A crash-course on the euro crisis

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A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
A crash-course on the euro crisis
Presentation transcript:

A crash-course on the euro crisis Markus K. Brunnermeier & Ricardo Reis A crash-course on the euro crisis

Channels of funding and the role of (shadow) banks Section 3

The traditional bank On the asset side are holdings of mortgages, business loans, and financial assets which are mostly government bonds On the liabilities side are demand deposits from individual households Banks monitor domestic borrowers to reduce chances of default as well as transforming from liquid liabilities to illiquid assets However this transformation of maturity and liquidity exposes the banks to runs

The traditional bank

Bank runs If all depositors demanded to withdraw their deposits at the same time then the bank would not be able to liquidate its assets to honour its promises If one depositor expects a bank run then she would want to run as well to be ahead of the line to withdraw Policy such as deposit insurance backed by fiscal authorities or lender of last resort by monetary authorities can eliminate the incentive to run

Modern and shadow banks ASSETS Securitization LIABILITIES Wholesale funding

01 02 03 Securitization of assets Pool mortgages to remove idiosyncratic risk 01 Sell future revenue stream in exchange for payment today 02 Previously hard-to-trade mortgages are now tradable securities 03

Modern and shadow banks Wholesale funding market for liabilities Modern and shadow banks Borrow from other financial institutions 01 Short-term borrowing in the unsecured interbank market. 02 Borow through repos where securities are temporarily sold to other financial institutions to be later repurchased at a pre-agreed price. Collateralized and short-term so effectively senior to depositors. 03

Consequences Securitization Share of traded assets that are constantly marked-to-market is now considerably larger The modern bank can quickly realize losses and relies on markets working to sell these securities Wholesale funding Unlike depositors, financial institutions are well-informed and quick to withdraw loans. Inertia can no longer be counted on to prevent runs. New funding risk form repos not being rolled over. Both allow banks to grow quickly

Modern banks are riskier: size Because they grow quickly supported on wholesale borrowing, The share of net worth that funds assets is lower. Hence, incentives for banks to exert effort to monitor the quality of their loans become weaker.

Modern banks are riskier: funding risk Funding liquidity risk is higher Lenders of wholesale funding are quick to exit at the first sign of trouble. Some institutions do not take deposits at all and so avoid the government regulation that comes with them. These “shadow banks” are prone to classic bank runs

Modern banks are riskier: asset-price cycles Modern banks amplify asset-price cycles. When house prices rise, the marked-to-market assets increase immediately which makes it easier to obtain wholesale funding in the repo market. This enables further lending, lower mortgage costs, more demand for houses and therefore leading to further appreciation

The build-up towards the crisis: Spanish credit boom and the Cajas From 2002, when Spanish banks start to expand small local savings and loan banks, “Cajas”, also started to grow despite little growth in deposits The new ability to securitise, sell mortgages and access the wholesale market enabled them to become modern banks and grow quickly Hence, the Cajas were able to fund credit to real estate at a much faster rate than other banks

Spanish banks v. Cajas

The Spanish new banking landscape By 2007, the Cajas accounted for 52% of all loans to the Spanish private sector and its loans to real estate grew by a factor of 4.9 In 2017, all the Cajas has been dismantled or absorbed by other banks as a result of their high losses and mismanagement

European banks are special because Size of bank credit relative to total GDP is very large. Bank financing is dominant in Europe. Concentrated within countries. Largest few banks in each European country are very large relative to their countries, with total assets often in excess of annual GDP. Any individual country has trouble bailing out its banks. Flows of capital happened across multiple regions in Europe, involving countries with different deposit insurance mechanisms, different resolution authorities for troubled banks, and different fiscal authorities and legal systems behind these. Sovereign safety net of the financial sector was unreliable.

More modern banks data

Capital flows core-periphery through banks Source: Bank for International Settlements

Capital flows core-periphery through banks Source: Shin, H (2012) “The Euro Crisis Through the Lens of Capital Flow Reversals”

From German to Spanish banks Source: Shin, H (2012) “The Euro Crisis Through the Lens of Capital Flow Reversals”

Capital flows intermediated by banks Source: Rey, H (2012)

Banks and government borrowed from abroad Source: Chen, Milesi-Ferreti, Tressel (2012)

Europe’s huge banks

Countries borrowing through banks Source: Baldwin Giavazzi (2015) “The Eurozone Crisis: A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Remedies” CEPR Press

The growth of securitization in Europe Source: Shin, H (2012) “The Euro Crisis Through the Lens of Capital Flow Reversals”

Securitization in Spain Source: Shin, H (2012) “The Euro Crisis Through the Lens of Capital Flow Reversals”

Greek banks growth in loans from other banks Source: Meghir, Pissarides, Vayanos, Vettas (201x) Beyond Austerity: Reforming the Greek Economy, MIT Press

Summary Traditional banks have a simple balance sheet: mortgages, business loans and government bonds as assets and demand deposits as liabilities The transformation from illiquid liabilities to liquid assets expose banks to runs. However, policy in the form of deposit insurance or lender of last resort can eliminate the incentive to run Modern banks, however, have a much larger share of traded assets that are constantly marked-to-market and grow very quickly Funding liquidity risk is higher and modern banks amplify asset-price cycles The Cajas expanded rapidly from 2002 despite little growth in deposits. They became modern banks and funded credit to real estate and spurring misallocation between sectors