor to include it in the TGaz SFD under section 6 (security) and grant the SFD Editor editorial license: (5) In the PHY Security mode (VHTz, HEz, DMGz, EDMGz), the training waveform shall be transmitted with zero power (no signal) guard intervals preceding and following the field(s) used for channel/ToA measurement. (Note that zero power guard interval shall be inserted following the last sounding symbol if the last sounding symbol is followed by non-zero power signal) (6) In the PHY Security mode (VHTz, HEz, DMGz, EDMGz), the field used for channel/ToA measurement shall be derived from (a) random sequence(s) known by the authorized I-STA and R-STA only Moved by SK Yong Seconded by Yongho Seok Y: 11 N:0 A:7 SK Yong and Mingguang Xu - Apple