National Agent Scheme for Gas Theft Detection – Proposed Funding Arrangements Chris Hill – RWE Npower

How would the third party be incentivised? Suggest that shared industry funding should only cover the operational costs of the scheme Incentivisation would take the form of additional payments made for the actual detection of theft (supported by acceptable evidence) This way, the third party will only make a profit if theft is actually discovered. The more theft they detect, the more money they make Important that proof of theft detection is robust in order to discourage spurious detection claims (Photographic evidence?)

How would the costs be split amongst industry players? Suggest that players contribute to the core service costs based on market share by number of MPRNs for both SSP and NDM LSP Incentive payments for theft actually discovered would be paid by the current supplier In the case where the theft spans more than one supplier, the incentive payment would be split between the affected suppliers on the basis of time supplied over the total period Incentive payments would be fixed and not based on volume as this could lead to an inappropriate incentive for the third party to over report detected volumes