Access Control for CERN Experimental Areas North Area Consolidation Safety Review 2019-06-06 by Rui Nunes /BE-ICS-AC 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Outline Access Control Concept and context SUSI & ZORA Primary vs Secondary NA ZORA access control and PPS Extents Historical evolution Way forward for Post LS2 Risk Analysis – Functional safety studies Consequences Question 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

Access Concept – SUSI vs ZORA Today we are discussing this one 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Definitions SUSI SUrveillance des SItes  Non interlocked OTS commercial equipment Main function Security or safety by control of allowed area population ZORA ZOnes de RAdiation  Interlocked Integration of OTS commercial equipment with in-house development for interlock of the machine elements Main function : Safety System for Protection of Personnel from existing hazards. Control of area population, but most importantly interlock of machine elements in case of dangerous situation. 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

Primary vs Secondary (our perspective) Primary areas High risk of personnel exposure to radiation hazards emanating from the beam during operation or from activated materials Generally lower risk of exposure to other hazards Secondary areas Low risk of exposure to radiation hazards emanating from the “secondary” beam during operation or from activated materials Generally even lower risk of exposure to other hazards The terms High, Low and Lower are currently not defined quantitatively 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

Primary vs Secondary (our perspective) Primary systems deployed up to now according to a Functional Safety methodology 2008 - LHC Access 2015 - LS1 PS Access 2019 - LS2 SPS Access Secondary systems were designed in a different context, without a functional safety methodology, at a time when the perception of the risk did not warrant an equivalent to the “primary areas” in terms of safety requirements 2023 - LS3 Exp Areas Access ??? 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 NA PPS Extents 918 ECN3 EHN2 EHN1 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Historic Evolution IEFC 10 June 2011 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Historic Evolution IEFC 10 June 2011 39 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Historic Evolution IEFC 10 June 2011 Mostly unchanged 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Historic Evolution v20 IEFC 10 June 2011 v8 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Evolutions & requests Executed changes LOKN upgrade equipment Ion Mode interlock GIF++ Turnstile and upstream beam Sources not dependent on SPS extraction Neutrino Platform More zones ODH risks Close the galleries with non interlocked access Increased access control to the buildings EHN1 & EHN2 Laser interlocks systems […] Known future requests Limit access to trained people Change access system in every zone Interlock galleries in EHN1 & EHN2 Increase of interlocked zones Review of patrol capabilities Identify holders of safety keys Change of equipment Alternative to analog telephone intercoms ? 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

Way forward for post-LS2 The combination of: increase of beam energies new and more complex hazards increased complexity of zones uncoordinated modifications such as presented in the North Area Consolidation Study Report (2042932 v1) may not provide the adequate safety personnel protection that could be expected in the post LS2 operation scenarios. For this reason, a risk-based review and functional safety redesign of the post-LS2 ZORA Personnel protection system seems adequate at this time. 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

Consequences of FS studies Risk Analysis Quantification of radiological risks (RP) and other eventual risks Determination of safety functions Review architecture to implement to required SIL level May imply change of access policy in Exp Halls May imply revision of EIS-f interfaces May imply revision of EIS-a design (type of door/device/key distributor) May imply change of PLCs and supervision May imply cabling and powering changes Study implementation phases to minimize impact Post LS2 The cost of these measures cannot be completely estimated, until the scope and functions of the future system are determined. This is a result of the risk analysis and functional safety studies. 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412

NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412 Shall we go for it? Thank you for your attention. Questions? 2019-06-06 NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412